Christopher Schneider v. Sutter Amador Hospital , 621 F. App'x 480 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 29 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER D. SCHNEIDER, No. 15-15017
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00804-GEB-AC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SUTTER AMADOR HOSPITAL; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 14, 2015**
Before: SILVERMAN, BERZON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Christopher D. Schneider appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising out of the disclosure of his medical
information and the subsequent suspension of his driver’s license and pilot’s
license. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). Rhoades v.
Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Schneider’s claims against the
Department of Motor Vehicles and the State of California because these defendants
are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (“[I]n the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is
proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
The district court properly dismissed Schneider’s claims against the
remaining defendants because they are not state actors subject to liability under
§ 1983. See Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir.
2011) (“To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of
a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Schneider leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that the district court may dismiss without leave to amend
where amendment would be futile).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Schneider’s motion
to seal the record because Schneider failed to show that there were compelling
reasons to seal the record that were sufficient to outweigh the general policy in
favor of public disclosure. See Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d
1172, 1178-79 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth standard of review and factors
for evaluating a motion to seal).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Schneider’s motion
to stay because Schneider failed to show that he would suffer sufficient hardship or
inequity. See United States v. Peninsula Commc’ns, Inc., 287 F.3d 832, 838 (9th
Cir. 2002) (standard of review); Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th
Cir. 2005) (setting forth factors that a district court must weigh when granting or
denying a stay).
We reject Schneider’s contentions regarding the denial of his motion for a
temporary restraining order because Schneider filed an interlocutory appeal from
the denial, which we construed as a petition for mandamus and denied.
We reject Schneider’s contentions regarding the district court’s alleged delay
in granting his application for ECF filing privileges and its inquiry into his medical
information at the motion to dismiss hearing.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
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in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Schneider’s request for injunctive relief, set forth in his opening brief, is
denied.
Schneider’s motion for judicial notice, filed on June 4, 2015, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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