Noble v. Giurbino , 384 F. App'x 675 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JUN 21 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DARRELL TYRONE NOBLE,                            No. 08-55004
    Petitioner - Appellant,            D.C. No. CV-06-01625-WQH
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    G. J. GIURBINO,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 10, 2010
    Pasadena, California
    Before: TROTT and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and MAHAN, District
    Judge.**
    Petitioner Noble was convicted by a jury in California in 2002 of serious
    crimes arising from an automobile accident. His conviction was affirmed on direct
    appeal. He then unsuccessfully sought relief in state court by way of habeas
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable James C. Mahan, United States District Judge for the
    District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
    corpus, contending that his trial counsel’s performance was prejudicially deficient,
    as defined by Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
     (1984). At the end of the
    day, those courts concluded, inter alia, that Noble did not demonstrate prejudice
    from his attorney’s behavior.
    This appeal comes to us from our district court’s conclusion pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d) and (e) that the state courts had reasonably found (1) that Noble’s
    attorney had performed competently, and (2) that there was no showing of
    prejudice.
    We affirm the judgment of the district court because we conclude after
    examining the record that the state court’s determination of “no prejudice” arising
    from his attorney’s disputed decisions was (1) legally sound, and (2) a reasonable
    determination of the evidence presented. At trial Evans’ testimony under oath
    when asked if she “might have grabbed the [steering] wheel” was, “If I did, I can’t
    remember it.” This testimony renders her letter suspicious, and its use as evidence
    might well have damaged Noble’s cause. In addition, the other evidence, including
    Noble’s elevated blood alcohol level and his post-accident conduct, provides
    independent support for the jury’s guilty verdict.
    Given all of the evidence introduced at trial, the district court’s decision not
    to conduct an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion.
    2
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-55004

Citation Numbers: 384 F. App'x 675

Judges: Trott, Fletcher, Mahan

Filed Date: 6/21/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024