Michael Sansoe v. Ford Motor Co. , 668 F. App'x 718 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    AUG 25 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MICHAEL J. SANSOE and ERIC                       No. 14-16124
    FRAZER, dba DE Landscaping,
    D.C. No. 4:13-cr-05043-PJH
    Plaintiffs - Appellees,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 19, 2016
    San Francisco, California
    Before: GRABER and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and EDMUNDS,** Senior
    District Judge.
    Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) appeals the district court’s denial of its
    special motion to strike pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds, Senior United States District Judge
    for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
    Proc. Code § 425.16. We review the denial of this motion de novo, and we affirm.
    Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 
    611 F.3d 590
    , 595 (9th Cir. 2010).
    Strategic lawsuits against public participation (“SLAPP”) masquerade as
    ordinary lawsuits but are “aimed at chilling expression through costly, time-
    consuming litigation.” Price v. Stossel, 
    620 F.3d 992
    , 999 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
    Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 
    264 F.3d 832
    , 839 (9th Cir. 2001)). The
    California legislature has attempted to discourage this practice by providing a
    procedural mechanism “for the early dismissal of unmeritorious claims filed to
    interfere with the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech
    and petition. ” Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, 
    196 P.3d 1094
    , 1098 (Cal. 2008).
    We hold that Ford has failed to make the threshold showing that Plaintiffs’
    causes of action are “based on an act in furtherance of [Ford’s] right of petition or
    free speech.” City of Cotati v. Cashman, 
    52 P.3d 695
    , 701 (Cal. 2002). As the
    district court correctly held, this question is dispositive of Ford’s motion.
    We need not look beyond the opening paragraph of Plaintiffs’ complaint to
    determine the impetus for this action. Each of Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on
    the allegedly “unlawful, unfair and deceptive practices of Ford Motor Company in
    reacquiring defective vehicles.” (Emphasis added.) Ford’s practices, as alleged in
    2
    the operative complaint, fall into two categories: first, “Ford routinely takes a
    deduction for excessive damage and/or wear and tear . . . based on the condition of
    the Lemon Car when it is reacquired”; second, “Ford requires the Lemon Car
    owner to make certain improvements to the car at their own expense before it is
    reacquired.” We therefore hold that the “act forming the basis for [Plaintiffs’]
    cause[s] of action” is Ford’s purportedly illegal business practice of taking
    excessive deductions in violation of California’s lemon laws. Feldman v. 1100
    Park Lane Assocs., 
    74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1
    , 13 (Ct. App. 2008).
    Ford argues that Plaintiffs’ claims “arise from” protected conduct—i.e., a
    number of allegedly fraudulent statements made during the settlement process. We
    disagree. California law is clear that “a defendant in an ordinary private dispute
    cannot take advantage of the anti-SLAPP statute simply because the complaint
    contains some references to speech or petitioning activity by the defendant.”
    People ex rel. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Anapol, 
    150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 224
    , 235 (Ct. App.
    2012) (quoting Martinez v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 
    6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494
    , 499 (Ct.
    App. 2003)). Rather, “it is the principal thrust or gravamen of the plaintiff's cause
    of action that determines whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies.” Martinez, 6
    Cal. Rptr. 3d at 499.
    3
    Here, there is seemingly no question that but for Ford’s allegedly illegal
    deductions (i.e., unprotected activity) Plaintiffs’ fraud claims would have no basis.
    Accordingly, we hold that the principal thrust of Plaintiffs’ claims are a challenge
    to Ford’s reimbursement methodology, i.e., unprotected conduct.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-16124

Citation Numbers: 668 F. App'x 718

Judges: Graber, Tallman, Edmunds

Filed Date: 8/25/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024