United States v. Ismael Velasquez ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NOV 04 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14–10541
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. 4:12-cr-02259-CKJ-LAB-2
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ISMAEL ALFREDO VELASQUEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 18, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: CALLAHAN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,** District
Judge.
A jury found Ismael Alfredo Velasquez guilty of conspiracy to possess one
kilogram or more of heroin with intent to distribute, possession of heroin with
intent to distribute, conspiracy to import heroin, and importation of heroin. He was
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
sentenced to concurrent terms of 120 months imprisonment and 60 months
supervised release. On appeal, Velasquez claims that (1) the government
improperly vouched for one of its witnesses, Alpana Prasad, resulting in plain
error; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to present a
duress defense and his request for a duress jury instruction; (3) the district court
abused its discretion during trial by allowing the government to elicit testimony
that Velasquez was on parole; (4) the district court committed plain error by
admitting text messages into evidence as co-conspirator statements; (5) the
cumulative error doctrine requires reversal; and (6) the evidence presented was
insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. The facts
are familiar to the parties and are restated here only as necessary to resolve the
legal issues of the appeal.
1. Because Velasquez did not object at trial, his claim of improper vouching
is reviewed for plain error, United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th
Cir. 1993), which requires that Velasquez demonstrate both that the error was plain
and that it substantially affected his rights, United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
732–35 (1993). The government concedes that the prosecutor impermissibly
vouched for the government’s witness, Alpana Prasad, by eliciting testimony on
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direct examination about the truth-telling provision in her plea agreement.
However, the impact of the improper vouching was mitigated by a curative
instruction, the weight of evidence in the case, and the lack of personal opinion
offered by the prosecutor. The improper vouching thus did not substantially affect
Velasquez’s fundamental rights given all the proof in the case. Consequently,
reversal is not required. Necoechea, 986 F.2d at 1276–79.
2. The district court properly denied Velasquez’s request for a duress
defense and jury instruction because Velasquez did not present a prima facie case
of duress. United States v. Ibarra-Pino, 657 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011).
Velasquez had a reasonable opportunity to escape the alleged threatened harm
when he was speaking with Border Patrol agents and separated from his co-
conspirator, Rodrigo (“Rico”) Velasquez. See id.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the
government in its case-in-chief to elicit testimony that Velasquez was on parole.
Although Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) generally excludes evidence of prior
bad acts, Velasquez’s parole status was relevant to show his reason for fleeing,
informed the jury of a coherent story regarding the commission of the crime, and
was not so prejudicial as to require exclusion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 1995).
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4. There was no plain error in admitting text messages between the co-
conspirators under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Pursuant to Rule
801(d)(2)(E), a co-conspirator’s statement “is admissible against the defendant if
the government shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy
existed at the time the statement was made; the defendant had knowledge of, and
participated in, the conspiracy; and the statement was made in furtherance of the
conspiracy.” United States v. Bowman, 215 F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 2000). The
text exchanges in question evidenced the existence of a conspiracy, indicated
Velasquez had knowledge of the conspiracy, and were corroborated by other
evidence, including photos, videos, and border crossing records. Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987); United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397,
1402 (9th Cir. 1988) (requiring “some evidence” of the conspiracy in addition to
the proffered statements). Because “[t]he requirements for admission of a co-
conspirator’s statement under [Rule] 801(d)(2)(E) are identical to the requirements
of the Confrontation Clause,” United States v. Bridgeforth, 441 F.3d 864, 868–69
(9th Cir. 2006), Velasquez’s Sixth Amendment challenge is also unavailing.
5. “Although individual errors looked at separately may not rise to the level
of reversible error, their cumulative effect may nevertheless be so prejudicial as to
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require reversal.” Necoechea, 986 F.2d at 1282. Here, however, there is no
cumulative error.
6. Finally, the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. We “must consider the
evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and “may
not usurp the role of the finder of fact by considering how it would have resolved
the conflicts, made the inferences, or considered the evidence at trial.” United
States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)). Here, the evidence presented at trial when viewed
in the light most favorable to the prosecution established the existence of a
conspiracy and Velasquez’s knowing participation. Alpana testified she thought
the group was carrying drugs. There was heroin in the vehicle. The digital record
(including texts, photos, and border records) of the group’s trip into Mexico also
supported the existence of a conspiracy. The evidence also proved Velasquez’s
participation in a joint venture to possess a controlled substance, all of which is
sufficient to support his possession convictions. United States v. Hernandez, 876
F.2d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 1989).
AFFIRMED.
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