David Maddox v. A. Battle , 585 F. App'x 527 ( 2014 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                             OCT 21 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    DAVID MADDOX,                                    No. 12-15878
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 1:07-cv-01227-MJS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    A. BATTLE, Correctional Officer,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Michael J. Seng, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 8, 2014
    San Francisco, California
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN, THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
    David Maddox appeals from a jury verdict against him following a trial on
    his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
    affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the history of the case, we need not
    recount it here.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    I
    Even assuming, without deciding, that the district court committed
    instructional error by giving a de minimis force instruction, any error fails to meet
    the plain error standard. When viewed as a whole, the jury instructions were not
    “misleading or inadequate to guide the jury’s deliberation.” United States v.
    Shryock, 
    342 F.3d 948
    , 986 (9th Cir. 2003). Further, Maddox’s substantial rights
    were not affected by any error in the instruction on de minimis force. He did not
    demonstrate that it was more probable than not that the jury would have reached a
    different verdict had it been properly instructed. See United States v. Vonn, 
    535 U.S. 55
    , 62–63 (2002); Haddad v. Lockheed Calif. Corp., 
    720 F.2d 1454
    , 1458–59
    (9th Cir. 1983).
    II
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Maddox’s motions
    for appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Palmer v.
    Valdez, 
    560 F.3d 965
    , 970 (9th Cir. 2009). “The decision to appoint counsel is left
    to the sound discretion of the district court.” Johnson v. U.S. Treas. Dep’t, 
    27 F.3d 415
    , 416 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). “[G]rants of such a motion are relatively
    rare” and “appellate reversal of trial court denials is also rare.” United States v.
    30.64 Acres of Land, 
    795 F.2d 796
    , 800 (9th Cir. 1986).
    -2-
    Here, the district court articulated reasonable grounds for its decision on
    each of the motions for appointment. Cf. Solis v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 
    514 F.3d 946
    , 958 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing and remanding to the district court to “provide
    an adequate explanation of its reasons such that its decision may be reviewed . . .
    on appeal”).
    Nor were Maddox’s Fifth Amendment due process rights violated by his
    lack of counsel. He was afforded a full opportunity to adjudicate his claim in
    federal court to a jury.
    AFFIRMED
    -3-