Hein Hettinga v. Thomas Vilsack , 428 F. App'x 732 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                           FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            APR 21 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    HEIN HETTINGA, DBA Sarah Farms;                  No. 10-15140
    ELLEN HETTINGA, DBA Sarah Farms,
    D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00204-JWS
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM *
    THOMAS J. VILSACK, in his capacity as
    Secretary of the United States Department
    of Agriculture,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 14, 2011 **
    Pasadena, California
    Before: REINHARDT, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
    Hein and Ellen Hettinga (“the Hettingas”) d/b/a Sarah Farms appeal the adverse
    grant of summary judgment in their action challenging the Secretary of the U.S.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
    oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Department of Agriculture’s (“USDA”) interpretation of the 2006 amended Arizona-
    Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order (“Amended Order”) as applied to them and seeking
    refund of $324,211.60 in assessments paid for the month of April 2006. We affirm.
    The USDA’s interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to substantial
    deference and must be given controlling weight “unless an ‘alternative reading is
    compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the agency’s
    intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.’” Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
    Shalala, 
    512 U.S. 504
    , 512 (1994) (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 
    485 U.S. 415
    , 430
    (1988)); see Auer v. Robbins, 
    519 U.S. 452
    , 461 (1997); Miller v. Cal. Speedway
    Corp., 
    536 F.3d 1020
    , 1028 (9th Cir. 2008).
    Here, the agency’s interpretation of the Amended Order is contradicted by
    neither its plain language nor other evidence of regulatory intent. The Hettingas did
    not lose their producer-handler exemption status in April 2006 due to failure to meet
    one of the five “designation requirements” or fulfillment of one of the three
    “cancellation conditions,” and therefore the Amended Order’s new cancellation
    provision, providing for a one-month enforcement grace period, does not, on its face,
    apply. See 7 C.F.R. § 1131.10(a), (c). Rather, USDA claims the Hettingas were
    immediately and automatically disqualified from producer-handler exemption status
    for the month of April 2006 because they exceeded the monthly three-million pound
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    sales cap. See 
    id. § 1131.10
    pmbl. Reading the regulation as a whole, we cannot say
    the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is unreasonable. See Or. Paralyzed
    Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 
    339 F.3d 1126
    , 1131 (9th Cir. 2003).
    AFFIRMED.
    3