Erick Hernandez v. Michael Mukasey ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               AUG 04 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ERICK FEDERICO HERNANDEZ,                        No. 08-71098
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A041-713-973
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    ERICK FEDERICO HERNANDEZ,                        No. 08-73360
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A041-713-973
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petitions for Review of Orders of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted July 14, 2010
    Seattle, Washington
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Before: REINHARDT, GRABER, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    Erick Federico Hernandez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
    review of two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that in turn
    reviewed an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying him asylum, withholding
    of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, and ordering
    him removed under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien convicted of an
    aggravated felony.
    No. 08-71098
    In the first petition, No. 08-71098, Hernandez challenges the dismissal of his
    appeal of the IJ’s removal order, which the BIA found to be untimely.
    Hernandez’s notice of appeal was due at the BIA’s offices in Falls Church,
    Virginia, on February 13, 2008, but it arrived one day late. The record shows,
    however, that Hernandez completed his pro se notice of appeal on February 8,
    while incarcerated at the detention center at which Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement (“ICE”) had held him for five months. In his notice of appeal, he
    declared that he “mailed or delivered” a copy of the notice to opposing counsel for
    the government that same day. In his brief, he explains that he gave the notice to
    2
    the detention center authorities for mailing that day. But ICE did not actually put
    the notice in the mail until February 11 – three days later.
    Were Hernandez a pro se prisoner filing a notice of appeal in this court, his
    notice would have been timely under the “inmate filing rule.” Fed. R. App. P.
    4(c)(1). But the BIA has no parallel rule that similarly acknowledges the “situation
    of prisoners seeking to appeal without the aid of counsel” and who have “no choice
    but to entrust the forwarding of [their] notice[s] of appeal to prison authorities
    whom [they] cannot control or supervise and who may have every incentive to
    delay.” Houston v. Lack, 
    487 U.S. 266
    , 270-71 (1988). We need not decide now
    whether a rule that fails to define “filing” for detainees as the date on which they
    deliver the notice to ICE officers is arbitrary or capricious, because the BIA may
    certify appeals to itself notwithstanding their untimeliness. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
    (c).
    We therefore GRANT the petition in No. 08-71098 and REMAND for the limited
    purpose of allowing the BIA to exercise its discretion to decide whether to certify
    Hernandez’s appeal.
    No. 08-73360
    Hernandez also petitions for review of a BIA decision affirming an IJ’s
    order denying his motion to reopen and reconsider, which the IJ and BIA construed
    3
    as a motion to reopen only. Because Hernandez is detained, we apply the inmate
    filing provision of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(C) to his second
    petition and determine that it was timely filed with this court.
    The BIA must construe filings of aliens proceeding pro se liberally.
    Agyeman v. INS, 
    296 F.3d 871
    , 878 (9th Cir. 2002). Hernandez’s motion, while
    styled a “motion to reopen,” was also a motion to reconsider in its substance and
    should have been construed as such. Indeed, the government supposed as much
    when it first responded to the motion. “[I]t goes without saying that IJs and the
    BIA are not free to ignore arguments raised by a petitioner.” Sagaydak v.
    Gonzales, 
    405 F.3d 1035
    , 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). The BIA erred in failing to rule at
    all on Hernandez’s motion to reconsider.
    The government contends that the motion to reconsider, had Hernandez’s
    motion been viewed as one, would have been untimely. Perhaps so. But the BIA
    would have had to so decide for that to be relevant here, because “this court cannot
    affirm the BIA on a ground upon which it did not rely.” Doissaint v. Mukasey, 
    538 F.3d 1167
    , 1170 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
    We therefore GRANT the petition in No. 08-73360 and REMAND for the BIA to
    consider Hernandez’s motion to reconsider in the first instance. If the BIA finds
    4
    that motion to be untimely, it may also consider Hernandez’s request that it
    reconsider sua sponte under 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (a).
    The panel retains jurisdiction over this matter, and Hernandez may file a
    renewed petition for review after the BIA determines whether to certify his appeal
    and whether to reconsider his removal order, and/or decides the merits of his
    appeal. The parties shall file a status report with this court when further action is
    taken by the BIA but, in any event, no later than six months from the date of this
    order. This court’s order of March 11, 2009, staying removal shall remain in effect
    until further order of this court.
    GRANTED and REMANDED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-71098, 08-73360

Judges: Reinhardt, Graber, Paez

Filed Date: 8/4/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024