Anthony Travis v. Jason Bradley , 385 F. App'x 615 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            JUN 22 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ANTHONY TRAVIS,                                  No. 08-57060
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01449-DDP-CT
    v.
    JASON MICHAEL BRADLEY                            MEMORANDUM *
    COUTURE, M.D., et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 25, 2010 **
    Before:        CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
    Anthony Travis appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his
    complaint alleging that defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his
    race by discharging him from Huntington Memorial Hospital prematurely and by
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly the parties’
    requests for oral argument are denied.
    08-57060
    reporting to the California Department of Motor Vehicles that Travis may have a
    seizure disorder. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de
    novo the district court’s dismissal, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 
    250 F.3d 668
    , 679
    (9th Cir. 2001), and for an abuse of discretion its denial of leave to amend, Papa v.
    United States, 
    281 F.3d 1004
    , 1008-09 (9th Cir. 2002). We may affirm on any
    ground supported by the record. Corales v. Bennett, 
    567 F.3d 554
    , 562 (9th Cir.
    2009). We affirm.
    Travis’s § 1983 claim was properly dismissed because Travis failed to plead
    sufficient facts to establish that the defendants were acting under color of state law.
    See O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 
    502 F.3d 1056
    , 1060 (9th Cir. 2007)
    (recognizing that allegation of state action is a “necessary element of a § 1983
    claim”); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    538 F.3d 1250
    , 1257-58 (9th Cir.
    2008) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim that was based on a private party’s
    phone call to police because no allegations established that law or state or local
    officials required that police be summoned).
    Travis’s § 1985 claim was properly dismissed because he did not allege facts
    from which racial- or other class-based invidious discrimination could be inferred.
    See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 
    266 F.3d 979
    , 989 (9th Cir. 2001)
    (recognizing that court need not “accept as true allegations that are merely
    2                                    08-57060
    conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences, and that
    “[a]n indispensable element of a claim under [§ 1985(3)] is some racial, or perhaps
    otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirator’s
    action[.]”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Because even on appeal Travis has failed to explain how the defendants
    acted under color of state law or conspired to deprive him of his civil rights, the
    district court acted within its discretion by dismissing his complaint without leave
    to amend. See Balser v. Dep’t of Justice, Off. of U.S. Trustee, 
    327 F.3d 903
    , 911
    (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming denial of leave to amend complaint, despite liberality
    generally afforded pro se litigants, because opening brief on appeal set forth no
    legal basis for reversal); Bowen v. Oistead, 
    125 F.3d 800
    , 806 (9th Cir. 1997)
    (affirming dismissal in part because appellant failed to explain how he could have
    amended complaint to state a claim).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
    supplemental jurisdiction over Travis’s state law claims. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c)(3); see also Ove v. Gwinn, 
    264 F.3d 817
    , 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining
    that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related
    state law claims after it dismisses the claims over which it has original
    jurisdiction).
    3                                      08-57060
    Travis’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
    Defendant Yafa Minazad’s request for judicial notice is granted. Travis’s
    request for judicial notice and to strike are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                08-57060