United States v. Duane Eleby , 672 F. App'x 775 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    JAN 11 2017
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No.   13-50462
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                D.C. No.
    2:12-cr-00159-MMM-5
    v.
    DUANE LEWIS ELEBY,                               MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 9, 2017**
    Pasadena, California
    Before:      KOZINSKI and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,***
    District Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
    page 2
    1. To apply the penalties under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b), the government need
    not “prove that the defendant knew the type or quantity of the controlled
    substance.” See United States v. Jefferson, 
    791 F.3d 1013
    , 1015 (9th Cir. 2015);
    United States v. Carranza, 
    289 F.3d 634
    , 644 (9th Cir. 2002). It is sufficient that
    Eleby admitted that the controlled substance he was carrying was, in fact,
    approximately 4,922 grams of powder cocaine. Because his sentence of 90 months
    falls within the statutory range under section 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), it doesn’t violate
    either Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000), or Alleyne v. United States,
    
    133 S. Ct. 2151
     (2013).
    2. Relying on United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz, 
    787 F.3d 581
     (1st Cir.
    2015), Eleby argues that he pled guilty only to aiding and abetting. Although the
    indictment in Encarnación-Ruiz, like the indictment in this case, charged the
    defendants with “aiding and abetting each other,” neither party in that case
    questioned that the defendant was liable only as an aider and abettor. 
    Id.
     at 591–92.
    Moreover, the plea agreement in Encarnación-Ruiz showed that the defendant only
    admitted to “aiding and abetting another co-defendant.” 
    Id.
     at 592 (citing the plea
    agreement). By contrast, Eleby’s indictment and plea agreement affirmatively
    page 3
    show that he was charged with and pled guilty to possession with intent to
    distribute a controlled substance as both a principal and an aider and abettor.
    3. Because we don’t examine Eleby’s sentence under the aiding and
    abetting theory of liability, we don’t address whether Rosemond v. United States,
    
    134 S. Ct. 1240
     (2014) changed the mens rea requirement for aiding and abetting a
    § 841(a)(1) offense. See Jefferson, 791 F.3d at 1017.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-50462

Citation Numbers: 672 F. App'x 775

Judges: Kozinski, Watford, Bennett

Filed Date: 1/11/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024