Janice Dickinson v. Ryan Seacrest Enterprises Inc. ( 2020 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 21 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JANICE DICKINSON, an individual, No. 19-55415
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:18-cv-02544-GW-JPR
v.
RYAN SEACREST ENTERPRISES INC., MEMORANDUM*
a California corporation; SUN
PRODUCTIONS, LLC, a Limited
Liability Company Erroneously Sued As
Suns Productions LLC,
Defendants,
and
TRULY ORIGINAL, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 2, 2020**
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: LIPEZ,*** RAWLINSON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Janice Dickinson (Dickinson) appeals the district court’s dismissal
of her Lanham Act and state law claims against Appellees Ryan Seacrest
Enterprises Inc., Truly Original, LLC, Sun Productions, LLC, Tess Cannon,
NBCUniversal Media, LLC, Erik Rosette, Ryan Seacrest Productions, LLC, and
Suns Productions, LLC based on her portrayal in the reality television series, Shahs
of Sunset (Shahs). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de
novo the district court’s order of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1151
(9th Cir. 2019).
When an allegedly infringing use of a mark is an expressive work, we apply
the test from Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), to determine
whether the Lanham Act applies. See Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire
Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 2017). Despite Dickinson’s contrary
arguments, the only requirement for application of Rogers is that “the [Appellees]
. . . make a threshold legal showing that [their] allegedly infringing use [was] part
of an expressive work protected by the First Amendment.” Gordon v. Drape
***
The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, United States Circuit Judge for the
First Circuit, sitting by designation.
2
Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 264 (9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). Dickinson
concedes that “a ‘reality’ television episode is an ‘expressive work.’” Thus,
Appellees made the threshold legal showing that the allegedly infringing use of the
mark in the Shahs episode was “part of an expressive work protected by the First
Amendment.” Id. Accordingly, we apply the Rogers test to ascertain the viability
of Dickinson’s Lanham Act claims arising out of the episode of Shahs and the
related advertisements. See Empire, 875 F.3d at 1196-97.
To succeed under the Rogers test, the “creator’s use of the mark [must be]
explicitly misleading as to source or content.” Gordon, 909 F.3d at 269 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases added). Dickinson argues that
the Appellees’ use of her mark was explicitly misleading as to source and content.
We disagree. First, under Rogers, we ask whether Dickinson’s appearance on an
episode of the series would “explicitly mislead consumers” into thinking that
Dickinson endorsed or sponsored Shahs—i.e., we consider whether use of the mark
“explicitly [misled] consumers” as to the source of the work. Brown v. Elec. Arts,
Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation, alterations, and internal
quotation marks omitted). There must be “an explicit indication, overt claim, or
explicit misstatement” that causes consumer confusion. Id. at 1245 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
3
Dickinson maintains that Appellees exploited her mark to promote the Shahs
series by taking advantage of the accumulated goodwill from her career as a
supermodel. Dickinson did not allege that the Shahs episode or the promotional
materials for that episode contained an explicit representation that Dickinson was
an endorser or sponsor of the series. Rather, Dickinson alleged only that she made
an appearance on the show. See id. (stating that “the mere use of a trademark alone
cannot suffice to make such use explicitly misleading”) (citation omitted). Thus,
Dickinson failed to allege that Appellees’ use of the mark is explicitly misleading
as to source or sponsorship.
Second, Dickinson argues that Appellees’ use of the mark explicitly
misleads consumers as to the content of the episode. Dickinson contends the
following two alleged false representations act together to deceive consumers into
believing the romper controversy actually occurred: (1) that Shahs is unscripted
and portrays real-life events; and (2) in the episode, Dickinson stole the romper
and had a confrontation with a Shahs cast member related to the romper. Under
Rogers, the relevant inquiry is not simply whether the content or advertisements
are misleading, but whether the Appellees’ use of the mark explicitly misleads
consumers as to the content of the work. See id. at 1239.
4
Considered individually or collectively, the alleged misrepresentations do
not explicitly mislead consumers as to the content of the episode. Indeed, as the
district court recognized with respect to the first alleged misrepresentation,
Dickinson’s “mark has no bearing on whether or not Bravo advertises [its] show as
a scripted series or reality television.” With respect to the second category of
misrepresentations, the identified clips and equivocal statements containing the
mark accurately portray the content of the episode. Even considered collectively,
the alleged misrepresentations do not explicitly mislead consumers but, only
implicitly suggest that the romper controversy actually occurred. Therefore,
because Dickinson’s allegation did not state a plausible Lanham Act claim, the
district court correctly dismissed the claims predicated on the Lanham Act and the
remaining state law claims. See Lima v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 947 F.3d
1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the district court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, when no federal claims
remain).
AFFIRMED.1
1
Because our resolution of the Lanham Act claims is dispositive, we need
not and do not address any other issues raised by the parties. See Marder v. Lopez,
450 F.3d 445, 454 (9th Cir. 2006).
5