Stephen Edwards v. Charles Schwab Bank ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 05 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHEN S. EDWARDS, an individual, No. 14-16114
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00066-MHB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES SCHWAB BANK; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Michelle H. Burns, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted July 26, 2016***
Before: SCHROEDER, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Stephen S. Edwards appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his civil action alleging federal claims related to his mortgage
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
documents. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th
Cir. 2010). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Thompson v.
Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Edwards’ action because Edwards
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Cervantes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining
that a complaint must allege more than labels and conclusions and must allege
sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory); see also Hebbe, 627 F.3d at
341-42 (though pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim).
Denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion because amendment
would have been futile. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041 (setting forth standard of
review); see also 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (prescribing at most a three-year statute of
limitations for violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(e) (an action for damages under the Truth in Lending Act must be brought
within one year of the alleged violation); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d
677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (district court may dismiss a claim “[i]f the running of the
statute is apparent on the face of the complaint” and the assertions of the complaint
2 14-16114
do not permit a showing that the statute was tolled).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Edwards’ motion
for reconsideration because Edwards did not demonstrate any basis for
reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5
F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and bases for
granting motion for reconsideration).
Edwards’ contentions that the district court was biased and unfair are
without merit.
AFFIRMED.
3 14-16114