Mojdeh Najle-Rahim v. Cir ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 21 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MOJDEH NAJLE-RAHIM, No. 20-72031
Petitioner-Appellant, Tax Ct. No. 15855-15
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from a Decision of the
United States Tax Court
Submitted July 21, 2022**
Before: WALLACE, D.W. NELSON, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Dr. Mojdeh Najle-Rahim, proceeding pro se, appeals from the Tax Court’s
decision upholding the Commissioner’s determination of income tax deficiencies
and application of fraud penalties against Dr. Najle-Rahim and her husband,
Seyed-Jalil Ghadiri-Asli (collectively, “taxpayers”) for 2009, 2010, and 2011. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). We review for clear error. Akland
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 767 F.2d 618, 620-21 (9th Cir. 1985). We affirm.
The Tax Court did not clearly err in sustaining the Commissioner’s
deficiency determination because the determination is supported by substantial
evidence and taxpayers did not provide any contrary evidence. See Bradford v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 796 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1996) (once the
government produces “substantial evidence . . . demonstrating that the taxpayer
received unreported income,” the burden shifts to the taxpayer to show “by a
preponderance of the evidence that the determination is arbitrary or erroneous”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Nor did taxpayers provide any
evidence substantiating their claimed deductions. See Sparkman v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 509 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he burden of clearly
showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer . . . [t]axpayers are
required to keep sufficient records to substantiate deductions.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Tax Court did not clearly err in sustaining the Commissioner’s
application of fraud penalties because the finding of fraud is supported by clear and
convincing evidence. See 26 U.S.C. § 6663(a) (“If any part of any underpayment
of tax . . . is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 75
percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud.”);
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Bradford, 796 F.2d at 307 (“[t]he Commissioner must prove fraud by clear and
convincing evidence . . . but intent can be inferred from strong circumstantial
evidence,” including understatement of income, inadequate records, concealment
of assets, and failure to cooperate with tax authorities (citations omitted)). The Tax
Court properly inferred fraud based on evidence that taxpayers had significantly
understated their income and overstated their expenses, failed to maintain records,
failed to cooperate with the Commissioner’s investigation, and concealed
information from their tax preparer, Clinton Young. The Tax Court did not clearly
err in finding that taxpayers—educated and sophisticated professionals who had
demonstrated their ability to pay careful attention to detail—lacked credibility
when they attempted to shift responsibility to Young, and that Young’s testimony
was credible. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574-75
(1985) (reasoning that a trial court’s credibility determinations are entitled to
deference); Estate of Trompeter v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 279 F.3d 767, 774
(9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument that “well-educated, sophisticated, and
knowledgeable” taxpayers’ blind reliance on their experts was sufficient to avoid a
finding of fraud).
The Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dr. Najle-Rahim’s
post-trial motions to vacate, for reconsideration, and to seek additional discovery
because the Tax Court had already considered and rejected the arguments raised in
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those motions. See Parkinson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 647 F.2d 875, 876
(9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a tax court’s “denial of a motion for reconsideration
will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.”); Russell v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 678 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating standard
of review for denial of a motion to vacate). Moreover, none of the requested
documents would have changed the trial court’s ruling, and the post-trial request
for additional discovery was untimely.
Dr. Najle-Rahim has waived any objection to the admission of an unredacted
copy of her innocent spouse form by failing to object to its admission before the
Tax Court. See Fenton v. Freedman, 748 F.2d 1358, 1360 (9th Cir. 1984).
Dr. Najle-Rahim’s unopposed request to change the caption in this case to
reflect that her husband is not a party to this appeal, filed on August 7, 2020 (Dkt.
No. 4), is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to remove Ghadiri-Asli’s name from
the case caption.
Dr. Najle-Rahim’s request for oral argument and an additional change to the
case caption, filed on October 15, 2020 (Dkt. No. 11), is DENIED.
Dr. Najle-Rahim’s request to supplement the record on appeal, filed on
February 22, 2021 (Dkt. No. 26), is DENIED.
AFFIRMED.
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