Belan Sanchez-Trejo v. Eric Holder, Jr. ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 18 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BELAN SANCHEZ-TREJO, a.k.a. Belen No. 11-70880
Sanchez-Trejo,
Agency No. A088-502-347
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 13, 2014**
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Belan Sanchez-Trejo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of
an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion to
remand and dismissing her appeal from a decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”)
denying her applications for cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law. Latter-Singh
v. Holder, 668 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012). We deny in part and dismiss in
part the petition for review.
Our case law forecloses Sanchez-Trejo’s contention that her offense of
making criminal threats under California Penal Code § 422 does not categorically
qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude. See id. at 1163 (“[W]e conclude that
§ 422 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.”). Accordingly, the BIA
correctly concluded that Sanchez-Trejo’s conviction for this offense precludes her
from establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal. See Flores Juarez v.
Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C),
an alien is ineligible for cancellation of removal if he has been convicted of certain
offenses, including a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).”).
Sanchez-Trejo’s related argument that her nolo contendere plea to this
offense pursuant to People v. West, 477 P.2d 409 (Cal. 1970), precludes a
categorical analysis of the statute of conviction is misplaced. See Latter-Singh,
668 F.3d at 1159 (“If the full range of conduct under the statute fits the definition
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of a crime involving moral turpitude, then any conviction under the statute can
subject an alien to removability.”).
Sanchez-Trejo has waived any challenge to the BIA’s dispositive
determination that she is ineligible for withholding of removal in light of her
admission that she has no fear of returning to Mexico. See Tijani v. Holder, 628
F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e generally will not take up arguments not
raised in an alien’s opening brief before this court.”). Therefore, we need not reach
Sanchez-Trejo’s challenge to the BIA’s alternative determination that she did not
adequately demonstrate membership in a particular social group. See Mendez-
Alcaraz v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 2006) (declining to reach
nondispositive challenges to a BIA order).
With regard to Sanchez-Trejo’s request for CAT protection, the record belies
her contention that the BIA erroneously considered in the first instance whether the
record demonstrated that the Mexican government would acquiesce in her torture.
See Perez-Palafox v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2014) (identifying no
impermissible factfinding by the BIA, where it “did not add any facts to those
found by the IJ or ignore any facts found by the IJ”). Sanchez-Trejo has waived
her related contention that the BIA misinterpreted the meaning of the term
“acquiescence.” See Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2007)
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(“Issues raised in a brief that are not supported by argument are deemed
abandoned.”).
We lack jurisdiction to review Sanchez-Trejo’s unexhausted contentions that
the IJ applied an incorrect standard to her particular-social-group claim, failed to
consider the applicable criteria for CAT, and ignored the bulk of her CAT
evidence. See Tijani, 628 F.3d at 1080.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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