Robert Hubbard, Jr. v. Jay Sheffield , 669 F. App'x 443 ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 4 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT G. HUBBARD, Jr., No. 14-35377
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 9:12-cv-00036-JCL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JAY C. SHEFFIELD, Justice of the Peace;
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Jeremiah C. Lynch, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted September 27, 2016***
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Robert G. Hubbard, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from his
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
arrests. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Johnson v. Henderson, 314 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hubbard’s state
law claims against defendants Bowe, Guches, Smith, and Rebo because Hubbard
did not establish that any of the exceptions to statutory immunity applied. See
Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-305; Germann v. Stephens, 137 P.3d 545, 553-54 (Mont.
2006) (“[An] employee enjoys immunity from individual liability for the conduct
where the county acknowledges that the conduct arose out of the course and scope
of the employee’s official duties.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing, as a sanction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, Hubbard’s state law claims against
Lincoln County, and his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fabrication of evidence claim against
defendants Guches and Smith, because Hubbard failed to comply with the district
court’s instructions and misrepresented his level of compliance with discovery
obligations. See Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 507-08 (9th Cir. 1997)
(setting forth standard of review and discussing five factors that district courts
must weigh prior to dismissal under Rule 37).
We reject as without merit Hubbard’s contentions that the local rule
2 14-35377
prohibiting self-represented litigants from filing electronically violated his due
process and equal protection rights, and that the district court improperly granted
defendants’ motion in limine.
AFFIRMED.
3 14-35377