Candyce Smith v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                                 FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    AUG 29 2022
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CANDYCE LARAE SMITH,                              No.    21-35625
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05882-SKV
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
    Commissioner of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    S. Kate Vaughan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 11, 2022**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: CHRISTEN, LEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
    Candyce Smith challenges the administrative law judge’s (ALJ’s) denial of
    her application for disability-insurance benefits at step four of the sequential
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    analysis applicable to her claim for social security disability benefits.1 The ALJ
    determined that Smith’s allegations concerning the intensity and limiting effects of
    her medical symptoms were inconsistent with the evidence. We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We affirm.2
    We review de novo the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of
    social security benefits, and we will disturb the ALJ’s decision only if it “contains
    legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Ford v. Saul, 
    950 F.3d 1141
    , 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tommasetti v. Astrue, 
    533 F.3d 1035
    , 1038
    (9th Cir. 2008)). When an ALJ determines that the claimant “has presented
    objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be
    expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged,” and there is no evidence
    of malingering, “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of
    her symptoms only by offering specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing
    so.” Ahearn v. Saul, 
    988 F.3d 1111
    , 1116 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).
    1
    Smith initially challenged whether the delegation of authority to the
    Commissioner was constitutional. We grant Smith’s motion to withdraw that
    argument given our decision in Kauffman v. Kijakazi, 
    32 F.4th 843
     (9th Cir. 2022).
    See Dkt. 33.
    2
    Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we recite only those
    necessary to decide this appeal.
    2
    1. Smith argues the ALJ failed to address her limitations from her alleged
    “lumbar impairment” and corresponding inability to sit, stand, or walk for more
    than 15–30 minutes. We are not persuaded. In this case, the ALJ “identif[ied] the
    testimony she found not credible” and “link[ed] that testimony to the particular
    parts of the record supporting her non-credibility determination.” Brown-Hunter v.
    Colvin, 
    806 F.3d 487
    , 494 (9th Cir. 2015). The ALJ grappled with the precise
    limitations that Smith identified concerning her ability to sit, stand, or walk. The
    ALJ then provided several reasons, with citations to the record, why Smith’s
    allegations were not credible. This comports with “our requirements of
    specificity.” Connett v. Barnhart, 
    340 F.3d 871
    , 873 (9th Cir. 2003).
    2. Smith further contends that the ALJ failed to provide “specific, clear and
    convincing reasons” for rejecting her testimony. Smolen v. Chater, 
    80 F.3d 1273
    ,
    1281 (9th Cir. 1996). We conclude that Smith’s objections to the ALJ’s reasoning
    are without merit or do not warrant reversal. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.
    Admin., 
    533 F.3d 1155
    , 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).
    First, the ALJ properly relied on objective medical evidence reflecting large
    swaths of the period when Smith was allegedly disabled. See Rollins v. Massanari,
    
    261 F.3d 853
    , 857 (9th Cir. 2001). We are persuaded that the ALJ’s interpretation
    3
    of the objective medical evidence was reasonable. See Fair v. Bowen, 
    885 F.2d 597
    , 604 (9th Cir. 1989).
    Second, the ALJ properly relied on evidence that Smith could effectively
    manage her symptoms with medication and chiropractic treatment because
    “[i]mpairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not
    disabling.” Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    439 F.3d 1001
    , 1006 (9th Cir.
    2006). As the ALJ found, Smith worked for many years on similar dosages of
    medication.
    Next, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Smith’s presentation to her
    providers without outwardly indicating distress, discomfort, or other behaviors
    associated with pain was inconsistent with her contemporaneous statements that
    she was suffering from continuous, debilitating pain. See Molina v. Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    , 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2012). We are not persuaded that the ALJ
    improperly picked out “a few isolated instances” because the providers’ notes
    about Smith’s presentation were consistent. Garrison v. Colvin, 
    759 F.3d 995
    ,
    1017 (9th Cir. 2014). The ALJ also reasonably relied on evidence showing Smith
    reported decreases in her pain level, or reported no pain at all, to conclude that the
    intensity and persistence of Smith’s impairments were not continuous and
    debilitating. See Molina, 
    674 F.3d at
    1112–13.
    4
    The ALJ also properly relied on Smith’s work and daily activities to support
    her credibility determination. The ALJ reasonably concluded that Smith’s
    continued employment with her alleged limitations from 2014 to 2016, until she
    was laid off as part of a reduction in force, undermined Smith’s allegations. See
    Tommasetti, 
    533 F.3d at 1040
    ; Molina, 
    674 F.3d at 1113
    . Smith’s argument that
    the ALJ speculated why she left work is without merit because Smith testified that
    she was laid off. While Smith’s descriptions of her daily activities were not
    entirely inconsistent with her alleged limitations, the ALJ could properly rely on
    Smith’s statement that she intended to travel. See Tommasetti, 
    533 F.3d at 1040
    .
    The ALJ also properly considered Smith’s use of a cane for her sciatica
    because there was no medical documentation to support this alleged need.
    Verduzco v. Apfel, 
    188 F.3d 1087
    , 1090 (9th Cir. 1999). We reject Smith’s
    argument that the ALJ was required to further develop the record on this issue
    because the medical records before the ALJ, which covered several years, provided
    an adequate basis for the ALJ’s conclusions. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1156.
    Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility determination. See
    Carmickle, 
    533 F.3d at 1162
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    5