Christopher Williams v. Mark Nooth , 671 F. App'x 499 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 02 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, No. 15-35835
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02283-JE
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MARK NOOTH,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, Chief Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 10, 2016
Portland, Oregon
Before: McKEOWN and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and DORSEY,**
District Judge.
In his federal habeas petition, Christopher Williams argues that his guilty
plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was incompetent to enter the plea.
He also argues that the state trial court’s failure to raise his competency sua sponte
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Jennifer A. Dorsey, United States District Judge for
the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
violated his due process rights. The district court denied Williams’s habeas
petition but issued a certificate of appealability. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant or deny a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 964 (9th Cir. 2004).
However, “[f]actual findings and credibility determinations made by the district
court in the context of granting or denying the petition are reviewed for clear
error.” Id. Because no state court has adjudicated Williams’s claims on the merits,
the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and review is de
novo. See James v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2013).
The district court did not clearly err in concluding that Williams was
competent when he entered his guilty plea. A defendant is incompetent when he
lacks either the “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding” or “a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the
psychiatric reports in the record indicate that Williams likely suffered from
significant mental health issues, they also reflect the possibility that Williams was
malingering and being purposefully noncooperative. The district court closely
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reviewed the record and reasonably determined that Williams was competent to
enter the plea.
Additionally, the state trial court’s failure to inquire into Williams’s
competency did not violate his due process rights. A trial court is required to “sua
sponte inquire into a defendant’s competency if a reasonable judge would be
expected to have a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competence.” Clark v.
Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 729 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). On
this record, a reasonable judge could have lacked a bona fide doubt as to
Williams’s competence.
AFFIRMED.
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