Keri Miglioretto v. Carolyn Colvin , 674 F. App'x 667 ( 2017 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JAN 06 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    KERI MIGLIORETTO,                                No. 13-36047
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 6:12-cv-01136-JE
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
    of Social Security,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Malcolm F. Marsh, District Judge, Presiding
    **
    Submitted January 4, 2017
    Before:        PREGERSON, LEAVY, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    Keri Miglioretto appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
    Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability
    insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, after an administrative
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    law judge (ALJ) concluded that Miglioretto did not overcome the presumption of
    continuing non-disability from a previous decision finding her not disabled. We
    affirm.
    We review the district court’s order de novo, and may set aside the denial of
    benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or contains legal error.
    42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Molina v. Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    , 1110 (9th Cir. 2012).
    1. The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting
    Miglioretto’s subjective complaints, including her daily activities, providers’
    observations, and lack of motivation to work. See Smolen v. Chater, 
    80 F.3d 1273
    ,
    1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing factors considered in evaluating credibility); see
    also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 
    533 F.3d 1035
    , 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (lack of motivation
    to work); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 
    242 F.3d 1144
    , 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (tendency to
    exaggerate); cf. Orn v. Astrue, 
    495 F.3d 625
    , 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (daily activities).
    2. The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting
    certain medical opinions in determining Miglioretto’s residual functional capacity
    (RFC). 
    Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041
    (reciting standard). The ALJ properly
    rejected the opinions of treating providers Stephan Ames, M.D., James Morris,
    M.D., and Ron Lechnyr, Ph.D., D.W.W., and examining provider Ryan Scott,
    Ph.D., because the providers’ opinions were based on Miglioretto’s properly
    2
    discounted credibility and were inconsistent with their own objective findings and
    the medical record. 
    Id. (permitting ALJ
    to reject opinion based on claimant’s
    incredible self-reports). Any error in not expressly rejecting Dr. Lechnyr’s opinion
    based on Miglioretto’s discounted credibility is harmless, because it is
    “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Brown-Hunter v.
    Colvin, 
    806 F.3d 487
    , 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    3. Miglioretto contends that the presumption of continuing non-disability
    under Chavez v. Bowen, 
    844 F.2d 691
    , 693 (9th Cir. 1988) does not apply. She
    argues that changed conditions rebut the presumption of non-disability, her panic
    disorder and depression are more severe, her degenerative disc disease and obesity
    are new impairments, and the ALJ de facto reopened her prior application by
    reassessing the evidence. The ALJ properly determined that neither Miglioretto’s
    new nor existing impairments altered the original RFC, and that there had been no
    legally significant change in age category, so as to overcome the presumption of
    continuing non-disability. Vasquez v. Astrue, 
    572 F.3d 586
    , 597-98 (9th Cir. 2009)
    (citing legally significant age change as a changed circumstance); Lester v. Chater,
    
    81 F.3d 821
    , 827 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing increased severity of impairment).
    Additionally, the ALJ’s discussion of the merits, followed by a denial of
    Miglllioretto’s claims as barred by the continued presumption of non-disability, did
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    not constitute a reopening. See Krumpelman v. Heckler, 
    767 F.2d 586
    , 589 (9th
    Cir. 1985). The ALJ compared the claims to determine whether the presumption
    should apply, and did not “consider[] ‘on the merits’ the issue of [Miglioretto’s]
    disability during the already-adjudicated period.” 
    Lester, 81 F.3d at 827
    n.3
    (quoting Gregory v. Bowen, 
    844 F.2d 664
    , 666 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also
    
    Krumpelman, 767 F.2d at 589
    . Moreover, the ALJ’s alternative, unchallenged step
    5 conclusion that Miglioretto can perform other work based on the well-supported
    and unchanged RFC determination renders any error in evaluating Miglioretto’s
    current impairments inconsequential. See 
    Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492
    .
    4. Finally, the ALJ provided a reason “germane to the witness” for rejecting
    the testimony of Miglioretto’s ex-husband, lay witness Brian Miglioretto. The ALJ
    noted that Brian’s testimony was similar to Miglioretto’s properly rejected
    subjective complaints. See 
    Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114
    (reciting standard); Valentine
    v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    574 F.3d 685
    , 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing rejection
    of claimant’s own subjective complaints as a germane reason). Any error in not
    explicitly rejecting Brian’s testimony was inconsequential to the ultimate
    nondisability determination. 
    Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492
    .
    AFFIRMED.
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