Bryan Monkres v. Rosanne Campbell , 408 F. App'x 101 ( 2011 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JAN 12 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
BRYAN RANDALL MONKRES, No. 08-16011
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:04-CV-02311-CW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ROSANNE CAMPBELL, et al.,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Claudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 11, 2010**
San Francisco, California
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, WALLACE and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
The California Supreme Court’s rejection of Monkres’ Due Process claim
was not an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
Monkres argues that he was denied due process when the trial court admitted
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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evidence of uncharged prior sexual assaults against the victim as evidence of her
lack of consent to the charged sexual offenses in this case, and of Monkres’
propensity to commit acts of sexual assault. However, Monkres “can point to no
Supreme Court precedent establishing that admission of propensity evidence, as
here, to lend credibility to a sex victim's allegations, and thus indisputably relevant
to the crimes charged, is unconstitutional.” Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046
(9th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has “not yet made a clear ruling
that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence [under state law]
constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.”
Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, the state
court’s decision to admit evidence of Monkres’ prior uncharged sexual assaults
against the victim was neither contrary to, nor an objectively unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see
also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77, 127 S. Ct. 649, 166 L. Ed. 2d 482 (2006).
Monkres also argues that his appellate counsel was constitutionally
ineffective because he did not raise the trial court’s admission of the evidence as an
issue on direct appeal. But Monkres has not shown a reasonable probability that he
would have otherwise prevailed on appeal. See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428,
1434 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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Finally, because Monkres has not raised any allegations of fact that would
entitle him to relief, his request that we remand for an evidentiary hearing is
denied. See West v. Ryan, 608 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2010).
AFFIRMED.