Sustretovas v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                       FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MAR 14 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    VIKTORAS SUSTRETOVAS,                          No. 21-1078
    Petitioner,                      Agency No.      A055-049-372
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 10, 2023**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: FRIEDLAND, R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, CARDONE, *** District
    Judge
    Petitioner Viktoras Sustretovas petitions for review of an order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ)
    denial of his application for withholding of removal under the Immigration and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
    precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for
    the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    Nationality Act (INA). We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , Wang v.
    Sessions, 
    861 F.3d 1003
    , 1007 (9th Cir. 2017), and we deny the petition.1
    When the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and law rather than
    adopting the IJ’s decision, we review the decision of the Board, “except to the
    extent [that] the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 
    204 F.3d 985
    , 990 (9th Cir. 2000).
    To demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal, an applicant must
    demonstrate that a protected ground is at least “a reason” for the harm he will
    likely suffer. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 
    846 F.3d 351
    , 359–60 (9th Cir.
    2017). We review the agency’s findings of fact regarding the motivations of the
    applicant’s persecutors for substantial evidence. Parussimova v. Mukasey, 
    555 F.3d 734
    , 739 (9th Cir. 2009). Under this standard, an agency’s findings of fact
    are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
    conclude to the contrary.” Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 
    25 F.4th 742
    , 748 (9th
    Cir. 2022) (quoting Zehatye v. Gonzales, 
    453 F.3d 1182
    , 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)).
    We do not need to address the merits of the IJ’s adverse credibility finding
    1
    Sustretovas’s opening brief does not raise a claim for relief under the
    Convention Against Torture (CAT). Thus, this claim is waived on appeal, and
    we do not address it. Sung Kil Jang v. Lynch, 
    812 F.3d 1187
    , 1189 n.1 (9th Cir.
    2015). Additionally, Sustretovas failed to appeal the IJ’s determination that he is
    ineligible for asylum due to his conviction for an aggravated felony offense;
    therefore, he failed to administratively exhaust the issue under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (d)(1).
    2
    because the Board’s conclusion that, even crediting his testimony,2 Sustretovas
    failed to establish eligibility for relief on account of a protected ground is
    supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 
    841 F.3d 1077
    , 1081 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The lack of a nexus to a protected ground is
    dispositive of [petitioner’s] asylum and withholding of removal claims.”); Hose
    v. INS, 
    180 F.3d 992
    , 995 n.2. (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to decide issue
    unnecessary to case resolution); 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42).
    Even assuming Sustretovas did not forfeit through lack of adequate
    briefing a challenge to the BIA’s holding that the harm he fears lacks a nexus to
    a protected ground, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Sustretovas
    failed to provide any objective direct or circumstantial evidence that he suffered
    persecution on account of any political opinion or particular social group. INS v.
    Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 483 (1992); Sharma v. Garland, 
    9 F.4th 1052
    , 1060
    (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that persecution is an extreme concept meaning
    “something considerably more than discrimination or harassment,” and not
    “every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive” (quotation marks and
    citations omitted)).
    Sustretovas did not testify that he himself holds any political opinion or
    was harmed based off one imputed to him because of any disagreement with the
    2
    Given that we need not reach Sustretovas’s challenge to IJ’s the adverse
    credibility determination, we do not consider the part of that challenge arguing
    that the IJ’s approach to evaluating Sustretovas’s credibility violated due
    process.
    3
    Lithuanian government. He testified that as a child he was approached by a
    Lithuanian skinhead group and was beaten up when he refused to join them;
    however, he pointed to no evidence that this was due to any political opinion. See
    Zetino v. Holder, 
    622 F.3d 1007
    , 1011 (9th Cir. 2010).
    Sustretovas also fails to assert any harm on account of alleged mixed
    ethnicity. His father, who is ethnically Russian, testified before the IJ that he
    suffered extortion after opening a small car repair garage shop, but there is no
    evidence that this was on account of either his or Sustretovas’s ethnicity.
    PETITION DENIED.3
    3
    The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The
    motion for a stay of removal is otherwise denied.
    4