Washington v. Gonzalez , 392 F. App'x 559 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              AUG 17 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PAUL OSCAR WASHINGTON,                           No. 07-55569
    Petitioner - Appellant,            D.C. No. CV-06-04066-JVS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    FERNANDO GONZALEZ,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 7, 2010
    Pasadena, California
    Before: TROTT and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and BREYER, District
    Judge.**
    Paul Oscar Washington appeals from the dismissal of his federal petition for
    habeas corpus relief. The district court dismissed the petition with prejudice as
    time-barred. The district court’s dismissal of a habeas petition on statute of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Charles R. Breyer, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    limitations grounds, including whether the statute should be tolled, is reviewed de
    novo. Harris v. Carter, 
    515 F.3d 1051
    , 1054 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 397
    (2008) (mem.).
    The one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal petition for habeas
    corpus is tolled while a “properly filed” state habeas petition is pending. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d)(2). If a state post-conviction petition is untimely, it is not properly filed.
    Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 
    544 U.S. 408
    , 414 (2005). In denying Washington’s third
    round of state habeas petitions, the Los Angeles Superior Court said that his alibi
    evidence was certainly known at the time of his trial and that there was “no
    justification” for the failure to include this issue “at the time of the prior filing.”
    Washington’s third and fifth rounds were denied as untimely and cannot toll the
    statute of limitations. See Bonner v. Carey, 
    425 F.3d 1145
    , 1148 (9th Cir. 2005),
    amended by 
    439 F.3d 993
     (9th Cir. 2006); In re Clark, 
    855 P.2d 729
     (Cal. 1993)
    (en banc). Washington’s fourth round of habeas review addresses prison
    conditions, which is not “collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment
    or claim.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d)(2). The district court did not err by dismissing
    Washington’s federal habeas petition as untimely because it was filed more than
    one year after his second round of habeas review concluded.
    2
    Washington waived his argument that the statute of limitations should begin
    to run from the date he became aware of the change in law caused by Pace, 
    544 U.S. 408
    , because he failed to raise the issue before the district court. O’Guinn v.
    Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 
    502 F.3d 1056
    , 1063 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007). Washington is not
    entitled to equitable tolling because extraordinary circumstances did not prevent
    him from learning about the change in law. See Pace, 
    544 U.S. at 418
    . A pro se
    petitioner’s ignorance of the law and lack of legal sophistication, by themselves,
    are not extraordinary circumstances that warrant equitable tolling. Rasberry v.
    Garcia, 
    448 F.3d 1150
    , 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Washington’s failure to seek
    priority-legal-status access to the law library is due to his own mistake. See Harris,
    
    515 F.3d at 1055
    .
    The court declines to address Washington’s uncertified issue on appeal, as
    there is no “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(2); see also Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 
    291 F.3d 639
    , 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002);
    Hiivala v. Wood, 
    195 F.3d 1098
    , 1104 (9th Cir. 1999).
    AFFIRMED
    3