Matthew Smeltzer v. Audrey King ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 8 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATTHEW L. SMELTZER, No. 17-56835
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:14-cv-01251-WGH-WVG
v.
AUDREY KING, MEMORANDUM *
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 5, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and BEA, Circuit Judges, and DRAIN,*** District Judge.
Matthew Smeltzer appeals the denial of his habeas petition seeking relief
from his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator under California’s
Welfare and Institutions Code § 6604. Smeltzer argues that the district court erred
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Gershwin A. Drain, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
in concluding that the California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply
clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it found Smeltzer’s due process
rights were not violated when the trial court precluded defense counsel from asking
questions concerning state case authority on the standard for volitional impairment.
Smeltzer also argues that the district court erred in concluding that the California
Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court
precedent when it upheld the trial court’s decision declining to alter the standard
jury instruction defining “diagnosed mental disorder” to include language that the
disorder must “seriously impair” a person’s ability to control his dangerous
behavior. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We
affirm.
1. Generally, “a petition[er] for federal habeas relief may not challenge
the application of state evidentiary rules[.]” Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d
891, 897 (9th Cir. 1996). However, a petitioner “is entitled to relief if the
evidentiary decision created an absence of fundamental fairness that ‘fatally
infected the trial.’” Id. (quoting Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465
(9th Cir. 1986). Smeltzer has not met his heavy burden of demonstrating the trial
court’s evidentiary decision created an absence of fundamental fairness that fatally
infected the trial. Defense counsel was able to question the state’s experts and
Smeltzer’s expert on the legal requirement to establish a volitional impairment. A
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case-by-case factual recitation of People v. Burris, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113 (Ct. App.
2002) was irrelevant to the jury’s task of determining whether Smeltzer had a
mental illness that made it difficult to control his dangerous behavior.
2. Due process requires that state civil commitment statutes couple proof
of dangerousness with proof of some additional factor such as mental illness.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997). The required degree of an
inability to control behavior is “not [] demonstrable with mathematical
precision[,]” but “there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411, 413 (2002).
California’s standard instruction comports with due process. The state must
prove dangerousness, along with a mental illness which makes it “difficult, if not
impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.” Id. The instruction
required the jury to find that Smeltzer had a diagnosed mental disorder that affects
his ability to control his behavior and predisposes him “to commit criminal sexual
acts to an extent that makes [him] a menace to the health and safety of others.” It
further obligated a jury finding that he is likely to “engage in sexually violent
predatory criminal behavior” because of “a substantial, serious, and well-founded
risk that [he] will engage in such conduct if released in the community.” As both
the state court and the district court found, inherent in this instruction, which
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mimics California’s civil commitment statute, is the requirement that Smeltzer
have serious difficulty controlling his behavior.
Moreover, Smeltzer’s claim must be denied because there is a lack of
“clearly established” Supreme Court precedent on this issue. Wright v. Van Patten,
552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (noting that “because our cases give no clear answer,”
the state court could not have been unreasonable in its application of Supreme
Court precedent).
AFFIRMED.
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