Stephen Stetson v. West Publishing Corporation ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 30 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    STEPHEN STETSON, individual and all             No.    16-56313
    others similarly situated; SHANE
    LAVIGNE, individual and all others              D.C. No.
    similarly situated; CHRISTINE LEIGH             2:08-cv-00810-RGK-E
    BROWN-ROBERTS, individual and all
    others similarly situated; VALENTIN YURI
    KARPENKO, individual and all others             MEMORANDUM *
    similarly situated; JAKE JEREMIAH
    FATHY, individual and all others similarly
    situated,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    WEST PUBLISHING CORPORATION, a
    Minnesota Corporation, dba BAR/BRI;
    KAPLAN, INC.,
    Defendants - Appellees,
    and
    SETH BRYANT GRISSOM; JAMES
    RALPH GARRISON, III; DUSTIN
    KENNEMER; NATHAN HUNT; JOHN
    KELLEY; JOHN AMARI,
    Objectors - Appellees.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 25, 2017**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: REINHARDT, PAEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal from an award of attorney’s fees and costs
    issued on remand after a previous appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
    1. In a common-fund case such as this one, the district court has discretion
    to apply either the lodestar or the percentage-of-the-fund method in calculating a
    fee award. Stetson v. Grissom, 
    821 F.3d 1157
    , 1165 (9th Cir. 2016). In our
    previous opinion, we held that the district court acted within its discretion in using
    the lodestar method. 
    Id. Our remand
    instructions directed the district court to
    “clearly provide reasons for the factors in its lodestar computation.” 
    Id. at 1167.
    Therefore, the district court did not err in once again employing the lodestar
    method to determine a new fee award on remand.
    2. “Attorneys in common fund cases must be compensated for any delay in
    payment.” Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 
    307 F.3d 997
    , 1010 (9th Cir.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2
    2002). “The lodestar should be computed either using an hourly rate that reflects
    the prevailing rate as of the date of the fee request, to compensate class counsel for
    delays in payment inherent in contingency-fee cases, or using historical rates and
    compensating for delays with a prime-rate enhancement.” 
    Grissom, 821 F.3d at 1166
    . On remand, Appellants submitted supplemental briefing on these two delay
    compensation methods as well as a declaration with updated hourly and prime
    rates as of June 22, 2016. However, the district court’s fee award omitted any
    mention of delay compensation methods or updated 2016 hourly rates and instead
    cited a 2013 filing for class counsel’s claimed rates. The district court erred by
    failing to update the lodestar calculation to compensate for the delayed payment.
    3. The district court based its decision to deny a risk multiplier solely on its
    conclusion that class counsel’s hourly rates already reflected the risks of this
    action. See 
    id. (quoting Stanger
    v. China Elec. Motor, Inc., 
    812 F.3d 734
    , 741 (9th
    Cir. 2016)). Because its determination of the hourly rates was in error, that
    determination cannot support the denial of a risk multiplier. Furthermore, the
    district court based its assessment of the hourly rates on counsel’s 2013 rates and
    the 2015 Real Rate Report, a publication that is not in the record. The district
    court’s decision reveals nothing of the report’s methodology. Use of the Real Rate
    Report may, however, be appropriate if supported by findings that the report
    reflects contemporaneous rates. On remand, the district court should consider anew
    3
    whether to apply a risk factor using class counsel’s updated hourly rate. “We
    emphasize that regardless of whether or not the district court ultimately finds that
    this case requires application of a risk multiplier, it must fully and adequately
    explain the basis for its decision.” 
    Stanger, 812 F.3d at 741
    .
    4. A district court “has discretion to adjust the lodestar upward or downward
    using a multiplier that reflects a host of ‘reasonableness’ factors,” known as the
    Kerr factors. 
    Grissom, 821 F.3d at 1166
    –67 (internal quotation marks omitted)
    (quoting In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 
    654 F.3d 935
    , 941–42 (9th
    Cir. 2011)). “[T]he Kerr factors only warrant a departure from the lodestar figure
    in ‘rare and exceptional cases.’” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. 
    Litig., 654 F.3d at 942
    n.7 (quoting Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 
    214 F.3d 1115
    , 1119 n. 4 (9th
    Cir. 2000)). Appellants have not shown that the district court abused its discretion
    in determining that this was not a rare and exceptional case.
    5. The district court denied costs for expert fees because the amount
    requested for two experts was not justified and the time records submitted by
    Appellants did not reveal which fees were attributed to which expert. Appellants
    rely on a declaration that reveals nothing more specific about the contributions of
    these two experts to the litigation than that Appellants engaged in “extensive
    communications” with them and “consulted with [them] regarding both the range
    of possible damages and the various ways in which settlement might be achieved.”
    4
    This is a vague foundation upon which to rest an entitlement to $29,000 in costs.
    We review a denial of costs for abuse of discretion, see Escriba v. Foster Poultry
    Farms, Inc., 
    743 F.3d 1236
    , 1247–48 (9th Cir. 2014), and Appellants have not
    shown that the district court abused its discretion in denying costs for these expert
    fees.
    We therefore vacate the award of fees and remand for the district court to
    update the lodestar figure with a delay compensation method and to reconsider
    whether or not to apply a risk multiplier. We affirm the award of costs. Each party
    shall bear its own costs on appeal.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, REMANDED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-56313

Judges: Reinhardt, Paez, Smith

Filed Date: 10/30/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024