Hitoshi Yoshikawa v. Troy Seguirant ( 2022 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    HITOSHI YOSHIKAWA,                                 No. 21-15970
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                           1:18-cv-00162-
    JAO-RT
    TROY K. SEGUIRANT, Individually,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    OPINION
    and
    CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU;
    GREG TALBOYS; AGT
    CONSTRUCTION, LLC; JAMES A.
    SCHMIT,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Hawaii
    Jill Otake, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 14, 2022*
    San Francisco, California
    Filed July 25, 2022
    *
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2                   YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT
    Before: Jay S. Bybee and Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit Judges,
    and Susan R. Bolton,** District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Bybee
    SUMMARY***
    Civil Rights / Qualified Immunity
    The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying
    building inspector Troy Seguirant’s motion to dismiss, on the
    basis of qualified immunity, a claim brought by Hitoshi
    Yoshikawa under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    .
    Seguirant determined that Yoshikawa’s renovation of a
    property violated local ordinances. Although he conceded the
    ordinance violation, Yoshikawa alleged that the enforcement
    action against him was motivated by racial animus, in
    violation of § 1981.
    The panel held that, in addressing a qualified immunity
    claim in an action against an officer for an alleged violation
    of a constitutional right, the court first asks whether, taken in
    the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the
    facts alleged show that the officer’s conduct violated a
    constitutional right. If not, the complaint must be dismissed
    **
    The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, United States District Judge for
    the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
    ***
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT                      3
    for failure to state a claim. Second, the court asks whether
    the constitutional or statutory right was clearly established,
    such that the officer had fair notice that his conduct was
    unlawful.
    The panel held that Yoshikawa stated a § 1981 damages
    claim against Seguirant, a state actor. Under Comcast Corp.
    v. Nat’l Ass’n Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 
    140 S. Ct. 1009
    (2020), an allegation of discrimination on the basis of race is
    a but-for element of a claim brought under § 1981.
    Disagreeing with Seguirant’s contention that Yoshikawa’s
    undisputed violation of building regulations created an
    absolute defense to any claim of but-for causation, the panel
    explained that such a rule would mean that a plaintiff would
    lose on a § 1981 claim as long as the defendant provided
    some justification for the discriminatory act. The panel
    concluded that Yoshikawa’s allegations, if proven,
    established but-for causation, and he therefore stated a § 1981
    claim.
    The panel further held that Seguirant’s alleged actions
    violated clearly established law because he was accused of
    intentional racial discrimination, a violation of a well-
    established Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from
    racial animus in public decisions. The panel found irrelevant
    to qualified immunity, at the motion to dismiss stage, the
    issue of the applicability of the McDonnell Douglas test, an
    evidentiary standard, for analyzing § 1981 claims in non-
    employment cases.
    4                YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT
    COUNSEL
    Robert M. Kohn and Nicolette Winter, Deputies Corporation
    Counsel; Department of the Corporation Counsel, Honolulu,
    Hawai‘i; for Defendant-Appellant.
    Terrance M. Revere, Revere & Associates LLLC, Kailua,
    Hawai‘i, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    OPINION
    BYBEE, Circuit Judge:
    In this case we consider the application of qualified
    immunity to a claim arising under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    . Hitoshi
    Yoshikawa bought waterfront property in Kane‘ohe, Hawai‘i.
    Appellant Troy Seguirant, a building inspector for the City
    and County of Honolulu, determined that the subsequent
    renovation of the property violated the Revised Ordinances of
    Honolulu by rebuilding a prior nonconforming structure
    without the appropriate new building permit. Although he
    concedes the violation of the local ordinances, Yoshikawa
    alleged that the enforcement action against him was
    motivated by racial animus, in violation of § 1981. Seguirant
    moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis of qualified
    immunity, claiming that Yoshikawa had not stated a cause of
    action under § 1981 and, alternatively, that the law was not
    clearly established. The district court denied both the motion
    to dismiss and qualified immunity on the § 1981 claim,
    reasoning in part that the burden-shifting framework of
    McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
     (1973), is
    sufficiently established law in our circuit to justify a denial of
    qualified immunity. Yoshikawa v. City and County of
    YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT                     5
    Honolulu, 
    542 F. Supp. 3d 1099
     (D. Haw. 2021). Although
    we take a slightly different path than the district court, we
    affirm the denial of qualified immunity.
    I. BACKGROUND
    This is an appeal from the district court’s decision
    denying Seguirant qualified immunity. Because this case was
    decided at the motion to dismiss stage, we have taken the
    facts from the Third Amended Complaint (TAC) and, for
    purposes of this appeal, will assume them to be true. See
    UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners LLC,
    
    718 F.3d 1006
    , 1014 (9th Cir. 2013).
    A. Factual History
    Hitoshi Yoshikawa is a Japanese national and lawful
    permanent resident who resides in Hawai‘i. In 2014, he
    bought waterfront property in Kane‘ohe and hired a licensed
    architect (Defendant James Schmit) and contractor
    (Defendant Greg Talboys) to secure design plans and permits
    to renovate the property in compliance with applicable
    regulations. Yoshikawa’s plans were complicated by the fact
    that a nonconforming structure had previously been built
    within the shoreline setback area. Schmit secured permitting
    to commence the project, and Talboys started work in
    November 2015.
    Defendant-Appellant Troy Seguirant (Seguirant) is a
    building inspector for the City and County of Honolulu.
    Seguirant inspected the site at least nine times between
    6                  YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT
    December 2015 and May 4, 2016.1 During these inspections,
    Seguirant did not raise any issues or concerns related to the
    scope of the project.
    On May 6, 2016, however, Seguirant issued a Notice of
    Violation and Stop Work Order on the Project (May NOV),
    alleging that the project inappropriately reconstructed the
    nonconforming structure within the shoreline setback without
    a new building permit. Schmit and Talboys contacted the
    Department of Planning and Permitting (DPP) in an effort to
    have the May NOV rescinded, but they were instructed that
    NOVs were unappealable and they would have to wait to
    appeal until a formal Notice of Order (NOO) was issued. In
    October 2016, Acting DPP Director Art Challacombe issued
    a written letter (Challacombe letter) stating that a revised
    proposal from Schmit was acceptable. The letter authorized
    Yoshikawa to submit an application for a building permit,
    leading Yoshikawa to expend substantial resources revising
    and resubmitting the plans in December 2016.
    On February 2, 2017, while in Yoshikawa’s yard, Talboys
    overheard Seguirant telling the next-door neighbor, “I keep
    shutting them down but f--- [expletive] these Haoles2 don’t
    listen, that’s why I try [sic] keep it local.” (first alteration in
    1
    Yoshikawa alleges that this frequency of inspection was
    significantly higher than usual—that typically inspections are conducted
    only two or three times for such a project.
    2
    The word “haole” means “foreigner” in Hawaiian. In the modern
    vernacular “haole” typically refers to Caucasians or others who are not
    “locals.” It is sometimes regarded as a derogatory epithet. See Doe v.
    Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est., 
    596 F.3d 1036
    , 1040 n.3
    (9th Cir. 2010); Kaulia v. County of Maui, 
    504 F. Supp. 2d 969
    , 975 n.9
    (D. Haw. 2007). Both Schmit and Talboys are white.
    YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT                              7
    original). Following this statement, on March 14, 2017,
    Seguirant issued an NOO (March NOO) alleging that the
    work violated the approved building permit and a new
    building permit was required. Yoshikawa appealed the
    March NOO to the Board of Building Appeals (BBA). In the
    meantime, an Amended Building Permit consistent with the
    Challacombe letter was issued, DPP officials assured
    Yoshikawa that the project could proceed, and construction
    resumed.
    Seguirant issued a second NOV in April 2017. In
    addition to repeating the initial allegations, Seguirant further
    alleged that Yoshikawa had supplied false information to
    obtain the Amended Building Permit and a new structure had
    in fact been built on the location of the prior nonconforming
    structure in violation of the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu.
    Yoshikawa continued to challenge the orders, but city
    officials went silent.
    In November 2017, the BBA held a hearing on the March
    NOO and, in early 2018, issued its Findings of Fact,
    Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order (BBA Order).
    The BBA Order determined that a new building permit was
    required for the removal of the walls on the existing structure
    within the shoreline setback area, and that Yoshikawa had
    failed to obtain the appropriate permit reflecting the actual
    work done on the property. Yoshikawa did not appeal the
    order.3
    3
    In the TAC, Yoshikawa alleges that the BBA Order was sent not to
    Yoshikawa’s counsel but instead to an outdated address for Schmit and
    returned as undeliverable. Yoshikawa claims that his failure to appeal the
    8                  YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT
    B. Proceedings Below
    Yoshikawa filed this action in March 2018 against
    Seguirant, the City and County of Honolulu, Schmit, and
    Talboys. Only the first count in the TAC filed against
    Seguirant is relevant to this appeal. Yoshikawa alleged what
    he called an “equal protection claim” under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    .
    Referring to Seguirant’s comment on “haoles” and “keeping
    it local,” Yoshikawa alleged that Seguirant had interfered
    with his “right to make contracts with . . . [his] white or
    Caucasian architect [and] general contractor” and that the
    comments were made “with malice or intent to discriminate
    against [Yoshikawa] based on race, alienage, and/or national
    origin.” Seguirant filed a motion to dismiss the TAC on the
    grounds that it failed to state a claim under § 1981. He also
    asserted qualified immunity.
    In a published opinion, the district court denied
    Seguirant’s motion to dismiss with respect to the § 1981
    claim and denied him qualified immunity. Yoshikawa, 542
    F. Supp. 3d at 1111–12. The district court held that § 1981
    claims “typically arise in employment discrimination cases,”
    and the court would, accordingly, apply the McDonnell
    Douglas test: “Plaintiff must plead that he (1) is a member of
    a protected class, (2) attempted to contract for certain
    services, and (3) was denied the right to contract for those
    services.” Id. at 1110 (citing Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC,
    
    447 F.3d 1138
    , 1145 (9th Cir. 2006)). The court concluded
    that by alleging “that Seguirant, motiv[at]ed by racial animus,
    tried to prevent the Project from proceeding by engaging in
    BBA Order was the result of not receiving the order. The TAC alleged
    due process violations under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     by the City and County of
    Honolulu. This claim is not before us in this appeal.
    YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT                       9
    multiple inspections and issuing multiple violations,”
    Yoshikawa had made “sufficient factual allegations to state
    a Section 1981 claim against Seguirant.” 
    Id. at 1111
    . The
    district court rejected Seguirant’s argument that Yoshikawa
    had failed to allege that racial animus was the “but-for” cause
    of the failure of Yoshikawa’s project and that, in light of the
    BBA Order finding building code violations, Yoshikawa
    could not make such a showing. 
    Id. at 1112
    . The court
    observed that “[i]t may be the case that the Project violated
    the City’s ordinances and that Seguirant discriminated against
    Plaintiff in enforcing those ordinances because of racial
    animus.” 
    Id.
     “[I]t is possible that Seguirant would not have
    enforced the City’s ordinances in the precise manner that he
    did if [Yoshikawa’s] contractor and architect were of a
    different race.” 
    Id.
    The district court also rejected Seguirant’s assertion that
    he was entitled to qualified immunity. 
    Id.
     Seguirant argued
    that even if Yoshikawa had stated a § 1981 claim against him,
    the right was not clearly established because there is a circuit
    split concerning the applicability of the fourth prong of the
    McDonnell Douglas test outside of the employment context.
    See Lindsey, 
    447 F.3d at 1145
     (discussing a split between the
    Sixth and Seventh Circuits over whether, outside of the
    employment context, a plaintiff must prove that services were
    made available to persons not members of the protected class;
    declining to decide the issue). The district court held that,
    even if the fourth element of McDonnell Douglas applied, it
    would not protect Seguirant here because the “right to be free
    from such invidious discrimination . . . is so well established
    and so essential to the preservation of our constitutional order
    that all public officials must be charged with knowledge of
    it.” Yoshikawa, 542 F. Supp. 3d at 1112 (quoting Williams v.
    10               YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT
    Alhambra Sch. Dist. No 68, 
    234 F. Supp. 3d 971
    , 978–79 (D.
    Ariz. 2017)).
    Seguirant timely appealed.
    II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The district court had original jurisdiction over this action
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    , which grants jurisdiction to
    well-pleaded questions of federal law. We have appellate
    jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and the collateral order doctrine. See
    Plumhoff v. Rickard, 
    572 U.S. 765
    , 771–72 (2014); Johnson
    v. Jones, 
    515 U.S. 304
    , 309–12 (1995).
    We review de novo a government officer or employee’s
    entitlement to qualified immunity. S.B. v. County of San
    Diego, 
    864 F.3d 1010
    , 1013 (9th Cir. 2017). On a Rule
    12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “the court accepts the facts
    alleged in the complaint as true,” and “[d]ismissal can be
    based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence
    of sufficient facts alleged.” UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d
    at 1014 (alteration in original) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica
    Police Dep’t, 
    901 F.2d 696
    , 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).
    III. DISCUSSION
    Seguirant is here on appeal from the denial of qualified
    immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields
    officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not
    violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
    YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT                      11
    which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v.
    Luna, 
    577 U.S. 7
    , 11 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v.
    Callahan, 
    555 U.S. 223
    , 231 (2009)). Because qualified
    immunity is immunity from suit—and thus “an entitlement
    not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,”
    Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
    472 U.S. 511
    , 526 (1985)—“a ruling on
    [qualified immunity] should be made early in the proceedings
    so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the
    defense is dispositive,” Saucier v. Katz, 
    533 U.S. 194
    , 200
    (2001). In a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of
    a constitutional right, there are two steps to a qualified
    immunity claim. First, we ask whether “[t]aken in the light
    most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts
    alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional
    right?” 
    Id. at 201
    . If the answer to that question is “no,” the
    complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See
    
    id.
     If the answer to that question is “yes,” we then ask
    whether the constitutional or statutory right was “clearly
    established,” that is, “whether it would be clear to a
    reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
    situation he confronted.” 
    Id.
     at 201–02. The second question
    goes to “whether the officer had fair notice,” Brosseau v.
    Haugen, 
    543 U.S. 194
    , 198 (2004) (per curiam), because
    “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent
    or those who knowingly violate the law,’” Ziglar v. Abbasi,
    
    137 S. Ct. 1843
    , 1867 (2017) (quoting Malley v. Briggs,
    
    475 U.S. 335
    , 341 (1986)).
    In support of his claim for qualified immunity, Seguirant
    makes two arguments. First, he contends that Yoshikawa has
    not and cannot state a claim under § 1981 because Yoshikawa
    12               YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT
    “bears the burden of showing that race was a but-for cause of
    [his] injury.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n Afr. Am.-Owned
    Media, 
    140 S. Ct. 1009
    , 1014 (2020). Seguirant argues that
    the BBA Order established that Yoshikawa was in violation
    of the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu. Thus, there is an
    independent reason for the issuance of the March NOO, and
    Yoshikawa cannot prove that race was the but-for cause of his
    injury. Second, Seguirant argues that, even if Yoshikawa can
    allege a but-for cause of his injury, Seguirant is entitled to
    qualified immunity from suit because the elements of a
    § 1981 non-employment action are not clearly established.
    A. Whether Yoshikawa Has Stated a § 1981 Claim
    Section 1981 of Title 42 provides:
    All persons within the jurisdiction of the
    United States shall have the same right in
    every State and Territory to make and enforce
    contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
    and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
    and proceedings for the security of persons
    and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
    YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT                              13
    and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
    penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
    every kind, and to no other.
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    (a).4 Damage actions against public officers
    under § 1981 have a complex history. See, e.g., Jett, 491 U.S.
    at 711–31 (plurality opinion). Initially, “Congress did not
    4
    Section 1981 was adopted as part of the Enforcement Act of 1870,
    also referred to as the Civil Rights Act of 1870. Enforcement Act of 1870,
    ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 
    16 Stat. 144
    . The first section of the Enforcement Act
    reenacted portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Civil Rights Act of
    1866, ch. 31, § 1, 
    14 Stat. 27
    . The purpose of those acts “was to eradicate
    the Black Codes, laws enacted by Southern legislatures imposing a range
    of civil disabilities on freedmen.” Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v.
    Pennsylvania, 
    458 U.S. 375
    , 386 (1982). The Civil Rights Act of 1866
    had been adopted pursuant to § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. But with
    lingering doubts over the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
    Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate any question
    of its constitutionality. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
    392 U.S. 409
    ,
    436 (1968); Hurd v. Hodge, 
    334 U.S. 24
    , 32–33 (1948). The Court has
    ascribed § 1981 to Congress’s power under both the Thirteenth and
    Fourteenth Amendments. Jett v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 
    491 U.S. 701
    ,
    711–31 (1989); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 
    410 U.S. 431
    , 439–40 & n.11 (1973); Gibson v. Mississippi, 
    162 U.S. 565
    , 580
    (1896).
    The question of the source of Congress’s power is relevant because
    it demonstrates that principles found in both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
    Amendments animate the statute. The Thirteenth Amendment reaches
    both state and private action; the Fourteenth Amendment reaches state
    action alone. Unlike complaints brought under § 1983, § 1981 reaches
    both private action and state action, see Runyon v. McCrary, 
    427 U.S. 160
    ,
    168 (1976); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 
    421 U.S. 454
    , 459–60 (1975);
    Jones, 
    392 U.S. at
    441–43, a principle now made express in § 1981(c).
    Seguirant acted under color of state law. As a remedy for actions under
    color of law, Congress had authority to enact § 1981 under either the
    Thirteenth or the Fourteenth Amendments.
    14               YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT
    adopt a private enforcement mechanism for violations of
    § 1981.” Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1015. Nevertheless, in 1975,
    the Court read an implied right of action for damages into
    § 1981. Johnson, 
    421 U.S. at
    459–60. In 1989, however, the
    Court held that § 1981 did not create an action for damages
    against state actors. Jett, 
    491 U.S. at
    731–32. The Court
    reasoned that Congress crafted § 1983 as its remedial scheme
    for enforcing the rights enumerated in § 1981. See id. (“That
    we have read § 1 of the 1866 Act to reach private action and
    have implied a damages remedy to effectuate the declaration
    of rights contained in that provision does not authorize us to
    do so in the context of the ‘state action’ portion of § 1981,
    where Congress has established its own remedial scheme [in
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    ].”).
    In the meantime, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
    of 1991, which added § 1981(c) to the statute. That
    subsection provides that “[t]he rights protected by this section
    are protected against impairment by nongovernmental
    discrimination and impairment under color of State law.”
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    (c). Although most circuits have continued
    to follow Jett and deny a private right of action against state
    actors, see Buntin v. City of Boston, 
    857 F.3d 69
    , 72 n.3 (1st
    Cir. 2017) (cataloguing cases), we have held that the Civil
    Rights Act of 1991 statutorily overruled Jett. Fed’n of Afr.
    Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 
    96 F.3d 1204
    , 1210–14
    (9th Cir. 1996). We thus recognize a § 1981 damages action
    against state actors.
    In Comcast, the Supreme Court addressed the elements of
    a claim under § 1981. The Court observed that § 1981’s “text
    does not expressly discuss causation, [but] it is suggestive.”
    140 S. Ct. at 1015. The Court found “further clues” in “[t]he
    larger structure and history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866”
    YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT                     15
    and in the history of the Court’s recognition of an implied
    private right of action. Id. at 1015–16. Drawing from those
    sources, the Court held that § 1981 incorporates an “on
    account of race ” or “by reason of race” requirement. Id.; see
    Johnson, 
    421 U.S. at
    459–60 (holding that § 1981 “affords a
    federal remedy against discrimination . . . on the basis of
    race”).    The Court concluded that an allegation of
    discrimination on the basis of race is a “but-for” element of
    a claim brought under § 1981. See Comcast, 140 S. Ct.
    at 1014–15.
    Seguirant argues that the district court should have
    granted his motion to dismiss Yoshikawa’s § 1981 claim
    because Yoshikawa cannot satisfy Comcast’s standard. The
    core of Seguirant’s argument lies in the findings of fact and
    conclusions of law issued by the BBA. The BBA Order
    concluded that
    upon the inspection by the Department’s
    Building Inspectors, it was determined that
    the existing structure [on Yoshikawa’s
    property] was demolished and a new structure
    was erected in its place which exceeded the
    scope of the Building Permit and that
    Petitioner needed a new building permit
    which reflected the actual work being done on
    the Property. Furthermore, work done on
    non-conforming structures is only limited to
    repair and alteration, not replacement or
    reconstruction.
    The BBA affirmed the notice of violation issued by Seguirant
    in May 2016. Because Yoshikawa did not appeal from the
    BBA’s Order, the district court ruled that it must be given
    16               YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT
    preclusive effect, a ruling not challenged by Yoshikawa. See
    Yoshikawa, 542 F. Supp. 3d at 1108 n.4.
    Seguirant contends that Yoshikawa’s undisputed violation
    of building regulations creates an absolute defense to any
    claim of but-for causation. As Seguirant puts it: “‘If a
    complaint identifies independent non-discriminatory reasons
    for an alleged contractual impairment, a § 1981 claim is
    rendered implausible.’” Opening Brief for Defendant-
    Appellant at 12 (quoting Sharifi Takieh v. Banner Health,
    
    515 F. Supp. 3d 1026
    , 1035 (D. Ariz. 2021), aff’d sub nom.
    Takieh v. Banner Health, No. 21-15326, 
    2022 WL 474170
    (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 2022)).
    We disagree, for two reasons. First, despite Seguirant’s
    contentions otherwise, the district court applied the
    appropriate but-for standard to Yoshikawa’s pleadings. Not
    only did the district court label that section of its opinion
    “But-for Causation,” it cited Comcast and applied the case’s
    “because of” standard. Yoshikawa, 542 F. Supp. 3d at 1112.
    The district court concluded: “It may be the case that the
    Project violated the City’s ordinances and that Seguirant
    discriminated against Plaintiff in enforcing those ordinances
    because of racial animus.” Id. (second emphasis added). The
    district court correctly determined that it is legally possible
    for an individual to commit a technical violation of a
    regulation and for enforcement of that regulation still to be
    discriminatory if the government would not have enforced the
    regulation in that manner but for the plaintiff’s race. See
    Elliot-Park v. Manglona, 
    592 F.3d 1003
    , 1006–09 (9th Cir.
    2010).
    Second, Seguirant’s assertion would mean that a plaintiff
    would lose on a § 1981 claim as long as the defendant
    YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT                       17
    provided some justification for the discriminatory act. Here,
    Seguirant effectively argues that he would be entitled to
    qualified immunity even if he had explicitly declared that he
    only ever enforced the regulation against disfavored racial
    groups and would not have enforced it but for their race.
    Seguirant’s position is contrary to foundational Fourteenth
    Amendment principles incorporated in § 1981. The
    Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No State shall make or
    enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its
    jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
    amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Seguirant’s reading is in
    tension with the Supreme Court’s analysis of § 1981 in
    General Building Contractors Ass’n.             See 
    458 U.S. at
    386–90; see also supra at 13 n.4. Emphasizing the
    statute’s close relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment, the
    Court explicitly stated that the statute targeted the
    enforcement of “facially neutral” laws applied with
    discriminatory intent in the post-war South. Gen. Bldg.
    Contractors, 
    458 U.S. at
    385–87. To hold, then, that any
    violation of a facially neutral law provides an absolute shield
    to § 1981 would defeat a central principle of the statute.
    Rather, the statute’s history strongly suggests that sufficiently
    persuasive evidence of discriminatory enforcement can
    demonstrate but-for causation under § 1981, even in an as-
    applied challenge.
    Moreover, we have long understood that a law may be
    fair on its face but grossly unfair in its enforcement. The
    classic case is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
    118 U.S. 356
     (1886).
    Yick Wo operated a laundry in San Francisco. The city
    ordinance provided that no person could operate a laundry in
    San Francisco without obtaining consent from the board of
    supervisors, “except the same be located in a building
    constructed either of brick or stone.” 
    Id. at 357
     (statement of
    18                 YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT
    facts). Yick Wo alleged that more than 150 persons of
    Chinese ancestry were arrested for operating their laundries,
    while some 80 others operating “under similar conditions,
    [we]re left unmolested.” 
    Id. at 359
    . Citing the Fourteenth
    Amendment and what is now § 1981(a), the Court held that
    “[t]hough the law . . . be fair on its face, and impartial in
    appearance,” it may be “applied and administered by public
    authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand.” Id.
    at 373–74. Such maladministration was a “denial of equal
    justice” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
    Id. at 374. Yoshikawa’s allegations, if proven, therefore
    establish but-for causation, and the district court did not err
    in concluding they support a denial of Seguirant’s motion to
    dismiss.
    B. Whether Seguirant’s Actions Violated Clearly Established
    Law
    The district court read Yoshikawa’s complaint to claim
    that Seguirant’s “haole” comment demonstrated racial animus
    and that Seguirant, motivated by that “racial animus, tried to
    prevent the Project from proceeding by engaging in multiple
    inspections and issuing multiple violations.” Yoshikawa,
    542 F. Supp. 3d at 1111. We have long held that a public
    official is not entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1981 case
    if he is accused of intentional racial discrimination. See
    Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of Se. Jud. Dist., L.A. Cnty., 
    838 F.2d 1031
    , 1050–51 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated on mootness grounds,
    
    490 U.S. 1016
     (1989); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 
    775 F.2d 998
    , 1011 (9th Cir. 1985).5 “The constitutional right to be
    5
    Although Gutierrez was vacated as moot, we have cited the opinion
    favorably—and for this principle in particular—in subsequent decisions.
    See, e.g., Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 
    936 F.2d 1027
    , 1040 (9th Cir.
    YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT                            19
    free from such invidious discrimination is so well established
    and so essential to the preservation of our constitutional order
    that all public officials must be charged with knowledge of
    it.” Flores v. Pierce, 
    617 F.2d 1386
    , 1392 (9th Cir. 1980);
    see Elliot-Park, 
    592 F.3d at
    1008–09 (same).
    Seguirant argues that we have granted qualified immunity
    to officials alleged to have acted with racial animus. But the
    single case Seguirant cites, Wong v. United States, 
    373 F.3d 952
     (9th Cir. 2004), only reinforces the district court’s
    decision here. Wong involved an immigration official who
    allegedly discriminated against a non-admitted alien when
    considering whether to parole the alien into the United States.
    Neither we nor the Supreme Court had ever ruled on whether
    such foreign nationals at the border had equal protection
    rights. 
    Id.
     at 970–75. We concluded that Wong’s allegations
    were sufficient to state a discrimination claim under the Fifth
    Amendment, but we then held the “constitutional uncertainty
    regarding race discrimination against nonadmitted aliens”
    was “not sufficiently clear” that a reasonable border official
    would have recognized the Constitution’s application “with
    regard to immigration-related decisions.” 
    Id.
     at 975–76.
    Accordingly, although the complaint did state a constitutional
    violation, there was sufficient legal debate on the
    applicability of the Fifth Amendment in such a situation prior
    to the panel’s decision that a reasonable immigration officer
    might not have known that Wong had equal protection rights
    at all. 
    Id.
     Not only, then, did our decision in Wong close this
    narrow gap by providing clarity on the question, but it also
    1990), as amended on denial of reh’g en banc (1991) (citing Gutierrez for
    the holding that “governmental officials are not entitled to qualified
    immunity from a section 1981 or section 1983 action based on intentional
    discrimination”).
    20               YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT
    demonstrated the very limited circumstances under which a
    person acting under color of law could commit a
    constitutional violation based on intentional discrimination
    yet still receive qualified immunity. No reasonable
    government official would believe that a homeowner or
    contractor in Hawai‘i lacked constitutional rights under the
    standard set in Wong.
    Seguirant raises a slightly different claim to qualified
    immunity. He points out that the McDonnell Douglas test has
    been used as a framework for analyzing § 1981 claims in the
    employment context. Seguirant argues that there is a circuit
    split over the applicability of the fourth element of the test in
    non-employment cases. See Lindsey, 
    447 F.3d at 1145
    .
    Because there is a circuit split, he claims that there is no
    clearly established law, and he is entitled to qualified
    immunity.
    We are not persuaded by this argument. First, for the
    reasons we have explained, Yoshikawa has adequately pled
    a violation under color of law of a clearly established
    right—the right to be free from racial animus in public
    decisions—under the Fourteenth Amendment. That is
    sufficient to deny Seguirant qualified immunity. But, second,
    we are not persuaded that the McDonnell Douglas test is the
    proper measure of a § 1981 claim at the motion to dismiss
    stage. Even accepting Seguirant’s claim that there is a circuit
    split over the proper McDonnell Douglas standard in this
    context, his argument is irrelevant to qualified immunity. In
    Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the Supreme Court held that
    “under a notice pleading system, it is not appropriate to
    require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie
    case” under McDonnell Douglas. 
    534 U.S. 506
    , 511 (2002).
    The McDonnell Douglas test “is an evidentiary standard, not
    YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT                     21
    a pleading requirement” and is therefore both inapposite to
    claim sufficiency and inappropriate to apply at the motion to
    dismiss stage. 
    Id.
     at 510–11. Following Swierkiewicz, we
    have made clear that the evidentiary strictures of McDonnell
    Douglas do not determine the sufficiency of a § 1981 claim.
    Maduka v. Sunrise Hosp., 
    375 F.3d 909
    , 912 (9th Cir. 2004)
    (“[T]here is little doubt that Swierkiewicz governs complaints
    in section 1981 discrimination actions.”). We held that “in
    order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a
    complaint asserting a claim . . . pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    ”
    need only contain a short and plain statement under Rule 8.
    Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
    Simply put, invoking McDonnell Douglas at this stage
    created unnecessary confusion over the clearly established
    law test for qualified immunity. As an evidentiary standard,
    the McDonnell Douglas factors do not determine whether a
    defendant’s conduct violated a clearly established right;
    instead, they are used only as a potential means to determine
    whether a plaintiff has created a triable dispute of fact
    regarding discriminatory intent. See Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at
    1019 (“For its part, McDonnell Douglas sought only to
    supply a tool for assessing claims, typically at summary
    judgment, when the plaintiff relies on indirect proof of
    discrimination.”); Lowe, 
    775 F.2d at
    1006–07. Indeed,
    McDonnell Douglas is not the sine qua non of § 1981 claims;
    “a plaintiff can prove disparate treatment either (1) by direct
    evidence . . . or (2) by using the burden-shifting framework
    set forth in McDonnell Douglas.” Young v. United Parcel
    Serv., Inc., 
    575 U.S. 206
    , 213 (2015); see also McGinest v.
    GTE Serv. Corp., 
    360 F.3d 1103
    , 1122 (9th Cir. 2004).
    We think McDonnell Douglas is inapplicable in the
    qualified immunity context for another reason. The purpose
    22               YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT
    of the second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry is to
    ensure that public officials are on full notice that their
    conduct violates the Constitution, and that they acted in spite
    of that. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206 (“Qualified immunity
    operates . . . to ensure that before [governmental officials] are
    subjected to suit, [they] are on notice their conduct is
    unlawful.”). The McDonnell Douglas test is not suited to that
    purpose. As an evidentiary framework, it guides the litigants
    in preparing their case. Nothing in that test is designed to put
    officials on notice of what the Constitution demands. Indeed,
    the disputed fourth step of McDonnell Douglas would require
    a plaintiff in a non-employment case to prove that similar
    services were available to similarly situated individuals who
    were not members of the plaintiff’s protected class. Lindsey,
    
    447 F.3d at 1145
    . Nothing in that fourth step would apprise
    a public official that his conduct was in violation of the
    Fourteenth Amendment. Put another way, the disagreement
    over the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test does not
    represent a circuit split on “an issue so central to the cause of
    action alleged, [that] a reasonable official lacks the notice
    required before imposing liability.” Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1868
    (citation omitted).
    Thus, while the district court erred by applying
    McDonnell Douglas, it correctly determined that the
    complaint stated a claim for racial discrimination under
    § 1981 based upon actions—intentional discrimination in the
    enforcement of building codes, evidenced by statements
    asserting racial animus as the but-for cause of the official’s
    actions—that a reasonable government official would have
    known violated clearly established constitutional and
    statutory rights.
    YOSHIKAWA V. SEGUIRANT                 23
    IV. CONCLUSION
    We affirm the district court’s order denying Seguirant
    qualified immunity.
    AFFIRMED.