Margaret Morris v. Kenneth Atchity , 544 F. App'x 760 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            NOV 13 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MARGARET MORRIS, an individual,                  No. 11-56248
    Plaintiff-counter-defendant -     D.C. No. 2:08-cv-05321-RSWL-
    Appellant,                                       JC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KENNETH ATCHITY, an individual;
    ATCHITY ENTERTAINMENT
    INTERNATIONAL, a business entity
    form unknown; SONIC AGE LTD., a
    United Kingdom corporation; THE
    WRITER’S LIFELINE, INC., a Delaware
    corporation,
    Defendants-counter-claimants
    - Appellees.
    MARGARET MORRIS, an individual,                  No. 11-56829
    Plaintiff-counter-defendant -     D.C. No. 2:08-cv-05321-RSWL-
    Appellee,                                        JC
    v.
    KENNETH ATCHITY, an individual;
    ATCHITY ENTERTAINMENT
    INTERNATIONAL, a business entity
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    form unknown; SONIC AGE LTD., a
    United Kingdom corporation; THE
    WRITER’S LIFELINE, INC., a Delaware
    corporation,
    Defendants-counter-claimants
    - Appellants.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Ronald S.W. Lew, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 5, 2013
    Pasadena, California
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN, GRABER, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff Margaret Morris appeals, and Defendants Kenneth Atchity, The
    Writer’s Lifeline, Atchity Entertainment International, and Sonic Age Limited
    cross-appeal, from the judgment following a jury trial in this case involving
    copyright and related claims. We affirm.
    1. The district court did not abuse its discretion, Leong v. Potter, 
    347 F.3d 1117
    , 1125 (9th Cir. 2003), in striking Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order with
    respect to her manuscript, for failure to comply with the local rules. Moreover,
    even assuming that the district court should have considered the motion on the
    merits, Plaintiff failed to overcome the strong presumption in favor of public
    access to court records.
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    2. The district court did not abuse its discretion, 
    id., in denying
    Plaintiff’s
    motion to seal the entire case, because Plaintiff failed to allege any harm, broad or
    otherwise, that would overcome the strong presumption of Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 26(c) against removing a four-year-old case from the public domain.
    Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 
    966 F.2d 470
    , 476 (9th Cir. 1992).
    3. On de novo review, Wood v. City of San Diego, 
    678 F.3d 1075
    , 1080
    (9th Cir. 2012), we hold that the district court properly dismissed the sixth and
    tenth claims as preempted by the Copyright Act. Neither claim contained an extra
    element beyond those required to state a claim for infringement. Grosso v.
    Miramax Film Corp., 
    383 F.3d 965
    , 968 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended, 
    400 F.3d 658
    (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the available remedies would have duplicated those
    awarded on Plaintiff’s successful claim for breach of an implied contract.
    4. The district court did not abuse its discretion, United States v. Anekwu,
    
    695 F.3d 967
    , 981–82 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 2379
    (2013), in
    excluding the summary chart that Plaintiff offered at trial. The court permissibly
    allowed the use of the chart, instead, as a pedagogical device to illustrate Plaintiff’s
    testimony. United States v. Wood, 
    943 F.2d 1048
    , 1053 (9th Cir. 1991).
    5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) motion because Plaintiff failed to meet
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    her burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the verdict was
    obtained through fraud or misconduct. De Saracho v. Custom Food Mach., Inc.,
    
    206 F.3d 874
    , 880 (9th Cir. 2000).
    6. The district court did not err in denying Defendants’ motion for judgment
    as a matter of law on the seventh claim. We review that ruling for substantial
    evidence. Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 
    177 F.3d 839
    , 856 (9th Cir. 1999).
    Plaintiff pleaded and proved the "extra element" of an implied contract claim, that
    is, an implied promise to pay, sufficient to state a Desny v. Wilder, 
    299 P.2d 257
    (Cal. 1956), claim. Substantial evidence also supported the jury’s award of
    $70,000 to Plaintiff. Marsu, B.V. v. Walt Disney Co., 
    185 F.3d 932
    , 938–39 (9th
    Cir. 1999).
    7. The district court did not abuse its discretion, Wall Data Inc. v. L.A.
    Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 
    447 F.3d 769
    , 787 (9th Cir. 2006), in denying attorney fees
    to Defendants on the copyright claim. The court properly weighed the Fogerty v.
    Fantasy, Inc., 
    510 U.S. 517
    (1994), factors.
    AFFIRMED.
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