United States v. Steven Butcher , 377 F. App'x 628 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               APR 21 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 08-50518
    Plaintiff - Appellee,               D.C. No. 2:07-CR-00749-VBF-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    STEVEN EMORY BUTCHER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Valerie Baker Fairbank, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted April 8, 2010
    Pasadena, California
    Before: PREGERSON and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges, and CONLON,** District
    Judge.
    Steven Emory Butcher was convicted of two counts of willfully and without
    authority setting fire to federal land, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1855
    , as well as
    three misdemeanor offenses. The convictions stem from wildfires Butcher started
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Suzanne B. Conlon, United States District Judge for
    the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    in Los Padres National Forest in 2002 and 2006. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    , and we affirm his convictions and sentence.
    The parties are familiar with the facts of this case, so we repeat them here only as
    necessary.
    Butcher argues some of his convictions overlap to such a degree that they
    violate his rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. Because
    he raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error. United
    States v. Schales, 
    546 F.3d 965
    , 977 (9th Cir. 2008). Contrary to Butcher’s
    contention, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1855
     and 
    36 C.F.R. § 261.52
    (a) are separate and distinct
    offenses because each “requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”
    Blockburger v. United States, 
    284 U.S. 299
    , 304 (1932). Section 1855 requires
    proof that a defendant willfully started a fire; § 261.52(a) does not. United States v.
    Velte, 
    331 F.3d 673
    , 677 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 261.52(a) requires proof that
    a defendant violated a specific Forest Service prohibition against setting fires; §
    1855 does not. Id. at 677-78. Butcher’s argument that § 1855 is a lesser-included
    offense of 
    36 C.F.R. § 261.5
    (e) is equally unavailing. Section 1855 requires proof
    of an element not found in § 261.5(e), namely that a fire be started “without
    authority.”1 We find no error, let alone plain error, in Butcher’s multiple
    convictions.
    2
    We review the district court’s determination of the amount of loss for clear
    error. United States v. Santos, 
    527 F.3d 1003
    , 1006 (9th Cir. 2008). The district
    court determined that Butcher was responsible for $228,000 in losses, one of
    several alternative amounts proposed by Butcher himself. We are not persuaded
    by Butcher’s argument that the district court erred in including fire suppression
    costs in the loss calculation. There was sufficient evidence in the record to
    conclude that Butcher knew or should have known that fire suppression
    expenditures were a reasonably foreseeable result of his actions. See United States
    v. Warr, 
    530 F.3d 1152
    , 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2008).
    Butcher’s contention that the district court impermissibly enhanced his
    sentence based on a loss amount not determined by the jury is squarely foreclosed.
    See United States v. Hickey, 
    580 F.3d 922
    , 932 (9th Cir. 2009). The same is true of
    Butcher’s as-applied Sixth Amendment challenge to his sentence. See United
    States v. Treadwell, 
    593 F.3d 990
    , 1016-18 (9th Cir. 2010).
    Finally, we reject Butcher’s argument that the district court erred by
    including fire suppression costs in the restitution order. The Forest Service
    incurred the suppression costs as a direct result of Butcher’s offenses. The causal
    chain does “not extend so far, in terms of the facts or the time span, as to become
    3
    unreasonable.” United States v. Gamma Tech Indus., Inc., 
    265 F.3d 917
    , 928 (9th
    Cir. 2001).
    AFFIRMED.
    1. At the time of his conviction, 
    36 C.F.R. § 261.5
    (e) merely prohibited
    “[a]llowing a fire to escape from control.” Subsequently, the provision was
    amended to prohibit “[c]ausing and failing to maintain control of a fire that is not a
    prescribed fire that damages the National Forest System.” We do not address the
    question of whether the amended provision raises double jeopardy issues when
    paired with a conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1855
    .
    4