Jeffrey Sharp v. Christian Stringer , 592 F. App'x 581 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             FEB 2 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JEFFREY G. SHARP,                                No. 13-35465
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 6:12-cv-00140-AA
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CHRISTIAN STRINGER; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Ann L. Aiken, Chief Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 21, 2015**
    Before:        CANBY, GOULD, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Jeffrey G. Sharp appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and interference
    with familial association. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    review de novo, and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
    765 F.3d 999
    , 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (motion
    to dismiss); Crowley v. Nev. ex rel. Nev. Sec’y of State, 
    678 F.3d 730
    , 733-34 (9th
    Cir. 2012) (summary judgment). We affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sharp’s false
    arrest and malicious prosecution claims against defendants Houck, Brenner, and
    Stringer because Sharp failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
    whether Houck and Brenner, the arresting officers, or Stringer, the prosecutor who
    advised them, had a reasonable basis to believe that Sharp violated Oregon Revised
    Statutes § 163.200. See Smith v. Almada, 
    640 F.3d 931
    , 937-39 (9th Cir. 2011)
    (probable cause constitutes a defense to false arrest and malicious prosecution
    under federal law); Gustafson v. Payless Drug Stores Nw., Inc., 
    525 P.2d 118
    ,
    119-20 (Or. 1974) (probable cause is a complete defense to malicious prosecution
    under Oregon law); Bacon v. City of Tigard, 
    724 P.2d 885
    , 886 (Or. Ct. App.
    1986) (same for false arrest). We reject Sharp’s contention that a prior judicial
    determination as to his mother’s competence was required to support a finding of
    probable cause.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sharp’s claim for
    interference with familial association because Sharp failed to raise a genuine
    dispute of material fact as to whether any defendant caused unwarranted
    2                                       13-35465
    interference with Sharp’s association with his mother. See Crowe v. County of San
    Diego, 
    608 F.3d 406
    , 441 n.23 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard for a claim of deprivation
    of familial companionship is “unwarranted interference”).
    The district court properly dismissed Sharp’s claim for damages against
    defendant Kemper because all of Kemper’s alleged actions were taken in the
    performance of prosecutorial functions. See Heinemann v. Satterberg, 
    731 F.3d 914
    , 918 (9th Cir. 2013) (prosecutor has absolute immunity for decision to initiate
    a prosecution); Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 
    169 F.3d 636
    , 643
    (9th Cir. 1999) (same for conduct before grand juries). Although Sharp’s amended
    complaint also sought declaratory relief in addition to damages, because the relief
    Sharp requested would not clarify any legal relations in issue or resolve any
    controversy between the parties, we uphold the dismissal of Sharp’s claim against
    Kemper in its entirety. See United States v. Washington, 
    759 F.2d 1353
    , 1357 (9th
    Cir. 1985) (en banc) (declaratory relief should be denied when the relief requested
    “will neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in
    issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from the uncertainty and
    controversy faced by the parties.”).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                     13-35465