John Phet v. Eldon Vail , 403 F. App'x 282 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              NOV 17 2010
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOHN PHET,                             )      No. 08-35914
    )
    Petitioner – Appellant,          )      D.C. No. 3:07-CV-05493-RBL
    )
    v.                               )      MEMORANDUM *
    )
    ELDON VAIL,                            )
    )
    Respondent – Appellee.           )
    )
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 2, 2010
    Seattle, Washington
    Before:      B. FLETCHER, FERNANDEZ, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    John Phet appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus
    relief. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    . We affirm.
    Phet asserts that the state trial court’s admission of expert testimony on
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. Rule 36-3.
    gangs and Phet’s gang affiliation violated his constitutional rights1 as a matter of
    “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
    United States.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1); see also Richter v. Hickman, 
    578 F.3d 944
    , 950–51 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). We disagree.
    Initially, we were inclined to hold, as did the district court, that Phet failed to
    exhaust his state remedies regarding that claim.2 Although he did most likely
    present the First Amendment portion of his claim to the Washington Court of
    Appeals, which, in any event, decided the issue,3 it is at least questionable whether
    he presented that claim to the Washington Supreme Court, as he was required to,4
    and even less likely that he presented his due process claim to either court.
    Nevertheless, we need not decide that issue because, in any event, we can deny the
    1
    He asserts that his rights under the First (associational rights) and
    Fourteenth (due process rights) Amendments to the United States Constitution
    were violated.
    2
    See Duncan v. Walker, 
    533 U.S. 167
    , 178–79, 
    121 S. Ct. 2120
    , 2127–28,
    
    150 L. Ed. 2d 251
     (2001); Duncan v. Henry, 
    513 U.S. 364
    , 366, 
    115 S. Ct. 887
    ,
    888, 
    130 L. Ed. 2d 865
     (1995); Cook v. Schriro, 
    538 F.3d 1000
    , 1025 (9th Cir.
    2008); Castillo v. McFadden, 
    399 F.3d 993
    , 998–99 (9th Cir. 2005); Hiivala v.
    Wood, 
    195 F.3d 1098
    , 1106 (9th Cir.1999).
    3
    See Greene v. Lambert, 
    288 F.3d 1081
    , 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).
    4
    See Baldwin v. Reese, 
    541 U.S. 27
    , 31, 
    124 S. Ct. 1347
    , 1350, 
    158 L. Ed. 2d 64
     (2004); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 
    526 U.S. 838
    , 848, 
    119 S. Ct. 1728
    , 1734,
    
    144 L. Ed. 2d 1
     (1999).
    2
    petition on the merits.5 We will do so. Simply put, we do not sit to parse state
    evidentiary rulings,6 except for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether the
    admission of evidence was so lacking in a nexus to the issues of the case that the
    trial was rendered fundamentally unfair,7 or that the evidence bore no relationship
    to the issue being tried.8 Given the evidence in this case, we cannot say that either
    exception applies to the admission of the gang expert testimony (including the
    admission of photographs of Phet, which illustrated his gang affiliation). In fine,
    the decisions of the Washington state courts were not objectively unreasonable.
    See Lockyer v. Andrade, 
    538 U.S. 63
    , 76, 
    123 S. Ct. 1166
    , 1175, 
    155 L. Ed. 2d 144
     (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 
    529 U.S. 362
    , 409–10,
    120 S. Ct. 1495
    , 1521–22,
    
    146 L. Ed. 2d 389
     (2000). Thus, the district court did not err.9
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (b)(2).
    6
    See Estelle v. McGuire, 
    502 U.S. 62
    , 67–68, 
    112 S. Ct. 475
    , 479–80, 
    116 L. Ed. 2d 385
     (1991); Swan v. Peterson, 
    6 F.3d 1373
    , 1382 (9th Cir. 1993).
    7
    See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 
    926 F.2d 918
    , 920 (9th Cir. 1991); see also
    Dowling v. United States, 
    493 U.S. 342
    , 352–53, 
    110 S. Ct. 668
    , 674, 
    107 L. Ed. 2d 708
     (1990); Butcher v. Marquez, 
    758 F.2d 373
    , 378 (9th Cir. 1985).
    8
    See Dawson v. Delaware, 
    503 U.S. 159
    , 163–65, 
    112 S. Ct. 1093
    , 1096–97,
    
    117 L. Ed. 2d 309
     (1992).
    9
    Phet also asks us to consider and resolve an uncertified issue regarding
    exclusion of some evidence. We decline so to do. See Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 483–84, 
    120 S. Ct. 1595
    , 1603–04, 
    146 L. Ed. 2d 542
     (2000); Rhoades v.
    Henry, 
    598 F.3d 511
    , 518 (9th Cir. 2010).
    3