United States v. Mark Flynn , 384 F. App'x 678 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 21 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-10135
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:01-CR-00268-PGR
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MARK FLYNN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Paul G. Rosenblatt, District Judge, Presiding
**
Submitted May 25, 2010
Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Mark Flynn appeals from the 3-month sentence imposed following
revocation of his probation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Flynn contends that the district court committed plain error when it found
that there was a factual basis supporting Flynn’s admission that he violated a
condition of his probation. Even if the court plainly erred as Flynn contends, he
has failed to show that any error affected his substantial rights, or that it seriously
affected the fairness of Flynn’s probation revocation proceedings. See United
States v. Dallman, 533 F.3d 755, 761-62 (9th Cir. 2008).
Flynn also contends that the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked his probation given the de minimis nature of the violation. The district
court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Tham, 884 F.2d 1262, 1266
(9th Cir. 1989) (“Tham argues that his violations of the conditions of probation
were technical, and that his probation accordingly should not have been revoked. . .
. We cannot say the district court abused its discretion in revoking Tham’s
probation for violations of his probation conditions.”).
Flynn also contends that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The
sentence was reasonable in light of the court’s emphasis on Flynn’s breach of trust.
See U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A(3)(b); see also United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173,
1182 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A]t a revocation sentencing, a court may appropriately
sanction a violator for his breach of trust[.]”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
AFFIRMED.
2 09-10135