Carlos Martinez, Sr. v. Deborah San Juan ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 1 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARLOS MARTINEZ, Sr., No. 21-16081
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:21-cv-00146-DAD-EPG
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DEBORAH SAN JUAN, Board of Parole
Hearings - Commissioner; VIJAI DESAI,
Board of Parole Hearings - Commissioner;
CALIFORNIA BOARD OF PAROLE
HEARINGS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 17, 2022**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Carlos Martinez, Sr., appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
constitutional claims in connection with his parole hearing. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108,
1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Resnick v.
Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).
We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Martinez’s action because Martinez
failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claims. See Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be
construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief); see also Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220, 222
(2011) (in parole context, due process requires only that a prisoner be provided
with an opportunity to be heard and a statement of the reasons why parole was
denied; “a ‘mere error of state law’ is not a denial of due process” (citation
omitted)); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (“[A] prisoner in state
custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his
confinement.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Watison v. Carter,
668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (“After incarceration, only the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden
by the Eighth Amendment.”); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 898 n.4 (9th Cir.
2002) (explaining that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not bar a
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state parole board from considering an inmate’s disability in making an
individualized assessment of the future dangerousness of the inmate); cf. Baumann
v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining that an
inmate’s disappointment caused by additional months of incarceration before
parole is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Martinez’s motion to appoint counsel (Docket Entry No. 5) is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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