Ramos-Mejia v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION                       FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAR 14 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CAROLINA ERLINDA RAMOS-                        No. 21-102
    MEJIA, et al.,
    Agency Nos.    A209-227-127
    Petitioners,                                     A209-227-128
    A209-227-129
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 09, 2023**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: FRIEDLAND and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,***
    Judge.
    Petitioner Carolina Ramos-Mejia1 seeks review of a final order of removal
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
    precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court
    of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    1
    Ms. Ramos-Mejia is the lead petitioner, and her two minor children are
    derivative beneficiaries of her application for asylum. All references to Petitioner
    are to the lead petitioner, unless otherwise indicated.
    issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed
    Ramos-Mejia’s appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying her
    applications for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and
    Nationality Act and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , Wang v. Sessions, 
    861 F.3d 1003
    , 1007 (9th Cir. 2017), and we deny the petition.
    We review factual findings for substantial evidence. 
    Id.
     “[T]o reverse such
    a finding, we must find that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion,
    but compels it.” 
    Id.
     (cleaned up). We cannot “substitute an analysis of which
    side in the factual dispute we find more persuasive.” Cruz-Navarro v. INS, 
    232 F.3d 1024
    , 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Marcu v. INS, 
    147 F.3d 1078
    , 1082 (9th
    Cir. 1998)). And “[w]hen the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and
    law rather than adopting the IJ’s decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s
    decision, except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Shrestha
    v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    1.     The BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that Ramos-Mejia’s asylum
    and withholding of removal claims failed because she failed to show a sufficient
    nexus between past or future harm and a protected ground. Substantial evidence
    supports that conclusion.2 Ramos-Mejia argues that she was persecuted because
    2
    Ramos-Mejia also contends that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s conclusion
    that Ramos-Mejia failed to assert membership in a particular social group. We
    2
    of her status as a member of her former partner’s family. Her former partner’s
    work involved investigating gangs, and Ramos-Mejia contends that she was
    persecuted by gang members because of their familial status She testified,
    however, that a gang member called and threatened her because he knew she had
    received a bank loan and wanted her to pay him money. Additionally, although
    she testified that her former partner’s brother was killed, she also stated that she
    believed that the brother was involved in criminal activities himself, and that this
    may have been the reason for his killing. Given the potential alternative motives
    indicated by Ramos-Mejia’s testimony, the record does not compel the
    conclusion that membership in the family was one central reason, or even a
    reason, that she was threatened. See Santos-Ponce v. Wilkinson, 
    987 F.3d 886
    ,
    890–91 (9th Cir. 2021).
    2.     Ramos-Mejia also challenges the BIA’s denial of her CAT claim.
    Relief under CAT requires a showing that the petitioner will (1) more likely than
    not be tortured in the country of removal and (2) “that the torture would be
    inflicted with government acquiescence.” Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 
    25 F.4th 742
    , 748 (9th Cir. 2022); 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (c)(4). There is no evidence that
    Ramos-Mejia will be tortured upon removal and no evidence suggesting that the
    need not decide this issue, however, because the BIA appropriately concluded
    that, even assuming the family social group was cognizable, there was no
    showing of nexus between any past or future harm and that group. See Andia v.
    Ashcroft, 
    359 F.3d 1181
    , 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In reviewing the decision of
    the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.”).
    3
    Salvadorian government would consent or acquiesce in any torture. In fact, the
    evidence that her former partner investigates and places gang members in jail
    bolsters this conclusion. The agency therefore did not err in denying CAT relief.
    PETITION DENIED.
    4