Jehan Mir v. City of Torrance ( 2016 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       NOV 4 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JEHAN ZEB MIR, M.D.,                            No. 14-56022
    Plaintiff-Appellant,           D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01191-RGK-SH
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CITY OF TORRANCE; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 25, 2016**
    Before:       LEAVY, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    Jehan Zeb Mir appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging various
    federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    review de novo. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 
    328 F.3d 1136
    , 1139 (9th
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Cir. 2003). We vacate and remand.
    The district court erred by dismissing Mir’s action under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Parra v.
    PacifiCare of Ariz., Inc., 
    715 F.3d 1146
    , 1151 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Jurisdiction . . . is
    not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of
    action on which [a plaintiff] could actually recover.” (citation omitted)).
    We express no opinion on the merits of Mir’s action. On remand, the
    district court may consider, among other things, whether Mir’s complaint complies
    with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, whether Mir has alleged facts sufficient to
    state a plausible claim for relief, and whether Mir might be able to cure any
    potential pleading defects upon notice of any deficiencies. See Hebbe v. Pliler,
    
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally
    construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a
    plausible claim for relief); Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 
    66 F.3d 245
    , 248 (9th
    Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the
    defect, . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and
    an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”).
    Mir’s request for transfer to another district court judge on the basis of bias,
    2                                      14-56022
    set forth in his opening brief, is denied.
    VACATED and REMANDED.
    3   14-56022
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-56022

Judges: Leavy, Silverman, Graber

Filed Date: 11/4/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024