Sandra Taber v. Michael Astrue , 383 F. App'x 664 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 14 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANDRA L. TABER, No. 09-35744
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-05064-JPH
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
James P. Hutton, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 8, 2010 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
The ALJ’s determination that Taber was not credible was supported by
substantial evidence, in particular the medical records that indicated Taber was
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
malingering. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ
did not err in discrediting Taber’s subjective complaints in light of this evidence of
malingering and the lack of supporting medical evidence. Id.; see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c)(2).
In light of the ALJ’s valid adverse credibility determination, the ALJ’s
discounting of the medical opinions related to Taber’s mental impairment was
proper. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995).
The ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. French’s Physical Medical Source
Statement were specific and legitimate. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). Even assuming the ALJ erred in
commenting on whether Dr. French may have a pro-patient bias as a result of his
position as Taber’s treating physician, the ALJ’s numerous other reasons for
rejecting Dr. French’s opinion were supported by substantial evidence, including
the Physical Medical Source Statement’s heavy reliance on Taber’s non-credible
reporting, and contradictions between Dr. French’s opinion and Taber’s other
medical records. See id.; cf. Reddick v. Chatter, 157 F.3d 715, 726 (9th Cir. 1998).
The limitations set forth in the RFC were supported by substantial evidence,
and the ALJ did not err in rejecting a hypothetical incorporating more restrictive
limitations. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2001). Given
that Dr. Bostwick testified that he agreed with the mental limitations described in
the RFC, which were taken from Dr. Baldwin’s Functional Capacity Assessment,
the RFC was consistent with Dr. Bostwick’s opinion. The ALJ could properly rely
on the vocational expert’s testimony that the jobs suited to Taber’s capabilities did
not involve significant contact with the general public. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427
F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRMED.