Michael Devaughn v. Stanley Sniff , 399 F. App'x 239 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              OCT 08 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MICHAEL O. DEVAUGHN,                             No. 08-56947
    Petitioner - Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:08-cv-00258-DSF-SH
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    STANLEY SNIFF, Sheriff of Riverside
    County,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    MICHAEL O. DEVAUGHN,                             No. 10-55281
    Petitioner - Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:08-cv-07972-TJH-SH
    v.
    STANLEY SNIFF, Sheriff of Riverside
    County,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding (No. 08-56947)
    Terry J. Hatter, District Judge, Presiding (No. 10-55281)
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Argued and Submitted August 31, 2010
    Pasadena, California
    Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, O’SCANNLAIN and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
    The government represented that DeVaughn’s Riverside trial has begun, and
    that the state court has now ruled on his pretrial motions. At oral argument,
    DeVaughn’s counsel could not identify any specific motion that is still
    outstanding. DeVaughn’s appeal No. 08-56947, to the extent it challenged lack of
    ruling on prior motions, is therefore moot. See San Lazaro Ass'n v. Connell, 
    286 F.3d 1088
    , 1095 (9th Cir. 2002). DeVaughn’s appeal is dismissed in part as to his
    challenge to delayed ruling on pretrial motions.
    To the extent DeVaughn argues that he cannot be forced to stand trial
    because the state has failed to follow its own pretrial commitment procedures, the
    district court properly abstained. See AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 
    495 F.3d 1143
    , 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2007). The ongoing proceedings involve important
    state interests, and DeVaughn may adequately raise the issue through state
    appellate procedures. See Commc’ns Telesys. Int’l v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
    196 F.3d 1011
    , 1019–20 (9th Cir. 1999). For our court to intervene would interfere
    with the state criminal prosecution in a way precluded by Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
     (1971).
    2
    The district court also properly abstained from intervening in DeVaughn’s
    Los Angeles prosecution. See 
    id.
     Those ongoing proceedings also implicate the
    state’s interest in administering its criminal justice system, and DeVaughn can
    adequately challenge any pre-trial delays at trial or through state appellate
    procedures. See AmerisourceBergen, 
    495 F.3d at
    1148–49. Ordering the dismissal
    of the charges as DeVaughn requests would effectively enjoin the proceedings.
    See 
    id. at 1149
    . He has not shown special circumstances justifying such federal
    intervention, as the multiple prosecutions do not demonstrate bad faith or
    harassment. See Carden v. Montana, 
    626 F.2d 82
    , 83–84 (9th Cir. 1980). Because
    the district court properly abstained, we need not address whether exhaustion was
    required.
    The motions for judicial notice are granted. See Holder v. Holder, 
    305 F.3d 854
    , 866 (9th Cir. 2002). We decline to address the uncertified issues raised in
    DeVaughn’s brief, because these uncertified issues are not fairly debatable. See
    Rhoades v. Henry, 
    598 F.3d 511
    , 515 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010).
    Pursuant to General Order 4.5(e), the panel determines that each party shall
    bear its own costs. It is so ordered.
    DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.
    3