Alisa Apps v. Universal Music Group, Inc. ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAR 30 2020
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ALISA APPS,                                      No.   18-15889
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No.
    2:16-cv-01132-JAD-NJK
    v.
    UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, INC.;                     MEMORANDUM*
    ISLAND RECORDS; JOHN NEWMAN;
    STEVE BOOKER,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ALISA APPS,                                      No.   18-15987
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                D.C. No.
    2:16-cv-01132-JAD-NJK
    v.
    UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    ISLAND RECORDS; JOHN NEWMAN;
    STEVE BOOKER,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 23, 2020**
    Las Vegas, Nevada
    Before: W. FLETCHER, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff Alissa Apps, a singer-songwriter, brought suit under the Copyright
    Act, 
    17 U.S.C. § 101
     et seq., alleging that the following defendants copied her song
    “Need to Know”: John Newman (singer of “Love Me Again,” the allegedly
    infringing song), Steve Booker (the song’s producer), Island Records (owner of the
    copyright to the allegedly infringing song and producer of the album containing the
    song), and Universal Music Group, Inc. (“UMGI”) (“a holding company [which]
    does not create, develop, perform, market, sell, distribute, or exploit recorded
    music or musical compositions”). A summons was issued for each defendant, but
    only UMGI was served, leaving UMGI as the sole defendant.
    The district court granted summary judgment as well as costs and attorneys’
    fees to UMGI. UMGI appeals, contending that its award of costs and attorneys’
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2
    fees should have been larger. Apps also appeals, contending that no costs and
    attorneys’ fees should have been awarded at all. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    A district court’s award and calculation of attorneys’ fees under the
    Copyright Act are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Maljack Productions, Inc. v.
    GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 
    81 F.3d 881
    , 889 (9th Cir. 1996). “Reasonable”
    fees may be awarded to the prevailing party under § 505. In reviewing that award,
    we consider the following factors: the degree of success obtained, frivolousness of
    the claim, motivation behind the claim, the objective reasonableness of the losing
    party’s factual and legal arguments, the need to advance considerations of
    compensation and deterrence, and the purpose of the Copyright Act. Id. at 890–91;
    Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
    136 S. Ct. 1979
    , 1986–87 (2016).
    Apps pursued litigation against UMGI even after she could have discerned
    “that UMGI was not a proper defendant because it is merely a holding company
    that transacts no business. ” “At the very least,” the district court explained, “she
    could have heeded the deposition testimony of UMG Recordings, Inc.’s in-house
    counsel and secretary Sheryl Gold, who testified unequivocally and repeatedly that
    UMGI is a holding company that has no business operations, engages in no
    transactions, and does not exploit music in any way.”
    3
    After the district court granted summary judgment, UMGI requested
    $127,658.94 in costs and attorneys’ fees, the amount incurred over “the entire life
    of this case.” But the district court only granted $41,955 in fees and $946.23 in
    costs, the amount incurred after Sheryl Gold’s deposition. The court explained, “I
    find UMGI is entitled to an award of the attorney’s fees and costs that it incurred
    after it became clear that UMGI was not the proper defendant—which occurred at
    the latest at the February 2017 deposition of UMGI’s person most knowledgeable.”
    The district court carefully considered the Fogerty and Kirtsaeng factors and
    outlined its reasoning in detail. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
    concluding that “it was unreasonable for Apps to maintain this suit only after she
    deposed Ms. Gold.” Its award of attorneys’ fees and costs for UMGI’s expenses
    after the deposition was proper.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-15889

Filed Date: 3/30/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/30/2020