Bingwei Liu v. Loretta E. Lynch ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                      FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                      MAR 29 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                  U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BINGWEI LIU,                                 No. 14-72141
    Petitioner,                   Agency No. A088-116-463
    v.                                 MEMORANDUM*
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted March 8, 2016
    Pasadena, California
    Before: MURPHY,** PAEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    Bingwei Liu, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the
    order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal
    from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
    precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Senior Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    and withholding of removal. This court has jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
    § 1252, and we review the BIA’s determination for substantial evidence.
    Zehatye v. Gonzales, 
    453 F.3d 1182
    , 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2006). To prevail
    on appeal, Liu must show the record not only supports, but compels the
    conclusion that the findings and decision of the BIA are erroneous. Singh
    v. INS, 
    134 F.3d 962
    , 966 (9th Cir. 1998). We deny the petition in part,
    grant it in part, and remand to the BIA for further proceedings.
    Liu’s application alleged past and future persecution based on both
    political opinion and religion. His political-opinion asylum claim was
    based on his opposition to China’s family planning policy. Having
    reviewed the record in its entirety, we conclude it does not compel the
    conclusion that any economic harm Liu suffered when the government
    terminated his family’s land lease rose to the level of persecution.
    Gormley v. Ashcroft, 
    364 F.3d 1172
    , 1178 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[M]ere
    economic disadvantage alone does not rise to the level of persecution.”).
    Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Liu is not
    entitled to asylum based on past persecution for his political beliefs. 1
    1
    To be entitled to withholding of removal, a petitioner must
    demonstrate “it is more likely than not” that his life or freedom would be
    threatened by persecution based on his race, religion, nationality,
    (continued...)
    -2-
    As to Liu’s asylum claim based on his religious beliefs, the totality of
    the circumstances compels the conclusion Liu suffered past persecution on
    account of his Christian religion. See Korablina v. INS, 
    158 F.3d 1038
    ,
    1044 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The key question is whether, looking at the
    cumulative effect of all the incidents a petitioner has suffered, the treatment
    she received rises to the level of persecution.”). Liu was arrested by
    Chinese authorities while attending Christian services at a home church.
    He was held at gunpoint, handcuffed, and transported to a detention
    facility. On the first day of his detention, Liu was physically assaulted by
    police officers during an interrogation. He was also instructed to stand
    motionless with his face against a wall and was struck with a baton when he
    moved. During a second interrogation, Liu was hit with a baton when he
    refused to provide the names of other members of his church. Liu was
    interrogated a third time and beaten when he refused to plead guilty. Liu
    remained in detention for seventeen days. He was released only after he
    1
    (...continued)
    membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Kamalthas v.
    INS, 
    251 F.3d 1279
    , 1283 (9th Cir. 2001). This standard is more stringent
    than the “well-founded fear” standard governing asylum claims. Al-Harbi v
    INS, 
    242 F.3d 882
    , 888-89 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Liu is not entitled to
    asylum on his political opinion claim, he is also not entitled to withholding
    of removal on that claim. See Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 
    224 F.3d 1147
    , 1150
    (9th Cir. 2000).
    -3-
    signed a forced confession and paid a fine. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 
    361 F.3d 1194
    , 1203 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding a finding of persecution was compelled
    in a situation where petitioner was detained for a day and a half, physically
    assaulted, and coerced into signing an affidavit promising not to practice
    Christianity).
    Because Liu established past persecution, he is entitled to a rebuttable
    presumption that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution on the
    basis of his religion, and the evidentiary burden shifts to the government to
    rebut the presumption. See Ahmed v. Keisler, 
    504 F.3d 1183
    , 1197 (9th
    Cir. 2007); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Accordingly, we remand for the BIA
    to decide in the first instance whether the government can meet its burden
    to rebut the presumption. See INS v. Ventura, 
    537 U.S. 12
    , 16–18 (2002)
    (per curiam).
    DENIED in part, GRANTED in part, and REMANDED for further
    proceedings.
    The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
    -4-