United States v. Elwyn Has the Eagle, Jr. , 423 F. App'x 726 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 22 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-30028
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:09-cr-00019-SEH-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ELWYN FLOYD HAS THE EAGLE, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 10, 2011
Seattle, Washington
Before: GRABER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and BENITEZ,** District
Judge.
Defendant Elwyn Floyd Has The Eagle, Jr., timely appeals his convictions
for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, two counts of felony murder, and
burglary. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
Reviewing the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion,
United States v. Redlightning, 624 F.3d 1090, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010), we hold that
the district court acted within the discretion vested in it by Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 when the court reasonably concluded that Defendant’s expert, a
social worker without any medical training, could not testify reliably about
Defendant’s medications or the effects of those medications on Defendant. See
United States v. Chang, 207 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
admissibility of expert testimony is "‘a subject peculiarly within the sound
discretion of the trial judge, who alone must decide the qualifications of the expert
on a given subject and the extent to which his opinions may be required’" (quoting
Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1968))). And, because the
expert could testify reliably about some things but not others, the district court
reasonably concluded that it could not give Defendant blanket permission to ask
the expert whatever Defendant wanted to ask. We see no error in the district
court’s handling of Defendant’s expert evidence.
We assume, without deciding, that the district court erred when it prohibited
Defendant’s expert from testifying about statements that Defendant had made to
the expert regarding the reported effects of Defendant’s medications. Even under
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that assumption, the error was harmless because the statements had little, if any,
probative value. United States v. Seschillie, 310 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002).
Reviewing de novo, United States v. Pineda-Doval, 614 F.3d 1019, 1032
(9th Cir. 2010), we reject Defendant’s assertion that the district court deprived
Defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense. As none of the excluded
evidence would have added substantially to the jury’s knowledge, we find no
constitutional violation. United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 588 (9th
Cir. 1992).
Reviewing de novo, United States v. Rocha, 598 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir.
2010), we hold that the district court correctly denied Defendant’s motion under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 regarding the felony murder charges.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable
juror could conclude that Defendant intended to take the victims’ car at the time he
entered their house. See United States v. Alarcon-Simi, 300 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th
Cir. 2002) ("In ruling on a Rule 29 motion, the relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The jury had enough
evidence to convict Defendant on the two felony murder charges.
AFFIRMED.
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