Reynaldo Condori-Quiroz v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 16 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REYNALDO JAIR ANDRE CONDORI- No. 19-70301
QUIROZ,
Agency No. A209-421-644
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 12, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, W. FLETCHER, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Reynaldo Jair Andre Condori-Quiroz (Condori-Quiroz) petitions for review
of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) concurrence with a Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) asylum officer’s negative reasonable fear determination, and of the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
DHS’s decision to execute Condori-Quiroz’s reinstated removal order. We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
I.
An alien seeking relief from a reinstated removal order must demonstrate “a
reasonable possibility that he or she would be persecuted on account of his or her
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion, or a reasonable possibility that he or she would be tortured in the country
of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(c) (2019); see also Bartolome v. Sessions, 904
F.3d 803, 807–09 (9th Cir. 2018). We review the IJ’s determination for substantial
evidence, meaning that “[t]o reverse the [IJ], we must determine that the evidence
not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it—and also compels the
further conclusion that the petitioner meets the requisite standard for obtaining
relief.” Sanjaa v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks, brackets, and citation omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that a protected ground
was not a reason motivating the threats or threatened harms alleged by Condori-
Quiroz. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying
petition for review where migrant “did not present evidence that the bandits
targeted his family on account of a protected ground” but on account of the
family’s “farm [being] on fertile land”); accord Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846
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F.3d 351, 359–60 (9th Cir. 2017). Furthermore, no evidence compels the
conclusion that the Peruvian government was, or would be, unwilling or unable to
stop Condori-Quiroz’s uncle from threatening or harming him, as he appeared to
allege. See Truong v. Holder, 613 F.3d 938, 940–41 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Condori-Quiroz lacked a
reasonable fear of persecution.
For similar reasons, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that
Condori-Quiroz lacked a reasonable fear of torture, as torture must entail severe
harm inflicted by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official. See
Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183, 1185–86 (9th Cir. 2020); 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1208.16(c)(1), 1208.18(a) (2019).
II.
Condori-Quiroz was removed before he petitioned our court. Condori-
Quiroz argues his removal was unlawful because his reinstated removal order was
not final or should have been stayed until the period for filing his petition had
passed.1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to consider Condori-Quiroz’s
challenge. See Garcia de Rincon v. DHS, 539 F.3d 1133, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2008)
1
Condori-Quiroz does not challenge his prior removal order nor its reinstatement,
and neither party questions our jurisdiction to hear his petition despite his removal.
We have jurisdiction. See Del Cid Marroquin v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 933, 935–36 (9th
Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
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(explaining that § 1252(a)(2)(D) vests this court with jurisdiction to address
questions of law raised in the context of reinstated removal orders); cf. Arce v.
United States, 899 F.3d 796, 799–801 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (holding
§ 1252(g) does not strip this court of jurisdiction where the government “lacks the
discretion to effectuate a removal order”).
Condori-Quiroz’s reinstated removal order was final. Where, as here, “the
immigration judge concurs with the asylum officer’s determination that the alien
does not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, the case shall be returned
to [DHS] for removal of the alien.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(g)(1) (2019). This
completes the agency proceedings and makes the order final. See id.; Ortiz-
Alfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955, 958–60 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, no stay barred his
order’s execution. Condori-Quiroz did not ask our court for a stay and no
automatic stay applied. See Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 964 (9th Cir.
2011) (per curiam).
PETITION DENIED.
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