Maria Rodriguez v. N.H. Ball Bearings, Inc. ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 21 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIA RODRIGUEZ, an individual, No. 19-55087
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-03876-R-AS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NEW HAMPSHIRE BALL BEARINGS,
INC., a New Hampshire corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 10, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and COGAN,*** District Judge.
Maria Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) appeals the district court’s grant on
summary judgment of her claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Brian M. Cogan, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940, in favor of her former employer, New
Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc. (“NHBB”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We affirm.
For more than two decades, Rodriguez worked in assembly at one of
NHBB’s manufacturing facilities in California. After experiencing symptoms of
depression, anxiety, and panic attacks, she took medical leave in April 2015. Over
the course of a year, she extended her medical leave until NHBB informed her that
it could not guarantee a position for her when she was well enough to return to
work. NHBB told Rodriguez that her position was no longer available and asked
her to provide a doctor’s note clearing her to return to work. Rodriguez never
submitted such a note and did not return to her former position. In 2018,
Rodriguez filed suit against NHBB, alleging violations of the FEHA. NHBB
removed the case to federal court, and the district court granted summary judgment
in NHBB’s favor. This appeal followed.
First, Rodriguez argues that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment in NHBB’s favor. She brought two claims under the FEHA: (1) failure
to provide reasonable accommodation, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m); and (2)
failure to engage in an interactive process, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n). We
review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v.
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Phattey, 943 F.3d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 2019).
Under the FEHA, an employee bears the burden of proving that she was a
“qualified individual” who could perform the essential functions of her job with or
without reasonable accommodation. Green v. State, 165 P.3d 118, 123 (Cal.
2007). Here, Rodriguez did not meet her burden because she could not rebut her
own doctor’s testimony that she was not cleared to return to work by April 10,
2016, the date she alleged that she was able and willing to return. In a deposition,
Dr. Watkins testified: “[i]f I had intended for her to return to work, I would have
also said, ‘I release her to return to work on such-and-such date.’”
Because Rodriguez could not show that she was a “qualified individual”
under the FEHA, the district court properly granted summary judgment in NHBB’s
favor with respect to Rodriguez’s reasonable accommodation claim. See Atkins v.
City of Los Angeles, 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 113, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (“[A] claim
for failure to accommodate under section 12940, subdivision (m), requires the
plaintiff to show that he or she is a ‘qualified individual’ under FEHA.”). And
because Rodriguez only raised her interactive process claim for the first time in
opposition to NHBB’s motion for summary judgment, that claim is waived.1 See
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Even absent waiver by Rodriguez, she could not show that she was cleared to
return to work. NHBB could not have reasonably accommodated her, so her claim
also fails on the merits. Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr.
3d 190, 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
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Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2006).
Second, Rodriguez argues that the district court should have allowed her to
depose NHBB’s senior human resources manager, Donna Marcinkowski
(“Marcinkowski”), before summary judgment. We review a district court’s refusal
to permit additional discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)
for an abuse of discretion. See IMDb.com Inc. v. Becerra, 962 F.3d 1111, 1127
(9th Cir. 2020). A district court abuses its discretion only “if the movant diligently
pursued its previous discovery opportunities, and if the movant can show how
allowing additional discovery would have precluded summary judgment.” See id.(quoting Qualls v. Blue Cross of Cal., 22 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis
in original)).
We see no abuse of discretion here. Rodriguez did not show that taking
Marcinkowski’s deposition would have precluded summary judgment. She merely
“expressed the hope that evidence to contradict [Marcinkowski’s declaration]
would transpire at deposition.” Cont’l Mar. of S.F., Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal
Trades Dis. Council, 817 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1987).
Finally, Rodriguez contends that the district court erred in relying on Dr.
Watkins’ testimony to find that Rodriguez was not a “qualified individual” under
the FEHA. According to Rodriguez, the district court should not have allowed
NHBB to introduce new evidence for the first time on reply in support of its
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summary judgment motion. But because Rodriguez failed to object before the
district court, this argument is waived. See Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2018) (“If a party does not object to or
challenge the improper submission of new evidence before the district court, the
party who fails to object has ‘waived any challenge on the admissibility of [the]
evidence.’”) (quoting Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 868 (9th Cir. 2011)).
AFFIRMED.
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