Lance Britton v. Klamath County ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 16 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LANCE ALLEN BRITTON, No. 19-35782
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:15-cv-02086-CL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KLAMATH COUNTY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 2, 2020**
Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Lance Allen Britton appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional violations. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391
F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment); Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal on the basis of absolute immunity). We
affirm. The district court properly dismissed Britton’s claims against defendants
Patridge and Vaughan because Patridge and Vaughn are entitled to prosecutorial
immunity. See Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth the scope of prosecutorial immunity).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Britton’s Fourth
Amendment claim because the claim is time-barred. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1)
(providing a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Douglas v.
Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the statute of
limitations for a § 1983 claim is the state law statute of limitations for personal
injury cases).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Britton’s false
arrest and malicious prosecutions claims because Britton failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether there was no probable cause for his arrest.
See Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014, n.1 (9th Cir. 2015) (the
absence of probable cause is an essential element of a § 1983 false arrest claim);
Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (a
malicious prosecution claim requires the absence of probable cause; a grand jury
indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Britton’s
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Fourteenth Amendment claim based on his pre-trial detention because Britton
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his confinement put
him at a substantial risk of suffering serious harm. See Castro v. v. County of Los
Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (a pre-trial detainee
bringing a Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim must
demonstrate that the conditions “put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering
serious harm”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Britton’s
supervisory liability claims against defendants Rowley, Davidson, and Skrah
because Britton failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
these defendants were personally involved in any constitutional violations, or
engaged in any wrongful acts causally connected to any constitutional violations.
See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a
defendant may only be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 where the
defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation, or where the
defendant’s wrongful acts are causally connected to the violation).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Britton’s
municipal liability claim because Britton failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the county maintained a custom or policy that inflicted
any constitutional injury. See Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776,
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802-03 (9th Cir. 2018) (requirements for municipal liability under § 1983).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Britton’s motions
for appointment of counsel because Britton failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (standard
of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
We reject as without merit Britton’s contentions that the magistrate judge
engaged in misconduct.
We do not consider arguments or allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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