Christopher Hadsell v. Barry Baskin ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 14 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER HADSELL, No. 18-16668
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:18-cv-00293-KAW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BARRY BASKIN, in his individual
capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Kandis A. Westmore, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted January 8, 2020***
Before: CALLAHAN, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Christopher Hadsell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
relating to California state court child and spousal support orders. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d
1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Hadsell’s action challenging the
California state court’s child and spousal support proceedings for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it is a “forbidden
de facto appeal” of decisions of the California state court and are “inextricably
intertwined” with those state court decisions. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65; see
also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that Rooker–
Feldman doctrine bars “inextricably intertwined” claim where federal adjudication
“would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the same issues” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hadsell’s motion to
alter or amend the judgment because Hadsell failed to establish any basis for such
relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d, 1262-
63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hadsell’s motion to
impose service costs because defendants had good cause to not sign and return a
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waiver. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2); Estate of Darulis v. Garate, 401 F.3d 1060,
1063 (9th Cir. 2005) (standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hadsell’s motion
for sanctions because Hadsell failed to comply with the procedural requirements of
Rule 11. See Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 788 (9th Cir. 2001)
(standard of review; there are “strict procedural requirements for parties to follow
when they move for sanctions under Rule 11.”)
The district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling on the motion to
dismiss without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Morrow v. Topping, 437
F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1971) (district court’s failure to hold oral argument
on a motion to dismiss was not an abuse of discretion or a denial of due process).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reject as unsupported by the record Hadsell’s contention that the district
court judge was biased.
AFFIRMED.
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