United States v. Brent Lovett ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
AUG 08 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-10297
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:11-cr-00165-RLH-GWF-1
v.
BRENT EDWARD LOVETT, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Roger L. Hunt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 12, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, SCHROEDER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Lovett appeals from a judgment following a jury trial verdict convicting him
of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344. On appeal, Lovett contends that: no rational
trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Lockheed Federal
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Credit Union (Lockheed) was federally insured; the government engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct by depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel; the district court abused its discretion in formulating the vicarious liability
jury instruction; cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial; and the district court
abused its discretion in ordering Lovett to pay restitution in the amount of
$4,899,134.78. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
First, the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Lockheed was
federally insured through the testimony of Lockheed’s CEO, who stated that
Lockheed was federally insured in 2006, the year in which Lovett obtained the 7.5
million dollar loan. See United States v. Ali, 266 F.3d 1242, 1243 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted) (providing that in prosecutions for bank fraud, proof of federally
insured status of the victim institution is both a jurisdictional prerequisite and an
element of the substantive crime). Our court has already held that “[a] bank
employee’s ‘uncontradicted testimony of a bank’s insured status can sufficiently
support the jury’s conclusion that this element was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” United States v. Hicks, 217 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Corbin, 972 F.2d 271, 272 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Second, we review Lovett’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct for plain
error as Lovett failed to object to the alleged misconduct during trial. United States
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v. Tam, 240 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review). Lovett contends
that the government “maligned him in the role of defense attorney” during closing
arguments. Lovett does not show how the prosecution’s statements amount to
misconduct. The prosecutor referred to Lovett’s pro se status simply to implore
that the jury not be blinded by sympathy because Lovett chose to proceed pro se;
the prosecutor never referred to Lovett as a “liar” or told jurors that Lovett was
“lying”; and the prosecutor was not precluded from attacking the reliability of a
defense witness during closing argument. See United States v. Nobari, 574 F.3d
1065, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that there is no misconduct during closing
argument when the prosecutor attacks the defense on the merits, not the integrity of
the defense counsel).
Third, the district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the
vicarious liability jury instruction. United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1215
(9th Cir. 2011) (standard of review). The district court’s instruction not only
followed Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction § 8.122, Scheme to
Defraud–Vicarious Liability, but it also mirrored our holding in United States v.
Stapleton, 293 F.3d 1111, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2002), in which we concluded that,
even in the absence of a conspiracy charge, individuals engaged in a scheme to
defraud can be held vicariously liable for their co-schemer’s conduct.
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Fourth, where, as here, “there is no single constitutional error in [the] case,
there is nothing to accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation,” and a
defendant’s allegation that the cumulative effect of errors prejudiced his right to a
fair trial fails. Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1999)).
Last, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Lovett to pay
restitution in the amount of $4,889,134.78. United States v. Brock-Davis, 504 F.3d
991, 996 (9th Cir. 2007) (standard of review). Lovett contends that the district
court’s restitution order runs afoul of United States v. Yeung, 672 F.3d 594 (9th
Cir. 2012). Lovett ignores that the United States Supreme Court overruled Yeung
in Robers v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1854, 1856 (2014), holding that “a sentencing
court must reduce the restitution amount by the amount of money the victim
received in selling the collateral, not the value of the collateral when the victim
received it.” Here, the district court correctly calculated restitution based on the
amount of money Lockheed recovered when it sold the Tenaya building on May
21, 2010.
AFFIRMED.
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