United States v. Helaman Hansen ( 2022 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                          No. 17-10548
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                           2:16-cr-00024-
    MCE-1
    HELAMAN HANSEN,
    Defendant-Appellant.                       ORDER
    Filed July 25, 2022
    Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Ronald M. Gould,
    Circuit Judges, and Jane A. Restani, * Judge.
    Order;
    Concurrence by Judge Gould;
    Dissent by Judge Bumatay;
    Dissent by Judge Collins
    *
    The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court
    of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    2                  UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    SUMMARY **
    Criminal Law
    The panel denied on behalf of the court a petition for
    rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel’s opinion,
    which vacated convictions on two counts of encouraging or
    inducing an alien to reside in the United States for private
    financial gain in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(iv),
    held that subsection (iv) is overbroad and unconstitutional
    because its narrow legitimate sweep pales in comparison to
    the amount of First Amendment protected expression it
    encompasses.
    Judge Gould concurred in the order denying rehearing en
    banc. He wrote that Judge Bumatay’s dissent seeks to
    rewrite subsection (iv) by conducting a so-called textual
    analysis that fails to analyze the text of subsection (iv) itself;
    analyzes additional words not in that section, such as
    “aiding,” “abetting,” and “solicitation,” to support the
    conclusion it advocates; misreads the opinion, the record,
    § 1324 itself, and precedent; conjures up parades of horribles
    belied by its own citations; introduces arguments the
    Government’s Petition for Rehearing did not make; and asks
    this court improperly to disregard Supreme Court precedent
    regarding the applicability of the facial overbreadth doctrine.
    Noting that Judge Collins’s dissent does not criticize the
    Supreme Court’s existing doctrine of facial overbreadth but
    urges that the panel misapplied that doctrine, Judge Gould
    wrote that the application of a rule of law that is agreed upon
    does not normally warrant en banc or other further review;
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                     3
    and that in view of the defendant’s fifteen remaining counts
    of conviction and the fact that few convictions for deplorable
    conduct rely only on subsection (iv), there is not
    “exceptional importance” to further review the two counts of
    conviction that were reversed under the facial overbreadth
    doctrine.
    Judge Bumatay—joined by Judges Callahan, Ikuta,
    R. Nelson, Lee, VanDyke, Bennett (in all except Part III-A),
    and Bress (in Parts I, II, and III-B)—dissented from the
    denial of rehearing en banc. He wrote that the panel
    (1) misread the statute by blindly relying on lay-dictionary
    definitions to reach an overly broad interpretation of the law
    instead of following the established principle of looking to
    the settled meaning of the statutory terms to understand that
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is an ordinary solicitation and aiding-
    and-abetting statute and poses no free-speech concerns;
    (2) improperly invoked the surplusage canon to disregard
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as a solicitation and aiding-and-abetting
    statute; (3) failed to respect the constitutional avoidance
    canon; and (4) shouldn’t have pulled the trigger on
    overbreadth invalidation—a remedy of last resort—even if
    the provision could conceivably reach some protected
    speech.
    Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge
    Collins concluded that (1) under the canon of constitutional
    avoidance, the court can and should interpret the statute as
    being limited to soliciting and facilitating the unlawful entry
    of, or the unlawful taking up of residence by, specific aliens;
    and (2) so construed, the statute is not facially
    unconstitutional. He wrote that facial invalidation is
    particularly inappropriate here, given that the defendant was
    convicted of an aggravated version of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(vi)
    offense, one that required the Government to prove the
    4               UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    additional fact that Hansen acted “for the purpose of
    commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(B)(i).
    COUNSEL
    Carolyn M. Wiggin (argued), Assistant Federal Defender;
    Heather E. Williams, Federal Defender; Office of the
    Federal Defender, Sacramento, California; for Defendant-
    Appellant.
    Katherine T. Lydon (argued), Assistant United States
    Attorney; Camil A. Skipper, Appellate Chief; Phillip A.
    Talbert, Acting United States Attorney; United States
    Attorney’s Office, Sacramento, California; John M.
    Pellettieri Jr. (argued), Appellate Section, Criminal
    Division; Lisa H. Miller, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney
    General; Kenneth A. Polite Jr., Assistant Attorney General;
    United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for
    Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Vera Eidelman (argued), American Civil Liberties Union
    Foundation, New York, New York; Cecillia D. Wang,
    American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, San Francisco,
    California; Shilpi Agarwal, American Civil Liberties Union
    Foundation of Northern California Inc., San Francisco,
    California; for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union
    and American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California.
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN               5
    ORDER
    Judges McKeown and Gould have voted to deny
    Appellee’s petition for rehearing en banc. Judge Restani
    recommends denying the petition for rehearing en banc.
    The full court has been advised of the petition for
    rehearing en banc. An active judge requested a vote on
    whether to rehear the matter en banc. The matter failed to
    receive a majority of votes of the non-recused active judges
    in favor of en banc consideration. See Fed. R. App. P. 35.
    The petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.
    GOULD, Circuit Judge, concurring in the order denying the
    petition for rehearing en banc:
    I concur in the order denying rehearing en banc. 1
    Judge Bumatay’s dissent (the “Judge Bumatay dissent”)
    from the denial of rehearing en banc is wrong on the law and
    incorrect in method. As for Judge Collins’s dissent (the
    “Judge Collins dissent”), it does not appear to challenge the
    facial overbreadth doctrine generally; rather, it appears to
    disagree with the Hansen opinion’s application of this
    Supreme Court precedent. I address the lengthy Judge
    Bumatay dissent in depth and the Judge Collins dissent in
    footnote 2 infra.
    In arguing for en banc rehearing, the Judge Bumatay
    dissent seeks to rewrite subsection (iv) by conducting a so-
    1
    I do not seek joins in this concurrence.
    6               UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    called textual analysis that fails to analyze the text of
    subsection (iv) itself. Rather, the Judge Bumatay dissent
    analyzes additional words not in that section, such as
    “aiding,” “abetting,” and “solicitation,” to support the
    conclusion it advocates. In the course of its argument
    essentially rewriting subsection (iv), the Judge Bumatay
    dissent misreads the opinion, the record, § 1324 itself, and
    precedent; conjures up parades of horribles belied by its own
    citations; and introduces arguments the Government’s
    Petition for Rehearing did not make. The Judge Bumatay
    dissent ends by asking us improperly to disregard Supreme
    Court precedent regarding the applicability of the facial
    overbreadth doctrine.
    I. Correcting the Record
    As an initial matter, I comment on several issues upon
    which the Judge Bumatay dissent is confused or mistaken.
    A. The Judge Bumatay dissent mischaracterizes the
    holding of Sineneng-Smith, 
    140 S. Ct. 1575
     (2020)
    The Judge Bumatay dissent begins by invoking the
    Supreme Court’s unanimous decision vacating and
    remanding a separate Ninth Circuit panel’s decision
    regarding the constitutionality of subsection (iv). The Judge
    Bumatay dissent contends that the Supreme Court in its prior
    decision was only “mostly concerned” with the prior panel’s
    violation of the party-presentation principle, but also
    expressed views about the merits of subsection (iv). A fair
    reading of Sineneng-Smith shows that the Judge Bumatay
    dissent’s position is incorrect. The Supreme Court’s only
    holding in Sineneng-Smith was that the panel violated the
    party-presentation principle. See United States v. Sineneng-
    Smith, 
    140 S. Ct. 1575
    , 1578 (2020) (“[W]e now hold that
    the appeals panel departed so drastically from the principle
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                     7
    of party presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
    We therefore vacate the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and
    remand”). The Supreme Court made no holding concerning
    the merits of the facial overbreadth challenge to subsection
    (iv).
    The Court in Sineneng-Smith was unanimously
    concerned with the party presentation-principle, the fact that
    the parties in that case had not even briefed facial
    overbreadth, and the fact that the Ninth Circuit had requested
    amicus briefing on the issue of overbreadth. Even the
    Government’s Petition for Rehearing recognizes that the
    Supreme Court in Sineneng-Smith did not make a decision
    on the merits. See Pet. for Reh’g at 1 (“[T]he Supreme Court
    ultimately reversed on alternative grounds in [Sineneng-
    Smith], without resolving the merits of the overbreadth
    issue”).
    The Judge Bumatay dissent recognizes the weakness of
    how it frames the issue at the outset with reference to
    Sineneng-Smith, because it soon thereafter excludes the
    opinion’s alleged failure to adhere to Sineneng-Smith from
    the Judge Bumatay dissent’s purported list of errors
    committed in the opinion. If the Hansen opinion had
    violated clear Supreme Court precedent in Sineneng-Smith,
    that violation would be a central thrust of the Judge Bumatay
    dissent; but, the Judge Bumatay dissent’s later silence is a
    recognition that the opinion violated no such precedent. I
    note that two separate and unanimous panels of this Circuit
    have held that subsection (iv) is facially overbroad. See
    United States v. Hansen, 
    25 F.4th 1103
    , 1111 (9th Cir.
    2022); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 
    910 F.3d 461
    , 485
    (9th Cir. 2018), vacated and remanded, 
    140 S. Ct. 1575
    (2020).
    8               UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    B. The Judge Bumatay dissent misstates Hansen’s
    conviction under subsection (iv)
    The Judge Bumatay dissent emphasizes the deplorable
    conduct that Hansen committed. I agree that the conduct
    was deplorable and egregiously fraudulent. But although
    Hansen’s conduct was deplorable, such a determination does
    not bear on the opinion’s analysis of a facial overbreadth
    challenge. The facial overbreadth doctrine is not concerned
    with the defendant’s conduct, but rather with the amount of
    legitimate speech that would be chilled or deterred by the
    provision that the opinion held unconstitutional, in relation
    to the amount of speech that can constitutionally be
    prohibited.
    Further, the Judge Bumatay dissent is incorrect
    regarding the facts of Hansen’s convictions and sentencing.
    Contrary to the Judge Bumatay dissent, Hansen was not
    convicted under subsection (iv) for defrauding
    approximately 500 aliens. The counts of conviction and
    sentencing under subsection (iv) related to Hansen
    encouraging and inducing only two specific aliens to
    overstay their visas. See Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1105–06.
    Hansen was also convicted of twelve counts of mail fraud
    and three counts of wire fraud for defrauding the
    approximately 500 aliens. Id. at 1105. The panel affirmed
    these convictions in a simultaneously-filed memorandum
    disposition (which memorandum disposition the Judge
    Bumatay dissent ignores). See id. at 1105 n.1; United States
    v. Hansen, No. 17-10548, 
    2022 WL 424827
    , at *1 (9th Cir.
    Feb. 10, 2022). Hansen was sentenced to 240 months for
    each of the fifteen fraud violations and 120 months for both
    of the two subsection (iv) violations, all to be served
    concurrently. Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1106. The opinion’s
    reversal of the two subsection (iv) convictions did not negate
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                              9
    all of Hansen’s other convictions for which he was punished
    and sentenced.
    C. The Judge Bumatay dissent misinterprets the mens
    rea requirement at issue
    The Judge Bumatay dissent is correct that Hansen’s
    subsection (iv) conviction and sentence also “requires proof
    that the defendant acted to obtain ‘commercial advantage or
    private financial gain’” under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(B)(i).
    However, the Judge Bumatay dissent is incorrect to the
    extent it suggests that “[a]ny statements prosecuted under
    this law must be designed to make money off the targeted
    aliens—fitting solicitation and facilitation.” As the very next
    subsection of the statute, ignored by the Judge Bumatay
    dissent, makes clear, an individual can be convicted under
    subsection (iv) regardless of whether he acted to obtain
    commercial advantage or private financial gain. See
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(B)(ii). Hansen did not challenge the
    constitutionality of § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). See Resp. to Pet. for
    Reh’g at 7 n.1. In short, acting for commercial advantage or
    financial gain is not an element of the criminal offense
    defined in subsection (iv). Any person can be convicted of
    that offense without seeking financial gain. 2
    2
    The Judge Collins dissent, unlike the Judge Bumatay dissent,
    makes no assault on the Supreme Court’s existing doctrine of facial
    overbreadth. Instead, the Judge Collins dissent urges that we have
    misapplied that doctrine because in the Judge Collins dissent’s view
    there is little doubt that the legitimate sweep of subsection (iv) “greatly
    exceeds any possible overbreadth.” The Judge Collins dissent does not
    criticize the Supreme Court’s doctrinal statements on facial overbreadth
    and the First Amendment values that doctrine serves. The application of
    a rule of law that is agreed upon does not normally warrant en banc or
    other further review. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a); see also S. Ct. R. 10 (“A
    10                  UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    D. The Judge Bumatay dissent manufactures an
    imaginary circuit split
    The Judge Bumatay dissent errs when it contends that the
    opinion “lead[s] a circuit split” and cites United States v.
    Tracy, 456 F. App’x 267, 272 (4th Cir. 2011)
    (unpublished). 3 Tracy is an unpublished case. As in the
    Ninth Circuit, in the Fourth Circuit “[u]npublished opinions
    are not binding precedent.” See Tracy, 456 F. App’x at 268.
    The Hansen opinion cannot have created a split with the
    Fourth Circuit relating to Tracy because Tracy was not a
    precedential opinion of that circuit. Simply put, there is no
    circuit split. Cf. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Ellis, 
    202 F.3d 1246
    ,
    1249 (9th Cir. 2000). Only two other Courts of Appeals
    panels have analyzed a facial overbreadth challenge to
    subsection (iv) in precedential opinions. In a briefly
    precedential opinion (before the opinion was vacated due to
    the party-presentation principle), a prior panel of this court
    held that subsection (iv) was facially overbroad. See
    Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485. Most recently, the Tenth
    Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Hansen opinion,
    holding that subsection (iv) is facially overbroad. See United
    petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
    consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly
    stated rule of law.”). Nor, in view of Hansen’s fifteen remaining counts
    of conviction, and the fact that few convictions for deplorable conduct
    rely only on subsection (iv), see infra Part IV, is there “exceptional
    importance” to further review the two counts of conviction that were
    reversed under the facial overbreadth doctrine. Id.
    3
    The Government did not even cite Tracy in its Petition for
    Rehearing.
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                            11
    States v. Hernandez-Calvillo, No. 19-3210, __ F.4th __,
    
    2022 WL 2709736
     (10th Cir. July 13, 2022). 4
    II. Aiding, Abetting, and Solicitation
    The main argument advanced by the Judge Bumatay
    dissent is that “encourages or induces” should instead be
    read to mean “aids, abets, or solicits.” The Judge Bumatay
    dissent, while saying that it argues for a textual
    interpretation, rewrites subsection (iv)’s plain language,
    changing “encourages or induces” to “aids, abets, or
    solicits.” This is unsound because immediately below
    subsection (iv), Congress expressly criminalized conduct
    that “aids or abets,” showing beyond doubt that Congress
    knew how to include “aids or abets” when that is what it
    meant. See § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(ii). As explained in the
    Hansen opinion, “when Congress includes particular
    language in one section of a statute but omits it in another—
    let alone in the very next provision—this Court presume[s]
    that Congress intended a difference in meaning.” 25 F.4th
    at 1108 (quoting Loughrin v. United States, 
    573 U.S. 351
    ,
    358 (2014)).
    The Judge Bumatay dissent disregards the express
    language of subsection (iv) and the Hansen opinion’s
    rationale. The Judge Bumatay dissent stresses authorities
    that define words not in subsection (iv)—such as “aiding,”
    “abetting,” and “solicitation”—instead of authorities that
    define the words actually used in subsection (iv)—
    4
    Not only is Judge Bumatay’s dissent incorrect in stating that we
    lead a circuit split, as explained above, but also if we were to rehear the
    case and adopt the legal analysis of Judge Bumatay, that mistaken
    analysis would create a circuit split between Judge Bumatay’s mistaken
    reasoning and the Tenth Circuit decision Hernandez-Calvillo which
    adopted reasoning parallel to that of Hansen in its current form.
    12                  UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    “encourages or induces.” 5 Judge Bumatay’s analysis is not
    persuasive: Defining “aiding, abetting, and solicitation” to
    sometimes include “encouraging or inducing” sheds no light
    on whether the words “encourages or induces” in subsection
    (iv) cover a substantial amount of protected conduct. To
    determine properly whether “encourages or induces” cover
    a substantial amount of protected conduct, one should take
    the common-sense approach used in the opinion to define
    “encourages or induces” itself. The Judge Bumatay dissent
    does not identify a single statute that uses only the words
    “encourages or induces” to mean “aids, abets, and solicits.”
    It is not surprising that some definitions of aiding,
    abetting, and solicitation cited by the Judge Bumatay dissent
    contain the words “encourage” or “induce,” just as they
    contain other words that, if substituted for “encourages or
    induces” in subsection (iv), might also be facially overbroad
    (such as “requests,” “hires,” or “otherwise procured”).
    Further, the Judge Bumatay dissent’s frequent references to
    statutes and authorities referencing “aiding,” “abetting,” and
    “solicitation” reinforce the point that when Congress intends
    to prohibit aiding, abetting, or soliciting, it includes those
    specific words in the statute.
    The Judge Bumatay dissent erroneously claims that the
    opinion “blindly rel[ied] on lay-dictionary definitions to
    reach its overbroad interpretation of the law.” The Judge
    Bumatay dissent is off-base for two reasons. First, to
    determine the meaning of “encourages” and “induces” in
    5
    The Judge Bumatay dissent several times cites to United States v.
    Lopez, 
    484 F.3d 1186
     (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), as part of this argument.
    Lopez too defines aiding and abetting, not encouraging or inducing.
    Further, the Government does not cite to Lopez in its briefing or Petition
    for Rehearing.
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                     13
    subsection (iv), the opinion relied on precedential cases
    which, in turn, used dictionary definitions to help determine
    the meaning of “encourages” or “induces” in the same or
    similar provisions. See Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1108 (citing to
    United States v. Thum, 
    749 F.3d 1143
    , 1147 (9th Cir. 2014),
    which defined “encourages” in subsection (iv), and United
    States v. Rashkovski, 
    301 F.3d 1133
    , 1136 (9th Cir. 2002),
    which defined “induce” in 
    18 U.S.C. § 2422
    (a)). As
    discussed above, the Judge Bumatay dissent’s proposed
    alternative methodology is flawed. Second, the Supreme
    Court has often looked to dictionary definitions and the plain
    meaning of the text in a statute. See, e.g., HollyFrontier
    Cheyenne Ref., LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 
    141 S. Ct. 2172
    , 2176–78 (2021) (“Where Congress does not furnish a
    definition of its own, we generally seek to afford a statutory
    term its ordinary or natural meaning.” (internal quotation
    marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has also often
    analyzed dictionary definitions.         See, e.g., Encino
    Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 
    138 S. Ct. 1134
    , 1140–41
    (2018).
    In its haste to equate subsection (iv) with an aiding and
    abetting statute, the Judge Bumatay dissent also overlooks
    several elements of aiding and abetting that are missing from
    any conceivably reasonable reading of subsection (iv). As
    explained in the opinion, subsection (iv) would make a poor
    aiding and abetting statute because “aiding and abetting
    requires someone to have committed an underlying criminal
    offense and for the accused to have assisted or participated
    in the commission of that offense.” Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1109
    (citing Thum, 749 F.3d at 1148–49). The language of
    subsection (iv) cannot be squared with these requirements.
    I agree with the Judge Bumatay dissent that writing a
    statute is “best left to elected officials,” not judges who seek
    14                UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    to rewrite the plain language of a statute. The legislature’s
    writing of the statute is superior to that of a judge who may
    attempt to rewrite the statute sub silentio. It is for this reason
    that the opinion did not attempt, as the Judge Bumatay
    dissent does, to “rewrite [subsection (iv)] to conform it to
    constitutional requirements for doing so would constitute a
    serious invasion of the legislative domain and sharply
    diminish Congress’s incentive to draft a narrowly tailored
    law in the first place.” Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1110–11 (quoting
    United States v. Stevens, 
    559 U.S. 460
    , 481 (2010)). The
    opinion correctly does not try to salvage the flawed language
    of subsection (iv); Congress, not the judicial branch, has the
    duty to write statutes.
    The Judge Bumatay dissent’s lengthy exegesis on early
    English and colonial law about solicitation and aiding and
    abetting is interesting but largely irrelevant. Doubtless any
    of us can benefit in an appropriate case from pondering early
    nineteenth-century cases and the words and thoughts of
    William Blackstone, Sir Edward Coke, Lord Matthew Hale,
    and other treatise authors and legal scholars. But their
    general comments give little practical guidance here when
    we deal with the plain meaning of a simply phrased statute.
    The words “encourages or induces” are better assessed on
    their own with the traditional standards for statutory
    interpretation used in the Hansen opinion.
    The Judge Bumatay dissent’s belabored reasoning does,
    however, highlight two additional points that undermine the
    Judge Bumatay dissent’s persuasive power. First, the Judge
    Bumatay dissent’s approach is in direct conflict with the
    principle of Occam’s razor, that the simpler approach is
    usually better. The Hansen opinion defines the words that
    are actually in subsection (iv). By contrast, the Judge
    Bumatay dissent advocates for discarding the words in
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                    15
    subsection (iv) and replacing them with words whose
    meaning it tries to derive from a scattering of definitions
    hundreds of years old. This overcomplicates the inquiry, as
    Judge Bumatay’s dissent advocates rewriting subsection
    (iv). Second, the Judge Bumatay dissent’s historical
    discourse is particularly inapt in the facial overbreadth
    context. “Facial overbreadth challenges are permitted
    because an overly broad statute may chill the speech of
    individuals, including those not before the court.” Hansen,
    25 F.4th at 1106 (citing Massachusetts v. Oakes, 
    491 U.S. 576
    , 581 (1989)). The examples of protected speech covered
    by subsection (iv) cited in the opinion, see id. at 1110, occur
    between countless individuals lacking the legal acumen or
    time to sift through dozens of sources hundreds of years old
    interpreting statutes with different language than subsection
    (iv). These individuals’ speech will be chilled regardless of
    how a federal appellate judge might personally prefer to
    parse the words.
    III. Surplusage
    The Judge Bumatay dissent makes much of one sentence
    in the opinion which references the canon against
    surplusage. Contrary to the Judge Bumatay dissent’s
    contention, that sentence merely highlighted that Congress
    clearly knew how to write “aids and abets”—as it did
    immediately below subsection (iv)—and instead chose to
    say “encourages or induces” in subsection (iv).
    IV. Parades of Horribles
    The Judge Bumatay dissent conjures up two fanciful
    parades of horribles that undermine its argument. First, the
    Judge Bumatay dissent opines that the opinion “may lead to
    the invalidation of other federal and state laws that use
    similar ‘encourage’ or ‘induce’ language.” To support this
    16               UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    contention, the Judge Bumatay dissent cites a variety of
    federal and state laws. But, in fact, many of the cited statutes
    explicitly criminalize aiding, abetting, or soliciting. This
    leads to the conclusion that Congress and state legislative
    bodies know how to criminalize aiding, abetting, and
    solicitation—by actually criminalizing “aiding, abetting, and
    soliciting.”
    Second, the Judge Bumatay dissent suggests that the
    opinion will prevent the Government from prosecuting
    deplorable conduct that was previously criminalized under
    subsection (iv). As an initial matter, the opinion only
    invalidated subsection (iv) and the two convictions under it,
    while leaving intact the rest of the substantial criminal
    provisions in § 1324. In support of its contention, the Judge
    Bumatay dissent cites seven cases. These cases show just
    how hypothetical the Judge Bumatay dissent’s alleged harm
    is: In all seven cases (as in Hansen), the defendants could
    also be convicted under other criminal statutes. See United
    States v. Yoshida, 
    303 F.3d 1145
    , 1149 (9th Cir. 2002)
    (defendant      also    convicted      under     
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(2)(B)(ii)); United States v. Lozada, 742 F. App’x
    451, 452 (11th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (also affirming
    defendant’s conviction for defrauding the United States
    under 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    ); United States v. Pena, 418 F. App’x
    335, 337 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (defendants also
    convicted of money laundering under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (a)(1)(B)(i)); Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 
    602 F.3d 1276
    ,
    1299−1300 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting the sufficiency of
    allegations to state a violation under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii));
    United States v. Lopez, 
    590 F.3d 1238
    , 1243 (11th Cir. 2009)
    (also affirming conviction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1327
    ); Tracy,
    456 F. App’x at 268 (also affirming conviction under
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1542
    ); United States v. One 1989 Mercedes
    Benz, 
    971 F. Supp. 124
    , 129 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                    17
    defendant’s motion for summary judgment and granting
    government’s motion for summary judgment also under
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1325
    (a)); see also Hernandez-Calvillo, __ F.4th
    __, 
    2022 WL 2709736
     at *8–9 (noting the Government’s
    failure to identify any case in which subsection (iv) is the
    only available statutory provision to punish deplorable
    conduct). The Judge Bumatay dissent therefore makes clear
    that there are very few cases in which a defendant
    committing deplorable conduct can only be convicted under
    subsection (iv).
    V. Constitutional Avoidance
    The Judge Bumatay dissent argues that it was “baffling
    that [the opinion] decided to give the canon [of constitutional
    avoidance] short shrift here.” The Judge Bumatay dissent
    then contends that the opinion’s “only response [to the canon
    of constitutional avoidance argument] is that ‘the plain
    meaning of subsection (iv) does not permit the application
    of the constitutional avoidance canon.’” This misreads the
    opinion. The opinion conducted a thorough analysis of what
    “encourages or induces” meant within the context of § 1324,
    subsection (iv)’s plainly legitimate sweep, and the amount
    of protected speech in relation to subsection (iv)’s plainly
    legitimate sweep. See Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1107–10. Other
    than disagreeing with that analysis and calling it “baffling,”
    the Judge Bumatay dissent does not identify how the opinion
    gave the constitutional avoidance argument “short shrift.”
    Instead, the opinion noted “that courts ‘construe[ ] [statutes]
    to avoid serious constitutional doubts,’ [and the canon of
    constitutional avoidance] only applies when a statute ‘is
    readily susceptible to such a construction.’” Hansen,
    25 F.4th at 1110 (quoting Stevens, 
    559 U.S. at 481
    ). Here,
    there was no reasonable and plausible interpretation of
    18                  UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    subsection (iv) that would avoid the facial overbreadth
    problem on which the opinion ruled.
    VI. The Facial Overbreadth Doctrine
    Perhaps most offensive to Supreme Court case law, the
    Judge Bumatay dissent takes issue with the facial
    overbreadth doctrine, repeatedly referring to the facial
    overbreadth doctrine as a “nuclear option.” But the Supreme
    Court’s law on facial overbreadth was not pulled like a rabbit
    out of a hat. The Hansen opinion relied on the Supreme
    Court’s own precedent. See, e.g., Stevens, 
    559 U.S. at
    472–
    73; United States v. Williams, 
    553 U.S. 285
    , 292–93 (2008);
    Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 
    535 U.S. 234
    , 244 (2002);
    Oakes, 
    491 U.S. at 581
    ; City of Houston v. Hill, 
    482 U.S. 451
    , 458–59 (1987); Members of City Council of City of Los
    Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
    466 U.S. 789
    , 800–01
    (1984). The Supreme Court, moreover, has very recently
    continued to rely on the facial overbreadth doctrine that the
    Judge Bumatay dissent so disfavors. See Americans for
    Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 
    141 S. Ct. 2373
    , 2387 (2021).
    In addition, not only the Ninth Circuit, but other federal
    circuits as well, have recognized and respected the Supreme
    Court’s doctrine on facial overbreadth. 6 As the opinion in
    Hansen correctly recognized and explained, facial
    6
    See, e.g., Lerman v. Bd. of Elections in City of New York, 
    232 F.3d 135
    , 153 (2d Cir. 2000); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 
    240 F.3d 200
    , 214–18 (3d Cir. 2001); Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 
    844 F.3d 400
    , 409 (4th Cir. 2016); Speet v. Schuette, 
    726 F.3d 867
    , 879–80 (6th
    Cir. 2013); Bell v. Keating, 
    697 F.3d 445
    , 455–61 (7th Cir. 2012); Snider
    v. City of Cape Girardeau, 
    752 F.3d 1149
    , 1157–59 (8th Cir. 2014);
    United States v. Rundo, 
    990 F.3d 709
    , 717–19 (9th Cir. 2021), cert.
    denied, 
    142 S. Ct. 865
     (2022); FF Cosms. FL, Inc. v. City of Miami
    Beach, 
    866 F.3d 1290
    , 1301–04 (11th Cir. 2017).
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                     19
    overbreadth is “strong medicine.” See 25 F.4th at 1111
    (citing United States v. Williams, 
    553 U.S. 285
    , 293 (2008)).
    On occasion, strong medicine is just what is needed. It is not
    a “nuclear option” causing unspeakable damage without any
    constraint. It is a Supreme Court doctrine that has its place
    in protecting First Amendment freedoms.
    The Judge Bumatay dissent relies primarily on a
    concurrence by Justice Thomas that no other justice joined.
    The Judge Bumatay dissent argues that the facial
    overbreadth doctrine is “suspect” and on a “shaky
    foundation.” To state the obvious, a concurrence by a single
    justice does not make precedent for the Supreme Court or for
    inferior courts like the Ninth Circuit. Instead, the Hansen
    opinion properly looked to recent cases in which the
    Supreme Court applied the facial overbreadth doctrine. See
    Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1106–10 (citing Stevens, 
    559 U.S. 460
    ;
    Williams, 
    553 U.S. 285
    ; Free Speech Coal., 
    535 U.S. 234
    ;
    Oakes, 
    491 U.S. 576
    ; Hill, 
    482 U.S. 451
    ; Taxpayers for
    Vincent, 
    466 U.S. 789
    ).
    Of course, the Supreme Court is free to change its
    precedent, and if it establishes a new rule, it will be followed
    by the Ninth Circuit. But, unless and until the Supreme
    Court changes its law (and no change has as yet even been
    foreshadowed by a precedential Supreme Court decision),
    this court is bound to follow the Supreme Court’s current
    precedent, regardless of any Ninth Circuit judge’s personal
    view about the correctness of the facial overbreadth doctrine.
    Ninth Circuit judges are not empowered to anticipatorily
    overrule a Supreme Court doctrine. See Agostini v. Felton,
    
    521 U.S. 203
    , 237 (1997) (“We reaffirm that ‘[i]f a precedent
    of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to
    rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the
    Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly
    20              UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling
    its own decisions.’” (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.
    Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 
    490 U.S. 477
    , 484 (1989))). Judges
    on this court cannot discard the Supreme Court’s doctrine on
    facial overbreadth merely because they disfavor its
    application in any particular case.
    BUMATAY, Circuit Judge, joined by CALLAHAN,
    IKUTA, R. NELSON, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit
    Judges; BENNETT, Circuit Judge, in all except Part III-A,
    and BRESS, Circuit Judge, in Parts I, II, and III-B,
    dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:
    Today, our court invalidates a 70-year-old alien-
    smuggling law—
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(iv)—which
    prohibits “encourag[ing]” or “induc[ing]” aliens to illegally
    enter the country. See United States v. Hansen, 
    25 F.4th 1103
     (9th Cir. 2022). We do so under the banner of First
    Amendment protection. Freedom of speech is a core
    principle    in     our    constitutional    republic,    but
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is no threat to that guarantee. Based on
    text, history, and structure, the provision prohibits only
    criminal solicitation and aiding and abetting. But instead of
    following the statute’s clear meaning, we contort its scope
    and then imagine ways the misconstrued law might cover
    protected speech. We then wipe away the whole provision
    under the overbreadth doctrine—the nuclear option of First
    Amendment jurisprudence.
    If this sounds familiar, it is. Our court took a similar
    approach a few years ago in United States v. Sineneng-Smith,
    
    910 F.3d 461
     (9th Cir. 2018). In that case, no party asked
    our court to review the alien-smuggling law on overbreadth
    grounds. But we took it upon ourselves to pick lawyers to
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                  21
    argue that position—and just like that, we held the statute
    unconstitutional.
    The Supreme Court quickly rebuked our handiwork and
    unanimously vacated our decision. See United States v.
    Sineneng-Smith, 
    140 S. Ct. 1575
    , 1582 (2020). True, the
    Court was mostly concerned with our egregious violation of
    the party-presentation principle in that case. But Justice
    Ginsburg, writing for the full Court, made clear that the
    Justices were also unhappy with our substantive holding:
    [T]he [Ninth Circuit] panel projected that
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) might cover a wide
    swath of protected speech, including political
    advocacy, legal advice, even a grandmother’s
    plea to her alien grandchild to remain in the
    United States. Nevermind that Sineneng-
    Smith’s counsel had presented a contrary
    theory of the case in the District Court, and
    that this Court has repeatedly warned that
    invalidation    for    [First   Amendment]
    overbreadth is strong medicine that is not to
    be casually employed.
    Id. at 1581 (simplified) (emphasis added).
    Rather than take the hint, we again strike down the same
    statutory provision. Nevermind that the law is perfectly
    consistent with the First Amendment under proper principles
    of statutory interpretation. Nevermind that the canon of
    constitutional avoidance commands us not to construe a
    statute in breach of the Constitution when we don’t have to.
    And nevermind that the Court disfavors the invalidation of
    statutes under the overbreadth doctrine.
    *
    22              UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    Helaman Hansen operated a fraudulent adult adoption
    program that targeted undocumented aliens. Hansen preyed
    on their hopes by falsely telling them that they could become
    U.S. citizens simply by being adopted. For these false hopes,
    Hansen charged as much as $10,000. Hansen defrauded
    almost 500 aliens, and, of course, no alien became a U.S.
    citizen. For this scheme, the government charged Hansen
    with multiple offenses—including two counts of
    encouraging or inducing an alien for financial gain under
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i). A jury convicted him of all
    counts.
    On appeal, we took the extraordinary step of holding
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) unconstitutional under the First
    Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine. Hansen, 25 F.4th at
    1111. In doing so, we gave “encourage” and “induce” a
    broad meaning untethered from the criminal law context and
    hypothesized that the law would chill “a vast amount of
    protected speech related to immigration.” Id. at 1107. To
    justify that conclusion, we conjured up a parade of horribles
    theoretically prosecutable under the law, such as “advising
    an undocumented immigrant about available social services”
    or to “take shelter during a natural disaster.” Id. at 1110.
    Just as we were wrong in Sineneng-Smith, we are wrong
    now. For centuries, the terms “encouraging” and “inducing”
    have been recognized in criminal law as referring to
    complicity in the commission of a crime. So under
    established and settled meaning, § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is just
    an ordinary criminal solicitation and aiding-and-abetting
    provision. Indeed, in prior versions of the alien-smuggling
    law, Congress used the terms synonymously with
    “soliciting” and “assisting” another to commit crime. And,
    of course, speech that solicits or aids illegal conduct is
    “categorically” unprotected by the First Amendment. See
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                    23
    United States v. Williams, 
    553 U.S. 285
    , 297 (2008).
    Reading the law in its proper light thus eliminates the parade
    of horribles created by our court and removes any tension
    with the First Amendment.
    Instead of following this straightforward interpretation,
    our court makes mistake after mistake to hold
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) unconstitutional.
    First, we misread the statute by blindly relying on lay-
    dictionary definitions to reach an overly broad interpretation
    of the law. Instead, we should have looked to the settled
    meaning of the statutory terms. As the Court recently
    reaffirmed, “[w]here Congress employs a term of art
    obviously transplanted from another legal source, it brings
    the old soil with it.” George v. McDonough, 
    142 S. Ct. 1953
    ,
    1959 (2022) (simplified).         If we had followed this
    established principle, we would have understood that
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is an ordinary solicitation and aiding-
    and-abetting statute and poses no free-speech concerns.
    Second, we improperly invoked the surplusage canon to
    disregard § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as a solicitation and aiding-
    and-abetting statute. To begin, we seemingly conflated the
    two concepts and completely ignored solicitation as a
    distinct offense. If we had considered solicitation, then we
    would have found no surplusage because no other provision
    of § 1324 outlaws solicitation. We also misapplied the
    surplusage canon to erase aiding-and-abetting liability from
    the law. We claimed that because another aiding-and-
    abetting provision exists in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II),
    subsection (iv) could not also prohibit aiding and abetting.
    See Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1109 (“Interpreting subsection (iv)
    as different from aiding and abetting also avoids any related
    concerns that either it or § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) is
    superfluous.”). But that’s wrong. Subsection (iv) prohibits
    24               UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    aiding and abetting a specific thing that no other provision
    of § 1324(a)(1)(A) targets. Specifically, subsection (iv)
    prohibits the aiding and abetting of an alien “com[ing] to,
    enter[ing], or resid[ing] in the United States” in violation of
    law, while subsection (v)(II) addresses aiding or abetting a
    criminal principal “bring[ing],” “transport[ing],” or
    “harbor[ing]” aliens illegally in the United States. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(i)−(iv), (v)(II). We thus have no surplusage
    problem here.
    Third, we failed to respect the constitutional avoidance
    canon. Even if exhausting statutory tools doesn’t clearly
    show that the law prohibits solicitation and aiding and
    abetting, at a minimum, the constitutional avoidance canon
    commands that we construe it that way. Ignoring this
    principle of avoidance undermines the separation of powers
    and aggrandizes our role as judges. In fact, we seemingly
    invent the opposite principle—let’s call it the “constitutional
    collision canon”—stretching the law to ensure that it violates
    the Constitution. Such a canon should be soundly rejected.
    And finally, even if the provision could conceivably
    reach some protected speech, we still shouldn’t have pulled
    the trigger on overbreadth invalidation—a remedy of last
    resort. There was no reason to cavalierly strike down the
    statute, especially given its long history and vast legitimate
    sweep.
    This case was an obvious candidate for en banc review.
    We now lead a circuit split. See United States v. Tracy,
    456 F. App’x 267, 272 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished)
    (“Although there may be some instances in which we might
    find that [
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(iv)] chills protected
    speech, we are unconvinced that the [provision] prohibits a
    substantial amount of such speech.”); United States v.
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                    25
    Hernandez-Calvillo, — F.4th —, 
    2022 WL 2709736
    , at *11
    (10th Cir. 2022) (“[W]e hold that [
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(iv)] is substantially overbroad under the
    First Amendment.”).
    And our decision may lead to the invalidation of other
    federal and state laws that use similar “encourage” or
    “induce” language. See, e.g., 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    (a) (“aids, abets,
    counsels, commands, induces or procures [the commission
    of an offense against the United States]”); 
    18 U.S.C. § 373
    (a) (“[w]hoever . . . solicits, commands, induces, or
    otherwise endeavors to persuade” another to engage in a
    crime of violence); 
    Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 705-510
    (1)
    (“commands, encourages, or requests”); 
    Mont. Code Ann. § 45-4-101
    (1) (“commands, encourages, or facilitates”);
    
    Idaho Code Ann. § 18-204
     (“aid and abet . . . advise[] and
    encourage[]”); 
    Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 195.020
     (“aids or
    abets . . . , counsels, encourages, hires, commands, induces
    or otherwise procures”) (emphases added).
    Indeed, this case is already wreaking havoc in our court.
    Compare Marquez-Reyes v. Garland, 
    36 F.4th 1195
    ,
    1201−07 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that Hansen doesn’t
    apply to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a)(6)(E)(i), which affects any alien
    who “knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted,
    or aided any other alien” to enter the country illegally), with
    
    id.
     at 1209−13 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hansen
    does apply).
    For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the denial
    of rehearing en banc.
    26                   UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    I.
    At its core, this case concerns the scope of what 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(iv) criminalizes. 1 If the provision is a
    straightforward solicitation and aiding-and-abetting statute
    (as I will show), we have little free-speech concerns. That’s
    because “speech integral to criminal conduct” is a
    categorical exception to the First Amendment. United States
    v. Stevens, 
    559 U.S. 460
    , 468–69 (2010). It’s thus important
    to understand the common law concepts of solicitation and
    aiding and abetting. So I begin there.
    Solicitation is a “well-established (and distinct) type of
    inchoate crime.” Cortes-Maldonado v. Barr, 
    978 F.3d 643
    ,
    651 (9th Cir. 2020). It prohibits the act of trying to persuade
    another to commit an unlawful offense with intent for the
    crime to be committed. See Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Subst.
    Crim. L. § 11.1 (3d ed. 2017). With solicitation, the crime
    is complete the moment a person “entice[s], advise[s],
    incite[s], order[s,] or otherwise encourage[s]” another to
    commit the underlying offense. Id. The offense solicited
    need not be completed. Id.
    Before the 1800s, it was generally accepted that
    solicitation of perjury, bribery, and forgery were crimes. Id.
    § 11.1(a) (citing Rex v. Johnson, 80 Eng. Rep. 753 (1679)
    and Rex v. Vaughan, 98 Eng. Rep. 308 (1769)). But it wasn’t
    until the turn of the 19th century, that solicitation as a general
    crime was recognized by English courts. See Rex v. Higgins,
    102 Eng. Rep. 209 (1801). There, a man was charged with
    1
    The provision provides that “[a]ny person who—encourages or
    induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing
    or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or
    residence is or will be in violation of law . . . shall be punished.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(iv).
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                      27
    soliciting a servant to steal his master’s goods. 
    Id.
     Even
    though the servant didn’t carry out the theft, the court held
    that the solicitation was its own crime. 
    Id.
     Since Higgins,
    solicitation has been accepted as a common law offense in
    both the United States and England. LaFave, supra,
    § 11.1(a). As an early state court held, “[t]he very act of
    advising to the commission of a crime is of itself unlawful.”
    Commonwealth v. Bowen, 
    13 Mass. 356
    , 359 (1816).
    Aiding and abetting, or more succinctly “facilitation,”
    resembles solicitation, but it requires the commission of a
    crime. At common law, “a person may be responsible for a
    crime he has not personally carried out if he helps another to
    complete its commission.” Rosemond v. United States,
    
    572 U.S. 65
    , 70 (2014). For aiding-and-abetting liability to
    attach, a person must, in part, “assist[] or participate[] in the
    commission of the underlying substantive offense,” and
    “someone [else] [must have] committed the underlying
    substantive offense.” United States v. Thum, 
    749 F.3d 1143
    ,
    1148−49 (9th Cir. 2014) (simplified). It’s a broad form of
    criminal liability and “comprehends all assistance rendered
    by words, acts, encouragement, support, or presence.” Reves
    v. Ernst & Young, 
    507 U.S. 170
    , 178 (1993) (simplified).
    Historically, the common law divided aiders and abettors
    into two buckets. First were second-degree principals, who
    were “aiders and abettors present at the scene of the crime.”
    Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 
    549 U.S. 183
    , 189 (2007).
    Second were accessories before the fact, who were “aiders
    and abettors who helped the principal before the basic
    criminal event took place.” 
    Id.
     As a seminal criminal
    treatise explains, accessory-before-the-fact liability was
    described as “order[ing], counsel[ing], encourag[ing], or
    otherwise aid[ing] and abet[ting] another to commit a felony
    and who [was] not present at the commission of the offense.”
    28               UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    LaFave, supra, § 13.1(c). Today, we focus less on this
    distinction and consider “aiders and abettors who fall into
    the [two] categories” as simply criminal facilitators. See
    Duenas-Alvarez, 
    549 U.S. at 189
    .
    Speech that creates criminal liability under either
    solicitation or aiding and abetting is unprotected. The First
    Amendment establishes that “Congress shall make no law
    . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I.
    But “speech integral to criminal conduct” is one of the
    “historic and traditional categories” of excepted, punishable
    speech. Stevens, 
    559 U.S. at
    468 (citing Simon & Shuster,
    Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 
    502 U.S. 105
    , 127 (1991); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
    
    336 U.S. 490
    , 498 (1949)). And speech that constitutes
    criminal solicitation or facilitation falls within this
    exception. See Williams, 
    553 U.S. at 297
     (holding that
    solicitation is “categorically excluded from First
    Amendment protection”); Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 73
    (approving of the federal aiding-and-abetting statute, which
    “comprehends all assistance rendered by words, acts,
    encouragement, support, or presence” (simplified)); see
    generally Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal
    Conduct” Exception, 
    101 Cornell L. Rev. 981
     (2016).
    With this understanding of first principles, let’s turn to
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).
    II.
    Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) punishes any person who
    “encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside
    in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the
    fact that such coming to, entry or residence is or will be in
    violation of law.” In addition, “in the case of a violation . . .
    in which the offense was done for the purpose of commercial
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                      29
    advantage or private financial gain,” the person will be fined
    or imprisoned for up to 10 years, or both. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(B)(i).
    When Congress used the terms “encourage” and
    “induce” in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), it was not legislating in a
    vacuum. Rather, it enacted the provision against the
    backdrop of those words having settled meaning in the
    criminal law. For hundreds of years, both terms were
    historically bound up with liability for criminal complicity.
    So it’s clear Congress was targeting those types of crimes—
    solicitation (when the underlying crime isn’t committed) and
    facilitation (when the underlying crime is committed)—
    when enacting § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). The text, history, and
    structure of § 1324 confirms this.
    A.
    First, some history. From before our Founding, to the
    late 19th century, to the modern era, crimes involving
    solicitation and facilitation were defined with terms
    tantamount to “encourage” and “induce.”
    Starting back in the 17th century, Edward Coke wrote
    that accessory-before-the-fact liability attached to “all those
    that incite, procure, set on, or stir up any other to do the fact,
    and are not present when the fact is done.” 2 Edward Coke,
    Institutes of the Laws of England 182 (6th ed. 1681). He
    also said that it applies to “all persons counselling, abetting,
    plotting, assenting, consenting, and encouraging to do the
    act, and are not present when the act is done.” Id.
    Closer to our Founding, William Blackstone described
    accessory-before-the-fact     liability  as      “procur[ing],
    counsel[ing], or command[ing] another to commit a crime”
    and explained that “[i]f A then advises B to kill another, and
    30              UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    B does it in the absence of A, now B is principal, and A is
    accessory in the murder.”          4 William Blackstone,
    Commentaries on the Laws of England 36−37 (1769); see
    also 1 Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown
    615 (1736) (noting that to “procure, counsel, command, or
    abet another to commit a felony” while being absent from
    the commission of the crime creates accessory-before-the-
    fact liability).
    This common law understanding persisted throughout
    the 19th century. For example, an 1816 state court approved
    of a charge against a prison inmate for “induc[ing],
    encourag[ing], and fix[ing] the intention, and ultimately
    procur[ing] the perpetration” of the suicide of another
    inmate, who was set for execution. Bowen, 13 Mass. at
    358−60. And prominent legal scholar Francis Wharton
    explained that “[i]t has been settled in England that if a man
    encourages another to murder himself, and he is present
    abetting him while he does so, such man is guilty of murder
    as a principal.” Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal
    Law of the United States 230 (1846).
    Further, at that time, English laws outlawing criminal
    encouragements and inducements were well established.
    For example, an English law punished “any person [who]
    entice[d] or encourage[d] any artificer employed in printing
    calicoes, cottons, muslins, or linens, to leave the kingdom.”
    4 Jacob Giles, The Law-Dictionary: Explaining the Rise,
    Progress, and Present State, of the English Law 235 (1811)
    (emphasis omitted). Another law provided that “[a]n
    attempt to induce a man to advise the king under the
    influence of a bribe, is criminal, though never carried into
    execution.” 1 Giles, supra, at 370.
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                   31
    Early legal dictionaries also used variants of
    “encourage” and “induce” to describe criminal solicitation
    and aiding and abetting. Consider these definitions from the
    1790s to the 1880s:
    -   1 Richard Burn, A New Law Dictionary 4, 7 (1792):
    •   Accessary before the fact: One who “procure[s],
    counsel[s], command[s], or abet[s] another to
    commit a felony.”
    •   Abet: “[I]s to stir up or incite, encourage or set
    on; one who promotes or procures a crime.
    Abettors of murder, are such as command,
    procure, or counsel others to commit a
    murder[.]” (emphasis deleted).
    -   1 Giles, supra, at 14:
    •    To Abet: “In our law signifies to encourage or set
    on; the substantive abetment is used for an
    encouraging or instigation. An abettor is an
    instigator or setter on; one that promotes or
    procures a crime.” (emphasis deleted).
    -   1 John Bouvier, Law Dictionary Adapted to the
    Constitution and Laws of the United States of
    America, and of the Several States of the American
    Union 30−31 (1839):
    •    To Abet: “[C]rim. law. To encourage or set
    another on to commit a crime[.] To abet another
    to commit a murder, is to command, procure, or
    counsel him to commit it.”
    32                UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    •   Abettor: “[I]s one who encourages or incites,
    encourages or sets another on to commit a
    crime.”
    -   William Cochran, The Students’ Law Lexicon A
    Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases 2, 142
    (1888):
    •   Abet: “[T]o aid, encourage, or incite another to
    commit a crime.”
    •   Incite: “[T]o stimulate or induce a person to
    commit a crime. This is a misdemeanor, whether
    the crime be committed or not.”
    -   Henry Campbell Black, A Dictionary of Law 6, 419,
    617 (1891):
    •   Encourage: “In criminal law. To instigate; to
    incite to action; to give courage to; to inspirit; to
    embolden; to raise confidence; to make
    confident. See Aid.”
    •   Abet: “In criminal law. To encourage, incite, or
    set another on to commit a crime. To abet
    another to commit a murder is to command,
    procure, or counsel him to commit it.”
    •   Inducement: “In criminal evidence. Motive; that
    which leads or tempts to the commission of
    crime.”
    Moving forward to the 20th century, the same
    terminology was used to define solicitation and facilitation.
    In Fox v. Washington, for example, the Supreme Court
    recognized that a state statute prohibiting the publication of
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                    33
    material “advocating, encouraging or inciting . . . which
    shall tend to encourage or advocate disrespect for law” was
    a common law solicitation or facilitation provision. 
    236 U.S. 273
    , 275 (1915) (simplified); see also 
    id. at 277
     (recognizing
    that “encouragements . . . directed to a particular persons’
    conduct, generally would make him who uttered them guilty
    of a misdemeanor if not an accomplice or a principle in the
    crime encouraged”). Justice Holmes understood the statute
    as “encouraging an actual breach of law,” which is “an overt
    breach and technically criminal act.” 
    Id. at 277
    . Under that
    narrow construction, Justice Holmes thought the law could
    not be used to “prevent publications merely because they
    tend to produce unfavorable opinions of a particular statute
    or of law in general.” 
    Id.
     And so the law was no
    “unjustifiable restriction of liberty” and comported with the
    freedom of speech. Id.; see also Cox v. Louisiana, 
    379 U.S. 559
    , 563 (1965) (explaining the familiar principle that “[a]
    man may be punished for encouraging the commission of a
    crime”).
    And more recently, courts have used “encouraging” and
    “inducing” to define criminal complicity. For example, in
    Williams, the Court equated “induce” with “solicit.”
    
    553 U.S. at 294
    . There, the Court said that the solicitation
    statute at issue “penalizes speech that accompanies or seeks
    to induce a transfer of child pornography.” 
    Id.
     Our court
    sitting en banc has also understood this settled meaning. In
    United States v. Lopez, we explained that an abettor
    “commands, counsels or otherwise encourages the
    perpetrator to commit the crime,” and a facilitator “aid[s],
    counsel[s], command[s], induce[s] or procure[s] [the
    principal] to commit each element” of the crime. 
    484 F.3d 1186
    , 1199 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (simplified).
    34              UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    Modern dictionaries also recognize the established
    meaning of the terms in the criminal context. In legal
    dictionaries, “abet” has been defined as “[t]o encourage,
    incite, or set another on to commit a crime.” Black’s Law
    Dictionary (4th ed. 1951). That dictionary also used the term
    synonymously        with     “encourag[ing],    counsel[ing],
    induc[ing], or assist[ing]” the commission of crime. 
    Id.
     The
    2019 edition of Black’s retains a similar meaning for “abet”:
    “[t]o aid, encourage, or assist (someone), esp. in the
    commission of a crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
    2019). And it defines criminal inducement as “entic[ing] or
    urging another person to commit a crime.” 
    Id.
     Even lay
    dictionaries understand the words as terms of art to define
    criminal complicity. See, e.g., Webster’s Third New
    International Dictionary 3 (2002) (defining “abet” as to
    “incite, encourage, instigate, or countenance,” as in “the
    commission of a crime”); Webster’s New International
    Dictionary 4 (2d ed. 1958) (same).
    Longstanding federal and state statutes also employ
    “encourage,” “induce,” and other variants to define criminal
    solicitation and aiding and abetting. For example, one
    federal statute punishes as solicitation “[w]hoever . . .
    solicits, commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to
    persuade” another to engage in a crime of violence.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 373
    (a). Another punishes as aiding and abetting
    a person who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or
    procures [the commission of an offense against the United
    States].” 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    (a). The Model Penal Code defines
    solicitation as “command[ing], encourag[ing], or
    request[ing] another person to engage in specific [unlawful]
    conduct.” Model Penal Code § 5.02(1) (1985). And many
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                           35
    state statutes defining solicitation 2 and accessory liability3
    look the same.
    B.
    With this understanding of the well-settled meaning of
    “encourage” and “induce,” I return to the statutory provision
    at issue: encouraging and inducing an alien to illegally enter
    the country under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(iv). Its statutory
    history confirms Congress’s goal to prohibit criminal
    solicitation and facilitation. And that’s how we should have
    interpreted the provision.
    i.
    In 1885, Congress enacted the statute that would later
    become 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    .         That statute criminalized
    “knowingly assisting, encouraging or soliciting the
    migration or importation of any alien or aliens, foreigner or
    foreigners, into the United States.” Alien Contract Labor
    2
    See, e.g., 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1002
    (A) (“commands,
    encourages, requests or solicits”); 
    Idaho Code Ann. § 18-2001
     (“solicits,
    importunes, commands, encourages or requests”); 
    Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 705-510
    (1) (“commands, encourages, or requests”); 
    Mont. Code Ann. § 45-4-101
    (1) (“commands, encourages, or facilitates”); 
    Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-302
    (a) (“commands, encourages or facilitates”); 
    Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-2-301
    (1) (“commands, induces, entreats, or otherwise attempts to
    persuade another person”); 
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15.03
    (a) (“requests,
    commands, or attempts to induce”).
    3
    See, e.g., 
    Idaho Code Ann. § 18-204
     (“aid and abet . . . advise[]
    and encourage[]”); 
    Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 195.020
     (“aids and abets [or]
    counsels, encourages, hires, commands, induces or otherwise
    procures”); Colo. Rev. Stat § 18-1-603 (“aids, abets, advises, or
    encourages”); 
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02
    (a)(2) (“solicits, encourages,
    directs, aids, or attempts to aid”); 
    Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202
     (“solicits,
    requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids”).
    36               UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    Law, ch. 164, § 3, 
    23 Stat. 332
    , 333 (1885). Thus, from the
    beginning, we know that Congress intended “encouraging”
    to take on a similar meaning as “assisting” or “soliciting”
    illegality. That’s because “a word is given more precise
    content by the neighboring words with which it is
    associated.” Williams, 
    553 U.S. at 294
     (describing the
    “commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis”); see also 
    id.
     at
    294−95 (construing “promotes” and “presents” to mean
    “solicits” in a statute punishing any person who “advertises,
    promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits” child
    pornography). Indeed, the Court understood that the statute
    “punish[ed] those who assist in introducing, or attempting to
    introduce, aliens in violation of [Congress’s] prohibition.”
    Lees v. United States, 
    150 U.S. 476
    , 480 (1893).
    Congress’s use of “encouragement” to refer to
    solicitation and facilitation remained consistent through
    1903 and 1907 updates. For example, the 1903 version of
    the law made it unlawful to (1) “prepay the transportation or
    in any way to assist or encourage the importation or
    migration of any alien into the United States”; (2) “assist or
    encourage the importation or migration of any alien by a
    promise of employment through advertisements”;
    (3) “directly or through agents, either by writing, printing, or
    oral representations, solicit, invite, or encourage the
    immigration of any aliens into the United States”; and
    (4) “[t]o knowingly aid[], advise[], or encourage[] any such
    person to apply for or to secure [unlawful] naturalization.”
    Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, § 5, 
    32 Stat. 1213
    ,
    1214−15, 1222. Again, Congress used “encourage” in the
    same breath as criminal “assist[ance]” and “solicit[ation]”—
    demonstrating their equivalence.
    The 1907 version was similar. It made it unlawful to
    (1) “prepay the transportation or in any way to assist or
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                      37
    encourage the importation or migration of any contract
    laborer or contract laborers into the United States”;
    (2) “assist or encourage the importation or migration of any
    alien by promise of employment through advertisements
    printed and published in any foreign country”; and
    (3) “either by writing, printing, or oral representation, solicit,
    invite, or encourage the immigration of any aliens into the
    United States.” Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, § 5, 
    34 Stat. 898
    , 900.
    With the 1917 iteration, Congress added “inducement”
    as another variant of the soliciting and assisting language. It
    updated the statute to make it unlawful to (1) “in any way to
    induce, assist, encourage, or solicit . . . the importation or
    migration of any contract laborer or contract laborers into the
    United States”; and (2) “induce, assist, encourage, or solicit
    . . . any alien to come into the United States by promise of
    employment through advertisements.” Immigration Act of
    1917, ch. 29, § 5, 
    39 Stat. 874
    , 879. The noscitur canon
    makes clear that “induce” also takes on a similar meaning to
    criminal “asssist[ance]” and “solicit[ation].” And there’s
    certainly no evidence that Congress intended to encompass
    non-criminal conduct by the inclusion of the word
    “inducement.”
    Indeed, the Court also interpreted “induce” in the 1917
    law to mean the solicitation or facilitation of a crime. See
    United States v. Hoy, 
    330 U.S. 724
     (1947). There, a man
    was charged for “writ[ing] a letter to certain persons living
    in Mexico to induce them to come to the United States to
    work for him.” 
    Id. at 725
    . In the letter, he assured the aliens
    that he would “arrange everything,” and get them out on
    bond if they were caught by immigration officials. 
    Id.
     In
    analyzing the case, the Court described the 1917 law’s
    solicitation and facilitation provision as a “prohibition
    38               UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    against employers inducing laborers to enter the country.”
    
    Id. at 731
    .
    In 1952, Congress streamlined its language in enacting
    the modern-day § 1324 statute. The new version made it
    unlawful to “willfully or knowingly encourage[] or induce[],
    either directly or indirectly, the entry into the United States
    of—any alien . . . not duly admitted by an immigration
    officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the
    United States[.]” Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477,
    
    66 Stat. 163
    , 229 (1952) (
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
     et seq.). Once
    again, there’s nothing to suggest that Congress altered the
    meaning of the immigration statute by reducing the number
    of operative verbs to two.
    And a few decades later, Congress made final tweaks to
    the provision—giving the statute its current form. In 1986,
    Congress amended the law to punish a person who
    “encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside
    in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the
    fact that such coming to, entry or residence is or will be in
    violation of law.” Immigration Reform and Control Act,
    Pub. L. No. 99-603, 
    100 Stat. 3359
     (1986) (current version
    at 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(iv)).
    Then in 1996, Congress added enhanced penalties for
    conduct undertaken for the “purpose of commercial
    advantage or private financial gain.” Illegal Immigration
    Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
    No. 104-208, div. C Tit. II, Subtit. A., § 203(a), (b), 
    110 Stat. 3009
    , 3009−565 (1996) (codified as 8 U.SC.
    § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i)). At the same time, Congress added
    punishments for conspiracy and for aiding or abetting the
    other provisions of § 1324. Id. (codified as 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(v)(I)−(II)).
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                    39
    With that overview, we can now interpret the meaning of
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).
    ii.
    When it comes to statutory interpretation, we must
    always be mindful of “the specific context in which the
    language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
    whole.” Yates v. United States, 
    574 U.S. 528
    , 537 (2015)
    (simplified). And while we often look to the ordinary
    meaning of the statute, sometimes looking at dictionary
    definitions in isolation can lead us astray. See, e.g., Bloate
    v. United States, 
    559 U.S. 196
    , 205 n.9 (2010). As we’ve
    recently said, “when a phrase is obviously transplanted from
    another legal source,” such as other legislation or the
    common law, “it brings the old soil with it.” United States
    v. Randall, 
    34 F.4th 867
    , 875 (9th Cir. 2022) (simplified). In
    other words, when Congress adopts a phrase with a settled
    meaning “absent some indication to the contrary, we
    presume that Congress chose to give the phrase its
    established meaning.” 
    Id.
     Indeed, the Court recently
    explained that “[t]he point of the old-soil principle is that
    when Congress employs a term of art, that usage itself
    suffices to adopt the cluster of ideas that were attached to
    each borrowed word.” McDonough, 142 S. Ct. at 1963
    (simplified). Here we have buckets of soil to understand
    Congress’s meaning.
    From before the Founding until today, both in statutes
    and in common law, the terms “encourage” and “induce”
    have been used to define solicitation and aiding and abetting.
    Congress knew that when it began passing criminal
    immigration laws in 1885.            So when interpreting
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)’s prohibition of “encourag[ing] or
    induc[ing] an alien to [illegally] come to, enter, or reside in
    the United States,” our duty is to apply settled meaning.
    40               UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    Thus, the best reading of the provision is that it prohibits the
    solicitation and facilitation of the underlying offense—
    coming to, entering, or residing in the country in violation of
    law. In other words, subsection (iv) is just an ordinary
    solicitation and facilitation provision.
    Once subsection (iv) is understood as a solicitation and
    facilitation statute, to be charged, any words of
    encouragement or inducement must be tied to the speaker’s
    “purpose of promoting or facilitating [the offense’s]
    commission.” Model Penal Code § 5.02(1). That’s because
    those crimes “require as one element the mens rea to achieve
    the commission of a particular crime.” United States v.
    Vidal, 
    504 F.3d 1072
    , 1079 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); see
    also Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 38 (15th
    ed. 1993) (describing an accomplice as one who “with the
    intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime,
    . . . solicits, requests, or commands the other person to
    commit it, or aids the other person in planning or committing
    it” and noting that “[t]he absence of mens rea precludes one
    from being an accomplice”).
    And even if those crimes encompass some speech,
    speech “that is intended to induce or commence illegal
    activities” is “undeserving of First Amendment protection.”
    Williams, 
    553 U.S. at 298
    . As the Court said back in 1893,
    “[i]f congress has power to exclude [certain aliens], as . . . it
    unquestionably has, it has the power to punish any who assist
    in their introduction” into the country. Lees, 
    150 U.S. at 480
    .
    Contrary to our holding then, the provision does not
    outlaw “commonplace statements and actions” or “general
    immigration advocacy.” Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1107, 1110.
    We reached this erroneous conclusion by broadly defining
    “encourage” and “induce” under ordinary dictionary
    definitions without checking whether the terms are
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                    41
    specialized terms-of-art in the criminal law context. Id. at
    1108−09. Indeed, we’ve recognized that this language
    criminalizes criminal complicity many times before, and it’s
    unclear why we failed to do so here. See, e.g., Lopez,
    
    484 F.3d at 1199
     (“[W]e have stated that an abettor is one
    who, with mens rea commands, counsels or otherwise
    encourages the perpetrator to commit the crime.”
    (simplified)).
    The statutory structure also supports reading the
    provision as a solicitation and facilitation law. First,
    although the statute is silent on this question, we have held
    that § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) requires a criminal mens rea
    consistent with criminal complicity. “[T]o convict a person
    of violating section 1324(a)(1)(A), the government must
    show that the defendant acted with criminal intent, i.e., the
    intent to violate United States immigration laws.” United
    States v. Yoshida, 
    303 F.3d 1145
    , 1149 (9th Cir. 2002)
    (simplified). So, under our own interpretation, to convict a
    person under subsection (iv), the defendant must encourage
    or induce an alien to enter the United States with “the intent
    to violate United States immigration laws.” 
    Id.
     (simplified).
    This mens rea requirement makes clear that subsection (iv)
    is a solicitation and facilitation provision because a
    defendant must act with “criminal intent.” 
    Id.
    Second, the offense at issue in this case requires proof
    that the defendant acted to obtain “commercial advantage or
    private financial gain.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(B)(i). So
    when subsection (iv) is charged with § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i), as
    here, it requires a financial incentive—a common criminal
    purpose. That eliminates the concern “that commonplace
    statements” about politics or immigration policy would be
    swept up by § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)—as our court imagined.
    Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1110. Any statements prosecuted under
    42              UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    this law must be designed to make money off the targeted
    aliens—fitting solicitation and facilitation.
    Finally, as we recognized, “the subsection requires the
    encouragement or inducement of a specific alien or aliens,”
    Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1108, which corresponds with the
    requirement for specificity in soliciting and facilitating
    crime. See Williams, 
    553 U.S. at 300
     (emphasizing that a
    child-pornography solicitation statute does not target
    abstract advocacy because it refers to a “particular piece” of
    child pornography with the intent to transfer it); see also
    Volokh, supra, at 993−94 (recognizing that specificity is the
    dividing line between punishable solicitation and protected
    advocacy).
    Once understood as a criminal solicitation and
    facilitation statute, the parade of horribles made up by our
    court fades away. We contended that the law punishes
    (1) “encouraging an undocumented immigrant to take
    shelter during a natural disaster”; (2) “advising an
    undocumented immigrant about available social services”;
    (3) “telling a tourist that she is unlikely to face serious
    consequences if she overstays her tourist visa”; or
    (4) “providing certain legal advice to undocumented
    immigrants.” Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1110. But none of those
    examples involve any proof of “mens rea to achieve the
    commission of a particular crime.” Vidal, 
    504 F.3d at 1079
    .
    That means one thing: the law does not reach abstract
    advocacy. It only prohibits speech that targets particular
    aliens with a proper criminal intent.
    iii.
    Contrary to our court’s reasoning, interpreting
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as a solicitation and facilitation
    provision does not create a surplusage problem. Hansen
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                    43
    suggested that subsection (iv) could not be an aiding-and-
    abetting provision because § 1324(a) has another aiding-
    and-abetting provision. Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1108−09. To
    be sure, § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) creates criminal liability for
    anyone who “aids or abets the commission of any of the
    preceding acts”—meaning subsections (i) through (iv). But
    our court incorrectly took this as proof that subsection (iv)
    was not an aiding-and-abetting provision. See Hansen,
    25 F.4th at 1109 (“Interpreting subsection (iv) as different
    from aiding and abetting also avoids any related concerns
    that either it or § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) is superfluous.”).
    But the surplusage canon is only employed to avoid
    “entirely redundant” provisions in a statute. Kungys v.
    United States, 
    485 U.S. 759
    , 778 (1988) (plurality opinion).
    It only comes into play if an interpretation would render one
    provision as having “no consequence.” Nielsen v. Preap,
    
    139 S. Ct. 954
    , 969 (2019) (plurality opinion) (simplified).
    We have none of these concerns here.
    First, we ignored analyzing § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as a
    solicitation provision. If we had, we would have recognized
    that no other provision of § 1324 punishes solicitation. So
    that’s one reason why there’s no surplusage problem here.
    And second, subsection (iv) and subsection (v)(II)
    prohibit the aiding and abetting of different things. As we
    have previously recognized:
    The “encourages or induces” offense,
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), criminalizes the act of
    encouraging the alien herself to illegally
    enter or reside in the United States, whereas
    aiding and abetting the principal in a
    “bringing to” offense, § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii),
    criminalizes the act of aiding, counseling,
    44               UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    inducing or encouraging not the alien but the
    principal, the person or venture who is
    illegally bringing the alien to the United
    States.
    United States v. Singh, 
    532 F.3d 1053
    , 1059 (9th Cir. 2008).
    While Singh interpreted a neighboring provision,
    § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), that subsection employs identical
    language as § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), and so Singh’s logic directly
    governs. Thus, subsection (iv) prohibits the aiding and
    abetting of an alien to “come to, enter, or reside in the United
    States” in violation of law, while subsection (v)(II) outlaws
    aiding and abetting a principal from committing the other
    alien-smuggling violations—“bring[ing],” “transport[ing],”
    and “harbor[ing]” aliens illegally.            See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(i)−(iii). Indeed, subsection (v)(II) can even
    prohibit aiding and abetting an encourager under subsection
    (iv). See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 
    590 F.3d 1238
    , 1250
    (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that (v)(II) can harmoniously
    modify subsection (iv)). So again, there is no surplusage
    problem. We were thus wrong to invoke that canon to avoid
    concluding that § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) targets solicitation and
    facilitation.
    Nor does the 1996 addition of subsection (v)(II) change
    the meaning of subsection (iv), which was enacted some
    50 years prior. Our court was wrong to hold otherwise. See
    Hansen,      25    F.4th      at   1108−09        (“Subsection
    1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) . . . strongly suggests that subsection
    (iv) should not also be read as an aiding and abetting
    provision.”). It would be “entirely unrealistic to suggest that
    Congress” meant to expand the scope of encourage and
    induce “by such an oblique and cryptic route” as simply
    adding an aiding-or-abetting provision in a different
    subsection 50 years later. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton,
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                    45
    
    549 U.S. 84
    , 99 (2006). Indeed, “later laws that do not seek
    to clarify an earlier enacted general term and do not depend
    for their effectiveness upon clarification, or a change in the
    meaning of an earlier statute, are beside the point in reading
    the first enactment.” Gutierrez v. Ada, 
    528 U.S. 250
    , 257–
    58 (2000) (simplified). So there is no reason to believe that
    Congress upended the well-settled meaning of “encourage”
    and “induce” in subsection (iv) by adding a separate aiding-
    and-abetting provision. From the day they were enacted to
    today, those terms have referred to the same thing—
    solicitation and facilitation.
    iv.
    Even if any doubt remains about § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)’s
    reach, under the constitutional avoidance canon, we are
    required to construe the provision as a criminal solicitation
    and facilitation provision. When “a serious doubt” is raised
    about the constitutionality of an act of Congress, it is a
    “cardinal principle” that courts will “first ascertain whether
    a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
    question may be avoided.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 
    138 S. Ct. 830
    , 842 (2018) (simplified). If a “fairly possible”
    interpretation averts a clash with the Constitution, 
    id.,
     we
    must follow it. See Boos v. Barry, 
    485 U.S. 312
    , 330−31
    (1988) (explaining that federal courts not only have the
    “power” but also “the duty” to narrowly construe federal
    statutes when possible to avoid constitutional issues). Such
    a doctrine is rooted in the separation of powers; we respect
    Congress by not holding that it violated its duty to follow the
    Constitution unless it’s necessary.
    We’ve had no problems liberally applying the canon to
    avoid constitutional questions in the past—especially in the
    immigration context. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins,
    46              UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    
    804 F.3d 1060
    , 1078−85 (9th Cir. 2015) (construing
    
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1225
    (b), 1226(c) and 1226(a) to require a bond
    hearing despite the statutory text), rev’d sub nom. Jennings,
    
    138 S. Ct. at 852
    . Indeed, we’ve invoked the canon even
    when it “inflict[ed] linguistic trauma” on the text of the
    statute. Jennings, 
    138 S. Ct. at 848
    . That’s why it’s baffling
    that our court decided to give the canon short shrift here.
    Not only is it “fairly possible” to construe
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as a solicitation and facilitation
    provision, it’s the best reading. Hundreds of years of
    authorities use “encourage,” “induce,” and other near
    synonyms to define solicitation and facilitation. Further, the
    structure of § 1324(a)(1)(A) supports reading subsection (iv)
    that way. The provision’s mens rea requirement, the
    financial-gain element, and specificity all narrow its scope.
    Given that the provision is “readily susceptible” to a
    construction that avoids protected speech, we should’ve
    adopted it. Stevens, 
    559 U.S. at 481
     (simplified). Our
    court’s only response is that “the plain meaning of
    subsection (iv) does not permit the application of the
    constitutional avoidance canon,” Hansen, 25 F.4th
    at 1110—but as the above shows, that’s wrong.
    Rather than force the statute into a direct collision with
    the Constitution, we should have taken the more textually
    appropriate road and read § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as a
    solicitation and facilitation provision.         Under this
    interpretation, the law easily survives First Amendment
    scrutiny and there is no reason to reach the overbreadth
    doctrine. But even if this law reaches some speech, it is a
    poor candidate for overbreadth invalidation.
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                      47
    III.
    A.
    The overbreadth doctrine is the nuclear option of First
    Amendment law. With it, a federal court can essentially
    level a federal statute if the law “prohibits a substantial
    amount of protected speech.” Williams, 
    553 U.S. at 292
    .
    Such a doctrine is a facial challenge on steroids. With facial
    challenges, courts may only invalidate a law if “no set of
    circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.”
    United States v. Salerno, 
    481 U.S. 739
    , 745 (1987). But with
    overbreadth, courts may wipe out laws merely by finding
    that a “substantial amount” of protected speech is impacted,
    even if “some of [the law’s] applications [are] perfectly
    constitutional.” Williams, 
    553 U.S. at 292
    .
    That’s a huge expansion of our Article III powers. So to
    balance-out that power, courts must “vigorously enforce[]
    the requirement that a statute’s overbreadth be substantial,
    not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s
    plainly legitimate sweep.” 
    Id.
     And “there must be a realistic
    danger” that the statute “significantly compromise[s] First
    Amendment protections.” Members of City Council of Los
    Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
    466 U.S. 789
    , 801 (1984).
    “[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some
    impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to
    render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.” 
    Id. at 800
    . Overbreadth invalidation is “strong medicine” that
    is “not [to be] casually employed” and must only be used as
    an option of “last resort.” Los Angeles Police Dep’t v.
    United Reporting Pub. Corp., 
    528 U.S. 32
    , 39 (1999)
    (simplified).
    The overbreadth doctrine should be rarely used
    especially because it appears to be ahistorical and atextual.
    48               UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    As Justice Thomas has explained, the doctrine first arrived
    in the mid-20th century with Thornhill v. Alabama, 
    310 U.S. 88
     (1940), with no indication that the doctrine was rooted in
    the history or text of the First Amendment. Sineneng-Smith,
    140 S. Ct. at 1583 (Thomas, J., concurring). Rather, the
    Court has justified overbreadth invalidation in terms of
    “policy considerations and value judgments.” Id. at 1584. It
    has said that First Amendment freedoms are “supremely
    precious” with “transcendent value to all society,” and so a
    court may strike down a statute if it decides that “the possible
    harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
    unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected
    speech of others may be muted[.]” Id. (simplified); see
    generally Richard H. Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth,
    100 Yale L. J. 853, 855 (1991) (explaining in detail how
    “First Amendment overbreadth is largely a prophylactic
    doctrine, aimed at preventing a chilling effect” (simplified)).
    Essentially, Justice Thomas observed that the doctrine
    lets judges decide what “serves the public good.” Sineneng-
    Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1584. But as he notes, there is no
    historical evidence to suggest judges were given such a
    power “to determine whether particular restrictions of
    speech promoted the general welfare.” Id. (quoting Jud
    Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment,
    127 Yale L. J. 246, 259 (2017)). In Justice Thomas’s view,
    the overbreadth doctrine is just “the handiwork of judges,
    based on the misguided notion that some constitutional
    rights demand preferential treatment.”        Id. at 1588
    (simplified).
    Indeed, to apply the doctrine, judges must become
    storytellers and bean counters. We first make up the most
    outrageous violations of free speech we can think of and then
    count whether those imaginary scenarios are “substantial”
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                    49
    enough. Such a creative calculus is beyond our competence.
    We are at our best when we stick to the facts presented in the
    record—not when we speculate about “imaginary cases” and
    sift through “an endless stream of fanciful hypotheticals.”
    See id. at 1586 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
    Republican Party, 
    552 U.S. 442
    , 450 (2008) and Williams,
    
    553 U.S. at 301
    ) (simplified). Those balancing and policy
    judgments are best left to elected officials.
    On top of its suspect historical roots, the overbreadth
    doctrine also clashes with traditional standing principles.
    Ordinarily, the rule is that a person may not challenge a law
    that “may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to
    others, in other situations not before the Court.” Broadrick
    v. Oklahoma, 
    413 U.S. 601
    , 610 (1973). But overbreadth is
    “a constitutional anomaly” that relaxes the standing
    requirement to protect against the chilling of speech. United
    States v. Yung, 
    37 F.4th 70
    , 76 (3rd Cir. 2022); see also
    Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1586−87 (Thomas, J.,
    concurring) (explaining the overbreadth doctrine’s departure
    from traditional standing principles). Just recently, the Court
    has reasserted its preference for a “strict standard for facial
    constitutional challenges” and has eschewed the dilution of
    the “third-party standing doctrine.” See Dobbs v. Jackson
    Women’s Health Org., 
    142 S. Ct. 2228
    , 2275 (2022).
    Given the overbreadth doctrine’s shaky foundation, we
    must be cautious in deploying it. While we have a duty to
    follow Supreme Court precedent, we must also “resolve
    questions about the scope of [] precedents in light of and in
    the direction of the constitutional text and constitutional
    history.” Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 
    949 F.3d 489
    , 506 (9th Cir.
    2020) (Bumatay, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
    en banc) (simplified). The text and history here counsel us
    not to expand the doctrine, but to pause before applying it.
    50               UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    See Yung, 
    2022 WL 2112794
    , at *2 (“Courts must hesitate
    before stopping the government from prosecuting conduct
    that it has the power to ban.”).
    B.
    Here there’s no justification for deploying the nuclear
    option. Even if § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) somehow reaches
    protected speech, that reach is far outweighed by the
    provision’s broad legitimate sweep. Consider just a few
    concrete examples of the activity legitimately punishable by
    subsection (iv):
    •   Escorting illegal aliens onto a plane bound for the
    United States. Yoshida, 
    303 F.3d at 1150
    .
    •   Arranging fraudulent marriages for aliens to receive
    permanent residency. United States v. Lozada,
    742 F. App’x 451, 453−55 (11th Cir. 2018)
    (unpublished).
    •   Selling H-2B work visas to illegal aliens for
    American jobs that don’t exist. United States v.
    Pena, 418 F. App’x 335, 338−39 (5th Cir. 2011)
    (unpublished).
    •   Facilitating the employment of illegal aliens by
    providing them with fraudulent social security
    numbers. Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 
    602 F.3d 1276
    ,
    1295−97 (11th Cir. 2010).
    •   Picking up illegal aliens from the Bahamas and
    boating them to the United States. United States v.
    Lopez, 
    590 F.3d 1238
    , 1252 (11th Cir. 2009).
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                      51
    •   Providing fraudulent travel documents and
    instructions to illegal aliens to facilitate travel to the
    United States. Tracy, 456 F. App’x at 269−71.
    •   Lying on behalf of an illegal-alien passenger to an
    immigration inspector about the alien’s citizenship
    and purpose for entry. United States v. One 1989
    Mercedes Benz, 
    971 F. Supp. 124
    , 128 (W.D.N.Y.
    1997).
    What’s on the other side of the ledger? According to our
    court, there’s United States v. Henderson, 
    857 F. Supp. 2d 191
     (D. Mass. 2012) and some inapposite hypotheticals. But
    on closer inspection, those examples don’t help our court’s
    case.
    Our court cites Henderson for the proposition that a
    person could be prosecuted under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) for
    simply advising an alien “generally about immigration law
    practices and consequences.” Hansen, 25 F.4th at 1111
    (quoting Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 193). But we only
    tell half the story. In that case, the government prosecuted a
    U.S. Customs and Border Patrol supervisor for employing
    an undocumented alien, knowing that the employee was in
    the country illegally and even coaching the employee on
    how to evade immigration authorities while residing in the
    country. Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 195−97. The district
    court reversed the conviction and doubted that the facts
    supported a conviction, and the government never retried the
    case. Id. at 200−14. Henderson is thus a poor reason to
    invalidate an entire law. Even if Henderson were convicted
    under a properly construed § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (as a
    solicitation and facilitation statute), it’s doubtful the First
    Amendment permits a CBP supervisor, whose job includes
    enforcing immigration laws, to knowingly violate those laws
    52              UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    by employing an illegal alien and advising that alien on how
    to reside in the country illegally.
    And as discussed earlier, our court’s hypotheticals are
    irrelevant. For example, we say that the phrase—“I
    encourage you to reside in the United States”—is
    prosecutable under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). Hansen, 25 F.4th at
    1110 (citing Williams, 
    553 U.S. at 300
    ). But that’s not true
    under the proper reading of the statute. That statement
    doesn’t direct a specific alien to violate the law and doesn’t
    show the speaker’s intent to violate immigration law. So
    while Williams noted the line between abstract advocacy and
    criminal solicitation, the provision can’t target abstract
    advocacy under a proper interpretation.
    So even if we apply the overbreadth doctrine, I can’t find
    any—let alone a substantial amount of—protected speech
    that can be swept up by the provision’s reach. It was thus
    inappropriate for us to invalidate § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) for
    overbreadth. By doing so, we “short circuit the democratic
    process by preventing [a] law[] embodying the will of the
    people from being implemented in a manner consistent with
    the Constitution.” Wash. State Republican Party, 
    552 U.S. at 451
    .
    IV.
    For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the denial
    of rehearing en banc.
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                            53
    COLLINS, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of
    rehearing en banc:
    For reasons similar to those recounted in Judge
    Bumatay’s dissent, I conclude that (1) under the canon of
    constitutional avoidance, we can and should interpret the
    statute at issue here as being limited to soliciting and
    facilitating the unlawful entry of, or the unlawful taking up
    of residence by, specific aliens; 1 and (2) so construed, the
    statute is not facially unconstitutional. See Milavetz, Gallop
    & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 
    559 U.S. 229
    , 239 (2010)
    (stating that, under “the canon of constitutional avoidance,”
    a reading of the statutory words that is “fairly possible” and
    1
    This reading of the statute is narrower than the one that the
    Government apparently advocated in United States v. Hernandez-
    Calvillo, ___ F.4th ___, 
    2022 WL 2709736
     (10th Cir. 2022). There, the
    defendants’ charge for conspiring to violate 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(iv)
    apparently rested on the theory that the object of their illegal employment
    scheme was to encourage and induce aliens who were already
    unlawfully present in the U.S. to continue that unlawful presence. It is
    not clear to me that the statute should be read so broadly. The prohibition
    on encouraging or inducing a particular alien to “come to, enter, or reside
    in the United States,” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(iv), is most naturally
    read, I think, to reach those who encourage or induce particular aliens to
    acquire an unlawful presence or residence that they do not already have.
    (One does not normally speak of “inducing” another to do what he or she
    is already doing.) Moreover, the first two listed verbs (“come to” and
    “enter”) plainly refer to such an acquisition, and under the principle of
    noscitur a sociis, the third verb (“reside in”) should be read the same
    way. See Yates v. United States, 
    574 U.S. 528
    , 543 (2015) (stating that
    the principle “avoid[s] ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it
    is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving unintended
    breadth to the Acts of Congress” (citation omitted)). The prosecution in
    Defendant Helaman Hansen’s case is fully consistent with this narrower
    reading, because his indictment rests on the theory that he used his sham
    adult-adoption program to persuade two specific aliens to overstay their
    visas before their visas had expired.
    54                UNITED STATES V. HANSEN
    that avoids the constitutional difficulty is to be preferred); cf.
    also United States v. Williams, 
    553 U.S. 285
    , 298–300
    (2008) (holding that solicitation of an illegal transaction is
    “categorically excluded from First Amendment protection”).
    Facial invalidation is particularly inappropriate here,
    given that Defendant Helaman Hansen was convicted of an
    aggravated version of the § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) offense, one
    that required the Government to prove the additional fact
    that Hansen acted “for the purpose of commercial advantage
    or private financial gain.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(B)(i).
    Because proof of that specific purpose raised the applicable
    statutory maximum from 5 years to 10 years, compare 
    id.
    with 
    id.
     § 1324(a)(1)(B)(ii), that purpose constitutes an
    element of Hansen’s offense and was required to be found
    by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New
    Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 490 (2000). In Hansen’s case, the jury
    in its verdict made such a specific finding as to both of the
    § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) charges against him. Hansen therefore
    did not suffer any conviction for the lesser offense, but only
    for the greater one. Accordingly, the relevant First
    Amendment issue before the panel in this case was whether
    the statutory language defining the aggravated version of the
    offense at issue—i.e., the offense defined by 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(iv), (B)(i)—is facially unconstitutional.
    That question is easy. The additional element of acting “for
    the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial
    gain,” 
    id.
     § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i), substantially narrows the reach
    of the relevant language in a way that, in my view, leaves
    little doubt that its “plainly legitimate sweep” greatly
    UNITED STATES V. HANSEN                           55
    exceeds any plausible overbreadth. 2                    Broadrick v.
    Oklahoma, 
    413 U.S. 601
    , 615 (1973).
    For these reasons, I agree that the panel seriously erred
    in facially invalidating the relevant statute, and I respectfully
    dissent from our failure to rehear this case en banc.
    2
    This represents an additional point of distinction between this case
    and Hernandez-Calvillo. There, the court concluded that, on the facts
    before it, the § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i) “enhancement does not apply to [the
    defendants’] offense” and “is therefore not an element of [the
    defendants’] crimes.” 
    2022 WL 2709736
    , at *8 n.19. Here, by contrast,
    the opposite is true.