Amy Lewis v. Clark County School District ( 2020 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 30 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AMY LEWIS, No. 18-17060
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:17-cv-00661-JCM-PAL
v.
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 25, 2020**
Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: W. FLETCHER, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Amy Lewis appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of Clark County School District (“CCSD”) on her claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Lewis worked as an office specialist at Cheyenne High School (“CHS”) for
ten years. In the beginning of the 2015–2016 school year, she told CHS principal
Zachary Robbins that she was having work difficulties from carpal tunnel
syndrome and arthritis. Robbins directed her to the district’s EEO office, which
promptly granted the single accommodation she requested: a lifting limit on items
over ten pounds.
Later that school year, Robbins was tasked with selecting employees for
transfer as part of a “turnaround” reform effort to improve CHS’s performance.
Lewis was one of the fourteen employees selected for transfer. The next school
year, Lewis was transferred to another school in the district that was three miles
further from Lewis’s house than CHS, where she worked the same hours and with
the same pay.
1. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lewis’s
retaliation claim. Lewis did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation because
she failed to show that her request for accommodation caused her allegedly adverse
transfer. See Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2003).
Lewis’s only evidence of causation is that five or six months passed between her
accommodation request and her selection for transfer. Standing alone, that interval
does not establish causation. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268,
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273–74 (2001) (per curiam); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054,
1064–65 (9th Cir. 2002).
Further, Lewis could not show that CCSD’s proffered reason for Lewis’s
transfer—her poor work performance—was pretext for discrimination. See
Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1284 (9th Cir.
2001). Lewis was one of fourteen employees transferred as part of an effort to
improve overall school performance. CCSD explained that it transferred Lewis
because of her poor work performance, evidence of which was documented in the
record. Lewis does not offer either direct or “specific and substantial”
circumstantial evidence to challenge this rationale. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
2. Lewis has waived appeal of her accommodation claim. See Christian
Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 2010).
Even if she did not, it would fail on the merits. CCSD did not fail to accommodate
Lewis because it provided the only accommodation she requested.
AFFIRMED.
3