Jerry Lara v. Dwight Neven ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    OCT 29 2015
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JERRY LARA,                                      No. 13-15476
    Petitioner - Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00505-KJD-PAL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    DWIGHT NEVEN, Warden,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Kent J. Dawson, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted September 15, 2015**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: CALLAHAN, CHRISTEN, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    Jerry Lara was convicted in 1997 for first-degree murder and discharging a
    firearm into a vehicle. He was sentenced to two consecutive 20-year terms and his
    conviction was affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court in 2000. His first state
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    post-conviction petition was finally denied in 2004. He filed a second state post-
    conviction petition in 2008, which was finally denied in 2011. On March 15,
    2012, Lara filed a federal habeas petition in the District Court for the District of
    Nevada. The petition alleged that the jury instruction based on Kazalyn v. State,
    
    825 P.2d 578
     (Nev. 1992), relieved the state of the burden of proving that the
    killing was deliberate, as well as premeditated. He further alleged that the
    instruction had been disapproved in Byford v. State, 
    994 P.2d 700
     (Nev. 2000), and
    Polk v. Sandoval, 
    503 F.3d 903
     (9th Cir. 2007), overruled in part by Babb v.
    Lozowsky, 
    719 F.3d 1019
    , 1028-30 (9th Cir. 2013). The district court dismissed
    the petition as both untimely and procedurally barred. We agree that the district
    court properly dismissed the petition as untimely.
    Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d)(1), the one-year statute of limitations
    applicable to Lara’s habeas petition begins to run from the latest of: (a) the date on
    which the judgment becomes final, (b) the date a state-created impediment to filing
    is removed, (c) the date the Supreme Court newly recognizes a constitutional right
    that is made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, or (d) the date on
    which the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the
    exercise of due diligence.
    2
    Lara argues that he is entitled to delayed accrual of the limitations period
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d)(1)(B), (C), or (D). We disagree. Even if Lara’s
    lack of law library access while in lockdown constituted a state-created
    impediment, from November 2006 until February 2008 Lara had law library access
    two times per week, three hours at a time. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Polk,
    
    503 F.3d 903
    , does not support Lara’s argument for a delayed onset of the
    limitations period because it was not a new rule of constitutional law issued by the
    Supreme Court. As to the factual predicate of his claim, Lara knew of the jury
    instruction at the time of his trial, and Byford was decided while his direct state
    appeal was still pending.
    Lara’s argument that he is entitled to statutory tolling during the pendency of
    his second habeas petition is equally unavailing. Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d)(2),
    statutory tolling of the one-year limitations period is only available if the state
    habeas petition was “properly filed.” Because the Nevada Supreme Court
    determined that Lara’s second state habeas petition was untimely, the petition did
    not satisfy this threshold requirement. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 
    544 U.S. 408
    ,
    417 (2005).
    Equitable tolling is available upon a showing that the petitioner diligently
    pursued his rights but “some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”
    3
    Holland v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 631
    , 649 (2010) (quoting Pace, 
    544 U.S. at 418
    ). We
    have indicated that equitable tolling is only available where a petitioner shows an
    extraordinary circumstance beyond his control that made it almost impossible to
    file a timely petition. See Bills v. Clark, 
    628 F.3d 1092
    , 1097 (9th Cir. 2010).
    Here, accepting Lara’s allegations as true, neither his limited access to the law
    library in prison, nor his lack of advice or assistance from counsel, nor their
    combination so interfered with his ability to file a timely federal petition as to
    allow for equitable tolling.
    The District Court’s dismissal of Lara’s habeas petition as untimely is
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-15476

Judges: Callahan, Christen, Friedland

Filed Date: 10/29/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024