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 2021-01

Tyrone Nall v. Shelley Williams ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
JAN 27 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TYRONE T.H. NALL,                               No. 19-16894
Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:18-cv-00281-RCJ-WGC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SHELLEY WILLIAMS; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 20, 2021**
Before:      McKEOWN, CALLAHAN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Tyrone T.H. Nall appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging a due process
claim arising from an alleged miscalculation of his parole eligibility date. We have
jurisdiction under
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo the district court’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr.,
    849 F.3d 1204
    ,
1208 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Nall’s Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim because Nall failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
claim. See Swarthout v. Cooke,
    562 U.S. 216
    , 219 (2011) (when analyzing a due
process claim, “[w]e first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of
which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures
followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient”); Moor v. Palmer,
    603 F.3d 658
    , 661 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Nevada’s statutory parole scheme . . . expressly
disclaims any intent to create a liberty interest.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Nall’s related state law claims. See
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c)(3); Ove v. Gwinn,
    264 F.3d 817
    , 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review;
court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims once it
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright,
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
2                                     19-16894