Jesus Vega-Reynoso v. Loretta E. Lynch , 650 F. App'x 351 ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 17 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JESUS BENJAMIN VEGA-REYNOSO, No. 13-73408
Petitioner, Agency No. A030-462-657
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 13, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, SACK***, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Jesus Benjamin Vega-Reynoso appeals the decision of the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) finding him removable and ineligible for
cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Robert D. Sack, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we deny the petition.
Vega-Reynoso argues that the agency erred in finding that the Government
met its burden to show that his conviction under Nevada Revised Statute § 453.321
qualifies as an aggravated felony. We disagree. The Immigration Judge and the
BIA properly relied on the judgment and indictment to find that he had been
convicted of unlawful sale of a controlled substance. See Descamps v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). Contrary to Vega-Reynoso’s argument that
the judgment was ambiguous as to which statutory subsection he was convicted
under, the judgment explicitly identified that Vega-Reynoso was guilty of
“unlawful sale of a controlled substance.” The judgment also specified that Vega-
Reynoso had pled guilty to the crime “charged in the Information,” and the
Information in turn clarified that the charge was for possession and sale of
methamphetamine. Cf. United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1087 (9th Cir.
2007) (en banc) (declining to consider the indictment in order to clarify the offense
to which the defendant pled guilty because the judgment did not contain “the
critical phrase ‘as charged in the Information’” (quoting Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d
892, 898 (9th Cir. 2004))).
2
Because, as the BIA correctly found, the judgment did not merely recite the
title of the statute of conviction, Vega-Reynoso’s reliance on Vidal, 504 F.3d at
1088, is unavailing. Instead, the record of conviction documents relied on by the
agency establish that Vega-Reynoso’s conviction corresponds to the generic
definition of a drug trafficking crime, see Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53-54
(2006); United States v. Valdavinos-Torres, 704 F.3d 679, 692 (9th Cir. 2012), and
thus qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). See
Rendon v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 967, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2008).
Petition DENIED.
3