Merle Janes v. Peter Harris , 389 F. App'x 683 ( 2010 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              JUL 26 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    MERLE JANES, MD, a physician licensed            No. 09-35602
    in the State of Washington; et al.,
    D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00200-EFS
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    PETER J. HARRIS; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    MERLE JANES, MD, a physician licensed            No. 09-35640
    in the State of Washington; et al.,
    D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00200-EFS
    Plaintiffs - Appellees,
    v.
    PETER J. HARRIS; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellants.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Washington
    Edward F. Shea, District Judge, Presiding
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Argued and Submitted July 12, 2010
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: REINHARDT, GRABER, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiffs appeal the grant of summary judgment to Defendants on the
    ground that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. Defendants cross-appeal. We
    have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1219
    . We affirm the grant of summary
    judgment and dismiss Defendants’ cross-appeal as moot.
    1.    Plaintiffs invoked federal court jurisdiction and, therefore, bore the burden
    of establishing Article III standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    ,
    561 (1992). To establish Article III standing, Plaintiffs were required to show that
    Defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct caused them to suffer an actual or
    imminent injury—not a hypothetical, conjectural, or abstract injury—that a
    favorable decision would redress. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
    
    542 U.S. 1
    , 12 (2004). Furthermore, in response to Defendants’ summary
    judgment motion, Plaintiffs could no longer rest on the allegations contained in
    their complaint, but were required to set forth by affidavit or other admissible
    evidence specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 56(e); Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 561
    .
    2
    Plaintiffs allege an injury based on the Agency of Medical Directors Group’s
    publication of the Interagency Guideline on Opioid Dosing for Chronic Non-
    cancer Pain (“Dosing Guidelines”). Plaintiffs, however, have failed to present any
    evidence that the Dosing Guidelines restrict the authority of doctors to prescribe, or
    the ability of chronic pain patients to obtain, opioids in the manner alleged.
    Indeed, the Dosing Guidelines state that they are “advisory.” Because Plaintiffs
    allege an injury that is no more than conjectural or hypothetical, they have failed to
    establish an injury in fact and, therefore, lack Article III standing to challenge the
    Dosing Guidelines. See Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 560
    .
    2.    Next, Plaintiffs claim that the Medical Quality Assurance Commission
    (“Medical Commission”) impermissibly enforces the advisory Dosing Guidelines
    and threatened discipline against Dr. Janes for prescribing opioids. We do not,
    however, reach the question of whether Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the
    Medical Commissions’ alleged enforcement of the Dosing Guidelines because we
    conclude that this claim is not ripe. Like standing, ripeness can be raised at any
    time and is not waivable. See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 
    509 U.S. 43
    , 58
    n.18 (1993).
    To date, Dr. Janes has received at most a threat of formal investigation and a
    suggestion of sanction, but no formal administrative action has been taken. The
    3
    parties do not dispute that a formal Medical Commission investigation includes
    many intervening steps, including an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing, which
    must occur before a disciplinary sanction, such as a license suspension, can be
    imposed. See 
    Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130
     et seq. This administrative process has
    not begun let alone concluded; therefore, any challenge to the actions taken by the
    Medical Commission with respect to Dr. Janes is not ripe. See Loma Linda Univ.
    Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 
    492 F.3d 1065
    , 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). Finally, evidence that
    the Medical Commission suspended another Washington doctor’s license for
    failure to keep adequate records does not establish impermissible enforcement of
    the Dosing Guidelines.
    3.    In light of our disposition of Plaintiffs’ appeal, Defendants’ cross-appeal is
    moot. We therefore dismiss it.
    No. 09-35602: AFFIRMED
    No. 09-35640: DISMISSED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-35602, 09-35640

Citation Numbers: 389 F. App'x 683

Judges: Reinhardt, Graber, Paez

Filed Date: 7/26/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024