Stacia Tatum v. Teresa Schwartz , 405 F. App'x 169 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             DEC 03 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    STACIA TATUM,                                    No. 08-16987
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:06-cv-01440-JAM-
    EFB
    v.
    TERESA SCHWARTZ; JONATHAN                        MEMORANDUM *
    ZEH; LANCE JENSEN; CALIFORNIA
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS &
    REHABILITATION,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 2, 2010 **
    San Francisco, California
    Before: THOMAS and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge.***
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of
    International Trade, sitting by designation.
    Stacia Tatum (“Tatum”) appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment, dismissing Tatum’s claims of hostile work environment and retaliation.
    See 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
    , 2000e(a)-(n).
    The district court properly denied Tatum’s request to toll the statute of
    limitations by reason of insanity under Cal. Civ. Proc. § 352(a). For purposes of
    section 352(a), a plaintiff is “insane” if “incapable of caring for his [or her]
    property or transacting business or understanding the nature or effects of his [or
    her] acts.” Alcott Rehab. Hosp. v. Super. Ct., 
    112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807
    , 812 (Cal. Ct.
    App. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Pearl v. Pearl, 
    177 Cal. 303
    , 307
    (1918)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The facts demonstrate “lucid
    intervals”: Tatum filed her workers’ compensation claim, was deemed by a
    psychiatrist to be alert and oriented with normal affect, wrote a letter stating her
    desire “to return to work as soon as possible,” reported subsiding anxiety to an
    almost negligible level, and hired legal counsel. See Hsu v. Mt. Zion Hosp., 
    66 Cal. Rptr. 659
    , 664–65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
    The district court properly denied Tatum’s request for equitable tolling.
    Mental incapacity warrants equitable tolling when, “extraordinary circumstances
    beyond the plaintiff’s control made it impossible to file a claim on time.” Stoll v.
    Runyon, 
    165 F.3d 1238
    , 1242 (9th Cir. 1999). Because Tatum was able to file
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    paperwork, converse with doctors, write a letter detailing her claim, and hire legal
    counsel, her circumstances do not rise to the extraordinary level required.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants on
    Tatum’s retaliation claim. Retaliation requires the plaintiff to show a causal link
    between protected activity and adverse employment action. Brooks v. City of San
    Mateo, 
    229 F.3d 917
    , 928 (9th Cir. 2000). Temporal proximity of one
    year–measured from the date of Tatum’s complaint until the date of her work
    assignment–is insufficient to establish an inference of retaliation without additional
    evidence, which Tatum failed to provide. See Manatt v. Bank of Am., N.A., 
    339 F.3d 792
    , 802 (9th Cir. 2003).
    AFFIRMED.
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