United States v. Joseph Haycock , 652 F. App'x 531 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    JUN 14 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 14-30152
    Plaintiff - Appellee,               D.C. No. 4:13-cr-00251-BLW-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JOSEPH RAYMOND HAYCOCK,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Idaho
    B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Argued September 3, 2015
    Seattle, Washington
    Withdrawn from Submission September 21, 2015
    Resubmitted June 10, 2016
    Before: McKEOWN, GOULD, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Joseph Haycock pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Haycock had previously pleaded guilty in Idaho
    state court to sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years in violation of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Idaho Code § 18-1506. At sentencing, the district court concluded that Haycock’s
    state court conviction was for a crime of violence as defined in United States
    Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.2(a) and accordingly determined a base
    offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a). The district court also imposed
    several conditions of supervised release related to Haycock’s status as a sex
    offender. Haycock appeals his sentence and these conditions.
    We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the
    district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. Alba-
    Flores, 
    577 F.3d 1104
    , 1107 (9th Cir. 2009), and we review conditions of
    supervised release for an abuse of discretion, United States v. Napulou, 
    593 F.3d 1041
    , 1044 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.
    Idaho Code § 18-1506 is both overbroad, as it prohibits conduct beyond the
    scope of the generic, federal crime, and divisible, as it includes subsections listing
    alternative offenses. It was thus not error for the district court to reference the state
    indictment to find that Haycock had been convicted of violating subsection 18-
    1506(1)(b). See Medina-Lara v. Holder, 
    771 F.3d 1106
    , 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2014)
    (where statute is overbroad and divisible, court may look to charging document to
    determine if underlying conviction matches generic, federal offense).
    2
    The district court erred, however, in concluding that subsection 18-
    1506(1)(b) matches the elements of the generic, federal offense. We have provided
    two definitions of the generic federal crime “sexual abuse of a minor.” The
    definition relevant here “encompasses statutes where (1) the conduct proscribed is
    [ ] sexual; (2) the statute protects a minor; and (3) the statute requires abuse.”
    United States v. Gomez, 
    757 F.3d 885
    , 904 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations and
    citations omitted). Abuse is “physical or psychological harm in light of the age of
    the victim in question,” and sexual contact with a victim under the age of fourteen
    is per se abusive. 
    Id. (internal quotations
    and citations omitted). The Idaho Court
    of Appeals has explained that “the elements of I.C. § 18-1506(b) are: (1) sexual
    contact, defined as any physical contact; (2) with a minor child under sixteen; and
    (3) with the intent to gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desire of the actor, minor
    child, or third party.” State v. Cochran, 
    239 P.3d 793
    , 795 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010).
    Because the statute does not “expressly include physical or psychological abuse of
    a minor as an element of the crime,” and is “not limited to conduct targeting
    younger children,” it is overbroad. Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 
    589 F.3d 1010
    , 1015
    (9th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, Haycock’s state court conviction for sexual abuse of
    a minor was not categorically a crime of violence and should not have been used to
    3
    enhance his sentence. We vacate Haycock’s sentence and remand for
    resentencing.1
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing conditions of
    supervised release related to Haycock’s sex offender status because it took into
    consideration the 18 U.S.C. § 1335(a) factors, did not base the sentence on clearly
    erroneous facts, and adequately explained the sentence selected. United States v.
    Carty, 
    520 F.3d 984
    , 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also United States v.
    Bainbridge, 
    746 F.3d 943
    , 952–53 (9th Cir. 2014) (district court did not abuse its
    discretion in requiring sexual deviance evaluation for a crime that did not
    constitute a sex offense in light of section 1335(a) factors). We affirm the
    conditions of supervised release.
    AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
    1
    The government withdrew its argument that Haycock’s state conviction
    was an offense presenting a “serious potential risk of physical injury to another”
    under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), and we need not reach this issue. On remand, the
    district court should reconsider its alternative conclusion that Haycock’s state court
    conviction was for a crime of violence under section 4B1.2’s residual clause, in
    light of the government’s concession and superseding Supreme Court precedent
    established by Johnson v. United States, 
    135 S. Ct. 2551
    (2015).
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-30152

Citation Numbers: 652 F. App'x 531

Judges: McKeown, Gould, Smith

Filed Date: 6/14/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024