Dezarie Taylor v. Carolyn Colvin , 667 F. App'x 256 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUN 23 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEZARIE C. TAYLOR, No. 13-36221
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-2141-RSM
(MAT)
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting MEMORANDUM*
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 9, 2016
Seattle, Washington
Before: EBEL,** PAEZ, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Dezarie Taylor challenges the Social Security Commissioner’s decision to
deny Taylor disability and supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits. “[W]e
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable David M. Ebel, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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will disturb the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits only if it is not
supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Brown-Hunter v.
Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Finding neither, we affirm.
1. The Commissioner’s erroneous reference to an earlier disability onset
date than Taylor claimed was harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
1115 (9th Cir. 2012).
2. The Commissioner gave specific and legitimate reasons, supported by
substantial evidence, for discounting the opinions of several of Taylor’s treating
and examining healthcare providers. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31
(9th Cir. 1995). For example, the opinions of examining psychologists Michael
Brown, Ph.D. and Melinda Losee, Ph.D., and treating licensed mental health
counselor Diane Hanson, were inconsistent with Taylor’s treatment notes. See
Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014). Examining consultant
Mark Heilbrunn, M.D.’s opinion, was contrary to Taylor’s overall medical record,
the opinions of several other treating and examining physicians, and Taylor’s
reported daily activities, which included caring for five of her children, cf. Rollins
v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting claimant’s testimony
about her disabling pain because she was able to care for two small children, cook,
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keep the house and do laundry, shop, and attend therapy and other meetings each
week).
The Commissioner properly credited the narrative portion of non-examining
psychologist Leslie Postovoit, Ph.D.’s report, see Nathan v. Colvin, 551 F. App’x
404, 408 (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished); gave specific and legitimate reasons,
supported by substantial evidence, for not giving controlling weight to Taylor’s
Global Assessment Functioning (“GAF”) scores, see Cantrall v. Colvin, 540
F. App’x 607, 609 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished); and properly considered evidence
from treating physician Shelly Dueber, D.O. Any error the Commissioner made in
considering treating physician Gregory May, M.D.’s treatment notes, was
harmless. See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2015).
3. The Commissioner gave “specific, clear and convincing reasons,”
supported by substantial evidence, for deeming Taylor’s credibility to be suspect.
Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 488-89; see also Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613
F.3d 1217, 1224 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010). Those reasons included the fact that Taylor’s
statements about the disabling nature of her conditions, were inconsistent with her
reported activities. See Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857.
4. Substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s determination that
Taylor had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work
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involving, among other limitations, only frequent, rather than constant, “handling
and fingering with her right hand” and not involving “complex or demanding
social exchanges.” See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th
Cir. 2009). Because the Commissioner properly considered and discounted some
of the medical evidence and properly questioned the credibility of Taylor’s
statements regarding the extent of her limitations, the Commissioner did not err in
refusing to recognize additional limitations to Taylor’s RFC.
5. The Commissioner posed an accurate hypothetical question to the
vocational expert, eliciting her testimony that there were jobs that Taylor could
still perform.
AFFIRMED.
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